Kevin Jackson

This article asks whether a “law-as-integrity” approach to human rights adjudication provides a theoretical framework within which to make sense of authoritative regional interpretations of basic human rights for the global community. To focus analysis, I consider U.S. court interpretations of international human rights as an interpretive context. I argue that, with appropriate modification so as to include the world community as a “community of principle” for purposes of human rights adjudication, the law-as-integrity perspective permits disputes surrounding the legality of human rights to revolve around competing interpretive claims backed up by justifying legal theories, rather than as ideological battles external to a juridical philosophy of rights.

Modern economics deploys the concept of time-value as if it were a descriptive, empirically-verifiable objective property of the sort studied by natural science in its investigation of the natural world. In particular, economics frames efficiency as a core feature of time-value understood in a purportedly descriptive sense. Economic time-value is stripped of its normative quality, and held up for scientific investigation and brute factual description of the sort associated with criterial and natural-kind concepts. As such, economics deploys the conceptual devices such as the “time-value of money” in its quest to objectively ascertain in a purportedly morally-neutral fashion behaviors that are favorable to capital efficiency maximization. Yet, as the paper shows, economics thus removes the relation of efficiency to time-value from the realm of normative choice – that is, from the realm of contested interpretive concepts.