Shane Ryan

This paper makes the case for what we call ‘logic-checking’. The paper begins by providing an overview of the development of fact-checking and of how fact-checking functions. As part of this discussion, we identify some limitations of fact-checking, including its reliance on testimony to function as intended. Such considerations, we argue, motivate logic-checking, which, when well articulated, can demonstrate that a piece of reasoning is flawed to an audience. What logic-checking involves is set out and examples of logic-checking are provided. The objection that experts in informal logic conducting logic-checking will be biased, thus undermining the whole enterprise, is considered and rejected.

This chapter examines the notion of “trustworthy AI”. While various public policy documents, industry leaders, and scholars, including philosophers, use the term, on the other hand, various other philosophers have challenged the use of the term. This chapter presents challenges to the use of the term, largely based on the claim that in order for one to be trustworthy, one must be an agent and AIs are not agents. This is done by introducing a goodwill account of trust. Drawing on this account, the case is later made that while trusting an AI is conceptually possible, the agency required for having goodwill means that plausibly the current state of technology is such that “trustworthy AI” doesn’t make sense. The chapter also engages with alternative approaches to explaining the notion of trustworthy AI, including the position that adopting a stance of trust to general AI is no less reasonable than adopting a stance of trust to human persons. I argue that consideration of this position can motivate a revision in how we see trust in human relations.

Can we see AI as a testifier? Or can it be no more than a tool? Earlier (Ryan, S., Mi, C., & Mizumoto, M. (2020). Testimony, credit, and blame. Ethno-epistemology: New directions for global epistemology. Routledge), conducted a cross-cultural study to empirically examine the Credit View of Knowledge, using Lackey’s Chicago Visitor case. Building on that study, we examined the patterns of people’s testimonial knowledge attribution by comparing a case in which the true belief of an agent is based on the testimony of a human and a case in which it is based on the “testimony” of an AI assistant. We found that people responded differently to the two cases, especially in their reasons for attributing knowledge to the recipient of testimony, differentiating the epistemic role of the recipient of testimony in the two cases, suggesting that for ordinary people, AI is more like a tool than an agent—an important consideration for trust attributions. We discuss what our findings can tell us about the influence of AI on human relations. In particular, we are interested in how increased use of AI as an information source will influence knowledge attributions of humans as testifiers. Also, concerning the Credit View, insofar as the folk notion of credit is concerned, Lackey was right and knowledge is possible without credit, but our results may still be consistent with the Credit View if we reinterpret the notion of credit based on the notions of reliability and proper method, as diverging depending on whether the testifier is a human or an AI. Moreover, we found some important cultural differences, which deserve independent attention and discussion.

This paper makes the case that a prima facie wrongness of swearing is due to the wrongness of disrespecting another person’s autonomy. This disrespect is manifested in the imposition of swearing and inhibiting reflective capacities, which is a consequence of swearing. In order to make this case, we start by defining and contrasting swearing with nearby concepts, as well as reviewing existing literature on swearing’s wrongness, which has tended to focus on offensiveness. Dual process theory is set out as it forms an important component of our account of swearing’s wrongness. In order to explain this wrongness, however, we first have to explain the wrongness of imposition and how this is connected to dual process theory. We explain how swearing evokes Type 1 cognitive processes in hearers and the threat this poses to autonomy. We elaborate on the boundaries of the wrongness of swearing by consideration of some final examples.

This paper makes the case for what we call ‘logic-checking’. The paper begins by providing an overview of the development of fact-checking and of how fact-checking functions. As part of this discussion, we identify some limitations of fact-checking, including its reliance on testimony to function as intended. Such considerations, we argue, motivate logic-checking, which, when well articulated, can demonstrate that a piece of reasoning is flawed to an audience. What logic-checking involves is set out and examples of logic-checking are provided. The objection that experts in informal logic conducting logic-checking will be biased, thus undermining the whole enterprise, is considered and rejected.

In this paper we argue that we have reason to use epistemic nudges to correct for biases influencing perceptions of normative expectations. There is a broad consensus in the literature on social norms that individuals’ normative behaviours are fundamentally conditional on normative (and empirical) expectations. Expectations are a sub-set of beliefs, hence normative expectations have an epistemic aspect. Our paper focuses on normative expectation which refers to an individual’s second-order belief about what most other people in her community believe she ought to do. Normative expectations can be influenced by various forms of bias which can lead individuals to overestimate or underestimate the prevalence or strength of certain norms in their community, or to conform to norms that do not provide social benefit. We propose using epistemic nudges to produce accurate normative expectations in those nudgees. We examine the sort of epistemic nudges that could do so by enabling better presentation and transparency of information.

This paper argues that a wise person is an intellectually virtuous person. The intellectual virtue requirement is explained as a necessary condition for wisdom, intuitively the highest epistemic good. This provides an answer to Duncan Pritchard’s question as to the significance of the intellectual virtues for the epistemological project. In other words, the requirement explains why the intellectual virtues are central to the concerns of epistemology. The paper starts by providing an overview of intellectual virtue. An overview of recent analytic philosophical literature on wisdom is set out. This discussion leads to the claim that the wise person understands how to live well. The claim that intellectual virtues are required for understanding how to live well is then examined. The case is made that understanding how to live well in a modally robust way requires possession of the intellectual virtues.

I make the case that what gets called epistemic paternalism isn’t correctly labelled as such. This mislabelling is problematic for two reasons. First, paternalism in general faces strong challenges to its permissibility. Second, the scope for action of epistemic paternalism is somewhat narrow given the typical concerns of applied epistemology. Having clarified epistemic paternalism and discussed the above considerations, this paper introduces epistemic benevolence. The case is made that the epistemic benevolence-based approach can avoid some of the strong challenges that epistemic paternalism faces and is often more suitable for the concerns of applied epistemology than a paternalist approach. To make these points, first, I make the case for a particular analysis of the epistemic paternalist act and, second, I explain epistemically benevolent acts as acts motivated by a concern for the epistemic welfare of another agent or agents. Given this characterisation, I argue that epistemic benevolence includes epistemic paternalism but extends beyond epistemic paternalism. I consider an objection to epistemic benevolence, which motivates laissez faire epistemic liberalism, a rival theoretical approach. Outlining this alternative serves to provide a further theoretical option relevant for work in applied epistemology. I offer some considerations as to why epistemic benevolence approach should still be favoured.

This paper proposes epistemic environmentalism as a novel framework for accounting for the contribution of the environment – broadly construed – to epistemic standings and which can be used to improve or protect epistemic environments. The contribution of the environment to epistemic standings is explained through recent developments in epistemology and cognitive science, including embodied cognition, embedded cognition, extended cognition and distributed cognition. The paper examines how these developments support epistemic environmentalism, as well as contributes theoretical resources to make epistemic assessments of dynamic environments. The epistemic environmentalist procedure from the assessment of an individual environment to changes made to that environment based on promoting the attainment of epistemic goods is also discussed.

This paper explores the prospects for a Pritchardean epistemological disjunctivist account of memory knowledge. We begin by providing an overview of Duncan Pritchard's epistemological disjunctivist account of perceptual knowledge, as well as the theoretical advantages of such an account. Drawing on that account, we present and motivate our own Pritchardean epistemological disjunctivist account of memory knowledge. After distinguishing different sorts of memory and the different roles that memory can play in knowledge acquisition, we set out our account and argue that the case for epistemological disjunctivism enjoys parity with the case for epistemological disjunctivism of perceptual knowledge. We also consider objections to our account. The first is from Joe Milburn and Andrew Moon, who argue against a general epistemological disjunctivism of memory on the basis of differences in memory types. The second objection arises from a Radford-like case whereby one's true belief is from memory even though one lacks rational support that is reflectively accessible to one.

The chapter begins by providing an overview of epistemic environmentalism, a meta-theory in applied epistemology. The Greater Value Thesis and the Greater Value Activism Thesis are offered in support of epistemic environmentalism. This leads to a discussion of the significance of epistemic value theory to epistemic environmentalism. Based on this examination, the case is made for the permissibility of state intervention in the epistemic environment. The permissibility of state intervention in the epistemic environment is defended against two liberal challenges.

This paper aims to address when the wise person should participate in politics. The question is addressed through engagement with the Analects. Rather than provide interpretations of key terms in the Analects, we provide an account of wisdom that draws from themes in the Analects. The case is made that the wise person is committed to participating in politics primarily because of the connection between wisdom and benevolence (ren 仁 in the Analects). We address challenges to the Confucian approach from the Zhuangzi concerning the potential harms of political participation. General political disengagement is not considered exemplary on the Confucian approach to wisdom, although when political engagement may be eschewed is explored. Finally, the case is made that while ren motivates the wise to participate politically, the wise also have a sense of timeliness that provides guidance as to when to refrain or withdraw from political participation.

Three key components of a legal case are evidence, fact and judgement. In a well conducted judgement there will be an appropriate relation between these three components. Epistemologists investigating the nature of knowledge have been concerned with an analogous three components and their relation. More specifically, epistemologists have been concerned with justification, truth, and belief and how these three components need to be related if there is to be knowledge. Given the analogy, the research of epistemologists plausibly has insights to offer to legal theorists. In fact, as we shall see, what epistemology have to offer legal theory actually goes beyond this as well.

This paper examines ordinary people’s responses to Jennifer Lackey’s Chicago Visitor case. In particular it examines responses regarding the case from participants with Taiwanese backgrounds and US backgrounds. The Chicago Visitor case is one of the most influential cases in epistemology in recent years and plays a significant role in a number of debates in epistemology. First, the case is used to suggest that the Credit View is mistaken. Second, the case seems to pose a problem for a virtue epistemological account of the nature of knowledge. Our paper explores these points in relation to our survey results, which show that participants believe that the protagonist in the case does have knowledge and that the protagonist deserves some credit for his true belief. Our aim in this paper, however, isn’t only to discover evidence bearing on the discussion of the Chicago Visitor case and cross cultural differences related to that case, we are also interested in what else the case might tell us about epistemic agency. For this reason we also asked participants to tell us to what extent they thought that the protagonist would be at fault in a case in which their belief turned out to be false. Here most of the participants found that the protagonist would indeed bear some fault in such circumstances. Our survey results also show, however, that participants of US background tend to be likely to attribute less fault to the testimonial recipient in bad testimonial cases, than their Taiwanese counterparts. More generally, we explore what the result regarding fault can tell us about epistemic agency.

This paper explores the prospects for a Pritchardean epistemological disjunctivist account of memory knowledge. We begin by providing an overview of Duncan Pritchard's epistemological disjunctivist account of perceptual knowledge, as well as the theoretical advantages of such an account. Drawing on that account, we present and motivate our own Pritchardean epistemological disjunctivist account of memory knowledge. After distinguishing different sorts of memory and the different roles that memory can play in knowledge acquisition, we set out our account and argue that the case for epistemological disjunctivism enjoys parity with the case for epistemological disjunctivism of perceptual knowledge. We also consider objections to our account. The first is from Joe Milburn and Andrew Moon, who argue against a general epistemological disjunctivism of memory on the basis of differences in memory types. The second objection arises from a Radford-like case whereby one's true belief is from memory even though one lacks rational support that is reflectively accessible to one.

In this response to Pritchard’s “In Defence of Veritism”, I defend the view that it is wisdom rather than truth that is fundamental in epistemology. Given that recent philosophical discussions of the nature of wisdom may be unfamiliar to some epistemologists, a brief overview of these discussions is provided and that which is relevant for the subsequent discussion in this piece is highlighted. I explain that scholars working on the topic tend to accept that wisdom comprises at least one familiar epistemic standing and that, unlike other epistemic goods, wisdom is thought to be tied to a narrowly specified content. I clarify the philosophical question to which veritism is the proposed answer and clarify the different senses of fundamental in play in that question. As Pritchard points out, fundamentality in epistemology concern both conceptual and axiological claims. Next, I explicate Pritchard’s veritism, his defence of the claim that truth is fundamental in epistemology, explaining the case made for it’s superiority over the considered alternatives. One alternative I consider is that there is no fundamental good in epistemology, either conceptually or axiologically. I examine whether Pritchard can reject truth equality successfully while maintaining his monism with regard to what he takes to be epistemically fundamental. Indeed, while Pritchard’s appeal to the intellectually virtuous inquirer here seems appropriate, his view that this ultimately provides support to his truth monism is less convincing for reasons that will be explored. I follow up this discussion by arguing that an appeal to the intellectually virtuous agent better lends support to wisdom as epistemically fundamental, rather than Pritchard’s veritism. I make the point that Pritchard’s claim that the intellectually virtuous agent loves the truth is plausible but I question whether it’s also plausible that the love of the intellectually virtuous agent stops at the truth. Rather, I claim that such an agent ultimately loves wisdom. In fact, wisdom seems likely to be the highest good prized by the intellectually virtuous agent – the good that they strive to attain or become better with regard to across a lifetime. In support of this claim, I point out that wisdom is the most prized of all epistemic goods.

I argue that if we accept the promotion of autonomy as an aim of education, then we should accept the promotion of skillful reflection as an aim of education. I set out the Dual Process Hypothesis of Reflection (DPHR), according to which both Type 1 and Type 2 cognitive processes play a role in an agent’s reflection. Next, I discuss how an agent’s reflection may be skillful, and how such reflection contributes to superior autonomy. I argue, however, that on the DPHR, skillful reflection, and so the superior sort of autonomy, is not cultivated by staying neutral on the good. The cultivation of autonomy, and so reflection, requires the training of what is worthy of reflection.

The chapter begins by providing an overview of epistemic environmentalism, a meta-theory in applied epistemology. The Greater Value Thesis and the Greater Value Activism Thesis are offered in support of epistemic environmentalism. This leads to a discussion of the significance of epistemic value theory to epistemic environmentalism. Based on this examination, the case is made for the permissibility of state intervention in the epistemic environment. The permissibility of state intervention in the epistemic environment is defended against two liberal challenges.

There is a well-established literature on the ethics of belief. Our beliefs, however, are just one aspect of our intellectual lives with which epistemology should be concerned. I make the case that epistemologists should be concerned with an ethics of intellectual agency rather than the narrower category of ethics of belief. Various species of normativity, epistemic, moral, and so on, that may be relevant to the ethics of belief are laid out. An account adapted from virtue ethics for an ethics that goes beyond the ethics of belief is defended. The main claim advanced here is that we should act as the virtuous agent would characteristically act in the circumstances. This claim is supported with reference to a number of examples, as well as considerations informing virtue ethics. An acknowledged feature of this account is that it provides limited guidance regarding right action in intellectual agency. While the account draws on virtue responsibilism to offer guidance, the case is made that it’s a mistake to think that an account in this area can provide a successful decision procedure.

This article makes the case that a deficit or absence of trust in media sources to report on news- worthy items facilitates acceptance of fake news. The article begins by identifying the sort of fake news that is of interest for the purposes of this article. Epistemic cove rage is then explained—in particular, how an individual’s expectations about their epistemic environment can lead them to accepting or rejecting claims. The article explains that when an individual believes that main- stream media report on what is deemed newsworthy, it follows that an individual will have grounds to dismiss a newsworthy claim that has not been reported upon—such as a claim made by fake news. Trust—which has both a believed competence requirement and a believed good- will requirement—is then discussed as part of this explanation. The article concludes with a dis- cussion of the implications of the argument for regulating mainstream media.

This essay articulates the contribution that the Zhuangzi can make to contemporary epistemological discussions of wisdom. It suggests that wisdom in the Zhuangzi involves, in part, correctly distinguishing the "heavenly" (or the naturally given) from human artifice. It is important for humanity to understand naturally given conditions (e.g., seasons, climate, forces, mortality) to grasp what is within, and what beyond, our initiatives. To enable this, we need to be openly engaged with the world, rather than approach it with rigid convictions about outcomes or goals. We characterize such openness and readiness to engage as an attitude, that of "epistemic humility." In building up our position, we assess two themes in analytic philosophical debates on wisdom: the epistemic component of wisdom and the domain of wisdom. This helps establish what we believe is an important contribution of the Zhuangzi to the discussion on wisdom, that is, the wise person's epistemic humility.

It has been 46 years since the publication of “Famine, Affluence, and Morality” by Peter Singer. In the paper Singer famously challenges readers to radically change their lives to save the lives of others, often in distant lands. With this paper, Peter Singer, perhaps the most famous living philosopher today, made his name and spawned the field of global justice. Although there have been improvements and successes, easily preventable deaths from poverty still occur in large numbers today. Philosophically the paper has been very influential and continues to generate considerable debate. We return to Singer’s argument in “Famine, Affluence, and Morality” and make the case that the argument is incomplete in that while Singer’s position that we are morally obliged to help relieve famine, hunger, and so on is supported by his argument, his position that we act all things considered is not.

Scholars have typically regarded Confucius as an ethical thinker broadly construed and not as an epistemological thinker. This chapter seeks to overturn that view and, in doing so, has three basic goals. The first goal is to make the case that Confucian thought is of epistemological significance. Goal two is to locate the significance of Confucian thought within epistemology while accounting for the past overlooking of this significance. The third goal is to show that Confucian thought is not only of epistemological significance, but that it can make a contribution to progressing contemporary epistemology.

In this paper, we defend the claim that reflective knowledge is necessary for extended knowledge. We begin by examining a recent account of extended knowledge provided by Palermos and Pritchard (2013). We note a weakness with that account and a challenge facing theorists of extended knowledge. The challenge that we identify is to articulate the extended cognition condition necessary for extended knowledge in such a way as to avoid counterexample from the revamped Careless Math Student and Truetemp cases. We consider but reject Pritchard’s (2012b) epistemological disjunctivism as providing a model for doing so. Instead, we set out an account of reflection informed by Confucianism and dual-process theory. We make the case that reflective knowledge offers a way of overcoming the challenge identified. We show why such knowledge is necessary for extended knowledge, while building on Sosa’s (2012) account of meta-competence.

This chapter focuses on the epistemic significance of Confucian ideas, rather than the ideas of Chinese philosophy more generally. It describes how Confucian philosophy has traditionally been seen by scholars of Chinese philosophy. The chapter introduces the reader to epistemologically significant Confucian ideas. Within the field of virtue epistemology there are two basic strands, virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism. Both have roots in Aristotelian philosophy and have been revived and developed within post-Gettier epistemology. Virtue responsibilists often list and discuss intellectual virtues such as: open-mindedness, conscientiousness, intellectual honesty, fair-mindedness, and inquisitiveness. Virtue responsibilists have tended to focus on the analysis of individual intellectual virtues. The chapter concludes by briefly setting out how our account of skillful reflection, an example of an account informed by Confucian thought, bridges the divide between virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism.