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128Restricted Theological VoluntarismPhilosophy Compass 7 (10): 679-690. 2012.In addressing objections to the theological voluntarist program, the consensus response by defenders of theological voluntarism has been to affirm a restricted theological voluntarism on which some, but not all, important normative statuses are to be explained by immediate appeal to the divine will. The aim of this article is to assess the merits and demerits of this restricted view. While affirming the restricted view does free theological voluntarism from certain objections, it comes at the co…Read more
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43Hobbes on Tacit CovenantsHobbes Studies 7 (1): 69-94. 1994.Tacit consent theories of political obligation have fallen into disfavor. The difficulties that plague such accounts have been well-known since Hume's "Of the Original Contract"1 and have recently been forcefully reformulated by M. B. E. Smith, A. John Simmons, and Joseph Raz.2 In this article, though, I shall argue that Hobbes' version of the argument from tacit consent escapes the criticisms leveled by Hume, Smith, Simmons, and Raz against tacit consent theories as a class. Crucial to my defen…Read more
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43Functioning and FlourishingProceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 73 193-206. 1999.
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55Morality and divine authorityIn Thomas P. Flint & Michael Rea (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophical theology, Oxford University Press. 2008.This article examines morality and divine authority in the context of the question of whether God – that is, God's existence, nature, or activity – explains morality. It begins with some clarifying remarks about the meaning of ‘God’, ‘morality’, and ‘explains’. The article then evaluates the Theistic Explanation of Morality: for every moral fact, there is some fact about God that explains it. Defences of this thesis might appeal to rather different sorts of relationship between moral and theisti…Read more
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61Hobbes' shortsightedness account of conflictSouthern Journal of Philosophy 31 (2): 239-253. 1993.
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45Finnis on nature, reason, GodLegal Theory 13 (3-4): 187-209. 2007.It is often claimed that John Finnis's natural law theory is detachable from the ultimate theistic explanation that he offers in the final chapter of Natural Law and Natural Rights . My aim in this paper is to think through the question of the detachability of Finnis's theistic explanation of the natural law from the remainder of his natural law view, both in Natural Law and Natural Rights and beyond. I argue that Finnis's theistic explanation of the natural law as actually presented can be, wit…Read more
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90The Common GoodReview of Metaphysics 59 (1): 133-164. 2005.NATURAL LAW ARGUMENTS CONCERNING the political order characteristically appeal, at some point or other, to the common good of the political community. To take the clearest example: Aquinas, perhaps the paradigmatic natural law theorist, appeals to the common good in his accounts of the definition of law, of the need for political authority, of the moral requirement to adhere to the dictates issued by political authority, and of the form political authority should take. But while united on the po…Read more
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245Natural Law in Jurisprudence and PoliticsCambridge University Press. 2006.Natural law is a perennial though poorly represented and understood issue in political philosophy and the philosophy of law. In this 2006 book, Mark C. Murphy argues that the central thesis of natural law jurisprudence - that law is backed by decisive reasons for compliance - sets the agenda for natural law political philosophy, demonstrating how law gains its binding force by way of the common good of the political community. Murphy's work ranges over the central questions of natural law jurisp…Read more
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31Hobbes on Conscientious DisobedienceArchiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 77 (3): 263-284. 1995.In _Leviathan Hobbes offers an argument for the conclusion that one is bound to obey one's sovereign even when one judges that obedience to the sovereign's command would require one to disobey a law of God. The basis for Hobbes's argument is his contention that the covenant that institutes sovereignty includes the renunciation of the right to act in accordance with one's private conscience. In this paper I show that Hobbes's argument fails because one that takes the law of the sovereign to be co…Read more
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253Divine Command, Divine Will, and Moral ObligationFaith and Philosophy 15 (1): 3-27. 1998.In this article I consider the respective merits of three interpretations of divine command theory. On DCT1, S’s being morally obligated to φ depends on God’s command that S φ; on DCT2, that moral obligation depends on God’s willing that S be morally obligated to φ; on DCT3, that moral obligation depends on God’s willing that S φ. I argue that the positive reasons that have been brought forward in favor of DCT1 have implications theists would find disturbing and that the positive reasons brought…Read more
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Alasdair Macintyre (edited book)Cambridge University Press. 2003.The contribution to contemporary philosophy of Alasdair MacIntyre is enormous. His writings on ethics, political philosophy, philosophy of religion, philosophy of the social sciences and the history of philosophy have established him as one of the philosophical giants of the last fifty years. His best-known book, After Virtue, spurred the profound revival of virtue ethics. Moreover, MacIntyre, unlike so many of his contemporaries, has exerted a deep influence beyond the bourns of academic philos…Read more
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43Reply to AlmeidaReligious Studies 40 (3): 335-339. 2004.Michael J. Almeida offers two criticisms of the argument of my ‘A trilemma for divine command theory’. The first criticism is that I mistakenly assume the validity of the following inference pattern: property A is identical to property B; property B supervenes on property C; therefore, property A supervenes on property C. The second criticism is that I have misinterpreted the moral-supervenience thesis upon which I rely in making this argument. The first of Almeida's criticisms is completely unt…Read more
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211Not Penal Substitution but Vicarious PunishmentFaith and Philosophy 26 (3): 253-273. 2009.The penal substitution account of the Atonement fails for conceptual reasons: punishment is expressive action, condemning the party punished, and so is not transferable from a guilty to an innocent party. But there is a relative to the penal substitution view, the vicarious punishment account, that is neither conceptually nor morally objectionable. On this view, the guilty person’s punishment consists in the suffering of an innocent to whom he or she bears a special relationship. Sinful humanity…Read more
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6Hobbes' Shortsightedness Account of ConflictSouthern Journal of Philosophy 31 (2): 239-253. 2010.
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79Divine authority and divine perfectionInternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion 49 (3): 155-177. 2001.
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89The Conscience PrincipleJournal of Philosophical Research 22 387-407. 1997.My aim is to defend the conscience principle: One ought never to act against the dictates of one’s conscience. In the first part of this paper, I explain what I mean by “conscience” and “dictate of conscience,” and I show that the notion that the conscience principle is inherently anti-authoritarian or inherently fanatical is mistaken. In the second part, I argue that the existence of mistaken conscience does not reduce the conscience principle to absurdity. In the third part, I present two argu…Read more
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34Philosophy of lawBlackwell. 2007.The Philosophy of Law is a broad-reaching text that guides readers through the basic analytical and normative issues in the field, highlighting key historical and contemporary thinkers and offering a unified treatment of the various issues in the philosophy of law. Enlivened with numerous, everyday examples to illustrate various concepts of law. Employs the idea of three central commonplaces about law - that law is a social matter, that law is authoritative, and that law is for the common good -…Read more
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235Acceptance of Authority and the Duty to Comply with Just Institutions: A Comment on WaldronPhilosophy and Public Affairs 23 (3): 271-276. 1994.
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64Self-Evidence, Human Nature, and Natural LawAmerican Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 69 (3): 471-484. 1995.
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81Natural Law and Practical RationalityCambridge University Press. 2001.Natural law theory has been undergoing a revival, especially in political philosophy and jurisprudence. Yet, most fundamentally, natural law theory is not a political theory, but a moral theory, or more accurately a theory of practical rationality. According to the natural law account of practical rationality, the basic reasons for actions are basic goods that are grounded in the nature of human beings. Practical rationality aims to identify and characterize reasons for action and to explain how…Read more