Nancy Jecker

This paper argues that we can see our lives as a snapshot happening now or as a moving picture extending across time. These dual ways of seeing our lives inform how we conceive of the problem of age group justice. A snapshot view sees age group justice as an interpersonal problem between distinct age groups. A moving picture view sees age group justice as a first-person problem of prudential choice. This paper explores these different ways of thinking about age group justice and illustrates them using a principle of respect for human dignity, understood in terms of reasonable support for floor level central human capabilities at each stage of life. I argue that different frames are suitable for different kinds of decisions, and each provides a true, but partial, picture of aging and age group justice.

This paper asks whether adult children have aduty of justice to act as caregivers for theirfrail, elderly parents. I begin (Sections I.and II.) by locating the historical reasons whyrelationships within families were not thoughtto raise issues of justice. I argue that thesereasons are misguided. The paper next presentsspecific examples showing the relevance ofjustice to family relationships. I point outthat in the United States today, the burden ofcaregiving for dependent parents fallsdisproportionately on women (Sections III. andIV.). The paper goes on to use Rawls''theoretical tool of the veil of ignorance toargue that caring for parents should not belinked to a person''s sex and more generally,that there is no duty of justice to assume therole of caregiver for dependent parents(Sections V.). Although justice does notprovide the moral foundations for parent care,I show that it nonetheless places importantlimits on the instinct to care. I concludethat the voice of justice should be audible,and is intrinsically present, withinfamilies.

Norman Daniels' and Daniel Callahan's recent work attempts to develop and deepen theories of justice in order to accommodate intergenerational moral issues. Elsewhere, I have argued that Callahan's arguments furnish inadequate support for the age rationing policy he accepts. This essay therefore examines Daniel's account of age rationing, together with the complex theory of age-group justice that buttresses it. Sections one and two trace the main features of Daniels' prudential lifespan approach. Section three calls into question the theory's conformity to liberal tenets. The next section attempts to show that the outcome of the prudential approach fails to match our considered judgments. The brief final section offers a broader perspective on the task of articulating a liberal theory of age-group justice. Keywords: elderly, age-group justice, biomedical model of disease, rationing, liberalism, distributive justice CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?

In this paper I argue that a narrow view of justice dominates the bioethics literature. I urge a broader view. As bioethicists, we often conceive of justice using a medical model. This model focuses attention at a particular point in time, namely, when someone who is already sick seeks access to scarce or expensive services. A medical model asks how we can fairly distribute those services. The broader view I endorse requires looking upstream, and asking how disease and suffering came about. In contrast to a medical model, a social model of justice considers how social determinants affect the health of a population. For example, social factors such as access to clean drinking water, education, safe workplaces, and police protection, profoundly affect risk for disease and early death. I examine one important social determinant of health, health care coverage, to show the limits of a medical model and the merits of a broader view.

The paper begins by drawing a distinction between “allocation” — the distribution of resources between different categories, and “rationing” — the distribution of scarce resources within a single category. I argue that the current allocation of funds to health care makes some form of rationing unavoidable. The paper next considers proposals by Daniel Callahan and Norman Daniels supporting age rationing publicly-financed life-extending medical care. I provide reasons for doubting that either argument succeeds. The final section of the paper sets forth an alternative approach which holds that if people have any rights to health care, then they have a right to a decent minimum

Stigmatization and sharming of healthcare workers in Japan during the coronavirus 2019 pandemic reveal uniquely Japanese features. Seken, usually translated as ‘social appearance or appearance in the eyes of others,’ is a deep undercurrent woven into the fabric of Japanese life. It has led to providers who become ill with the SARS-CoV-2 virus feeling ashamed, while concealing their conditions from coworkers and public health officials. It also has led to healthcare providers being perceived as polluted and their children being told they were not welcome in schools. Although such experiences are not isolated to Japan and have appeared in other parts of the world, the cultural forces driving them in Japan are unique. Overcoming stigmatization and shaming of Japanese healthcare providers will require concerted efforts to understand cultural barriers and to view such practices as raising human rights issues affecting the safety and well-being of all.

In ‘Nothing to Be Ashamed of: Sex Robots for Older Adults with Disabilities,’1 I make the case that the unwanted absence of sex from a person’s life represents not just a loss of physical pleasure, but a loss of dignity. Since people aged 65 and over suffer disproportionately from disabilities that impair sexual functioning, I focus on this population. Drawing on an analysis of dignity developed at greater length elsewhere,2 I argue that sex robots can help older adults with disabilities and that societies ought to take reasonable steps to make them available to this population. Unlike other assistive technologies, robots invite human-robot relationships and can form close connections with older adults.3 In response to the proposal, four commentators have introduced objections that I address below. Sorell4 argues that people who are young and able-bodied may wish for sex in their lives too and its absence may be a bigger concern for them than for older people. In reply, while my focus is older adults with disabilities that impair sexual function, I also acknowledge that loss of sexual function can occur at any age as …

Growing demand for direct care workers to assist care-dependent elderly people has created an opening for migrant workers from low- income nations to sell their services to middle and high-income nations. Using Singapore as a case example, we draw on capability theory to make the case that receiving nations that import direct care workers should be held to global justice standards that protect workers’ floor level human capabilities. Specifically, we (1) show that Singapore and other receiving nations fail to protect human capabilities at a threshold level required by dignity; (2) identify specific human capabilities placed at risk; and (3) recommend standards for receiving nations that support central capabilities. As populations in both developed and developing nations are rapidly aging, these concerns could not be timelier.

This paper spotlights ways in which sexual capacities relate to central human capabilities, such as the ability to generate a personally meaningful story of one’s life; be physically, mentally and emotionally healthy; experience bodily integrity; affiliate and bond with others; feel and express a range of human emotions; and choose a plan of life. It sets forth a dignity-based argument for affording older people access to sex robots as part of reasonable efforts to support their central human capabilities at a floor level. The argument develops stepwise: (1) first, I dispel ageism and negative stereotypes about later-life sexuality, showing their deep historical roots in medicine and science; (2) second, I set forth a positive argument, grounded in capability accounts of justice, for deploying sex robots for older people with disabilities; (3) finally, after responding to objections, I conclude that sex robots are a reasonable way to support later-life sexuality for persons with disabilities. While often depicted as a product for younger, able-bodied people, this paper is a bid for reimagining sex robots as a product for older, disabled people.

Societal aging raises challenging ethical questions regarding the just distribution of health care between young and old. This article considers a proposal for age-based rationing of health care, which is based on the prudential life span account of justice between age groups. While important objections have been raised against the prudential life span account, it continues to dominate scholarly debates. This article introduces a new objection, one that develops out of the well-established disability critique of social contract theories. I show the implications of this critique for the prudential life span account and for the special case of age-group justice. The result is that age-based rationing based on the prudential life span approach is not supported, and that the prudential life span approach itself is not the best way to think about allocating health care between age groups. I propose an alternative approach that avoids the disability objection, and consider its implications for specific proposals for age-based rationing of health care.