Eric Watkins

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Kants Philosophic des Subjekts. Systematische und entuncklungsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zum Verhältnis von Selbstbewusstsein und Selbslerkennlnis by Heiner F. KlemmeEric WatkinsHeiner F. Klemme. Kants Philosophic des Subjekts. Systematische und entuncklungsgeschichtliche Untersuchungen zum Verhältnis von Selbstbewusstsein und Selbslerkennlnis. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1996. Pp. ix + 430. Cloth, DM 148.In this impressive work Klemme provides a detailed historical account of the development of Kant’s views on self-consciousness from the early 1770s to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. In the first part of his book Klemme considers Kant’s views [End Page 471] in the 1770s as presented in his Inaugural Dissertation, newly available transcripts from his anthropology lectures, the so-called Duisburg Nachlass, and transcripts from his metaphysics lectures. Klemme first (Chapter 1) indicates briefly the place of psychology and anthropology in metaphysics in eighteenth-century Germany and identifies two general types of processes through which it was thought that self-knowledge might be attained. He then (Chapter 2) turns to a discussion of Kant’s project in the early 1770s—basing his philosophy on a spontaneous, free, and self-conscious I—and how it is developed against the background of (i) Kant’s “great light” of 1769, (ii) the awakening out of his “dogmatic slumber,” and (iii) the discovery of antinomial conflict. Klemme’s original thesis is that Moses Mendelssohn’s Phädon (1767) and especially Marcus Herz’s Betrachtungen aus der spekulativen Weltweisheit (1771), as well as Kant’s personal correspondence with these figures, are crucial to understanding how Kant comes to see the deficiencies of his view as presented in the Inaugural Dissertation. Klemme discusses Kant’s “remedy” (in Chapter 3): a new theory of the self, documented in the anthropology transcripts, according to which one has direct intuition of oneself as a simple, spontaneous, immaterial substance. Later in the 1770s (especially as documented in the Duisburg Nachlass) Kant finds himself unable to derive the categories from the self in either rational or empirical psychology and is thus forced to revise his theory in his first Critique.In the second part of his book Klemme discusses Kant’s account of self-consciousness in his Critical period. Accordingly, he presents interpretations of the Transcendental Deduction and the Paralogisms in both editions of the first Critique as well as some of the central theses of Transcendental Idealism. Fundamental to Kant’s theory of self-consciousness in the Critical period is a distinction between self-knowledge and self-awareness. The former is knowledge of the empirical self, whereas the latter is knowledge of the self considered “not as appearance nor as thing in itself” (B423) but rather pre-categorically as an indeterminate existence. With respect to self-knowledge, Klemme argues that Kant adheres to three distinct models from 1781 to 1787. In the first edition of the first Critique Kant endorses the analogy model, according to which the regulative use of reason allows one to connect all of the self’s mental states in inner sense “as if it were a simple substance” (A 672/B 700). By the time of the second edition he adopts the mediation model, according to which “the categories can be applied to inner sense because we can represent time to ourselves only through recourse to outer sense as a line” (240). In the transcripts from his anthropology lectures (as well as in his published Anthropology) Kant seems to adopt a third model of self-knowledge, according to which the categories cannot be applied to inner representations at all; such knowledge amounts to nothing more than a mere history of our representations.Klemme concludes his discussion by considering Kant’s account of self-awareness. Kant is often thought (e.g., by Dieter Henrich) to hold a reflection model, according to which the self literally reflects on itself in self-awareness, giving rise to problems of circularity. Klemme argues against such an interpretation (as well as Manfred Frank’s “intellectual intuition” interpretation) in favor of a view, according to which the self can be determined practically “as a mere intelligence according to the moral law” (395). Such a view is consistent with Kant’s theoretical assertions about...

This is a book about Kant's views on causality as understood in their proper historical context. Specifically, Eric Watkins argues that a grasp of Leibnizian and anti-Leibnizian thought in eighteenth-century Germany helps one to see how the critical Kant argued for causal principles that have both metaphysical and epistemological elements. On this reading Kant's model of causality does not consist of events, but rather of substances endowed with causal powers that are exercised according to their natures and circumstances. This innovative conception of Kant's view of causality casts a light on Kant's philosophical beliefs in general, such as his account of temporality, his explanation of the reconciliation of freedom and determinism, and his response to the skeptical arguments of Hume.