R. T. Mullins

In previous publications I have argued that divine timelessness is not compatible with the doctrine of creation ex nihilo. The doctrine of creation ex nihilo says that prior to creation God existed all alone, and then God exists with a universe. This precreation moment in the life of God generates all sorts of difficulties for divine timelessness. In a series of papers, Ben Page claims that the doctrine of creation ex nihilo does not have to mean that God once existed all alone, and hence a proponent of divine timelessness can ignore the precreation moment. In "O Precreation Moment, Where Art Thou?" Page argues that it is difficult to find the affirmation of the precreation moment. In this reply, I explain that it is quite easy to find the explicit affirmation of the precreation moment among proponents of creation ex nihilo. I also argue that Page's reinterpretation of creation out of nothing makes the doctrine indistinguishable from its well-established historical rivals.

Though it is often not recognized, there are multiple models of God being affirmed and debated throughout the history of philosophical theology. In contemporary discussion, we have developed labels for these models such as classical theism, neoclassical theism, open theism, panentheism, and pantheism. In this paper I want to discuss a unique problem that neoclassical theism faces. This is the Problem of Foreknowledge and Passibility. God is passible in that God is capable of being moved and influenced by creatures to some extent. God is capable of having a wide range of emotional responses to the world that are consistent with His perfect goodness and rationality. Also, God is capable of having maximal empathy with His creatures. Yet, there are some philosophers and theologians who think that divine passibility is inconsistent with exhaustive foreknowledge. As a neoclassical theist, I disagree. Before considering the inconsistency argument, I need to set the stage. In section 1, I shall articulate the neoclassical theistic model of God. In section 2, I will discuss some different issues related to omniscience, time, and emotions. These issues need to be developed in order to understand the objection to neoclassical theism. Then in section 3, I will develop two arguments against the compatibility of passibility and foreknowledge. There I will explain why the neoclassical theist has nothing to worry about from these objections.

On the heels of the advance since the twentieth-century of wholly physicalist accounts of human persons, the influence of materialist ontology is increasingly evident in Christian theologizing. To date, the contemporary literature has tended to focus on anthropological issues (e.g., whether the traditional soul / body distinction is viable), with occasional articles treating physicalist accounts of such doctrines as the Incarnation and Resurrection of Jesus cropping up, as well. Interestingly, the literature to date, both for and against this influence, is dominated by philosophers. The present volume is a collection of philosophers and theologians who advance several novel criticisms of this growing trend toward physicalism in Christian theology. The present collection definitively shows that Christian physicalism has some significant philosophical and theological problems. No doubt all philosophical anthropologies have their challenges, but the present volume shows that Christian physicalism is most likely not an adequate accounting for essential theological topics within Christian theism. Christians, then, should consider alternative anthropologies.

This paper argues for the coherence of penal substitutionary theories of atonement (PSA) with presentism. After summarizing both the PSA and presentism, we address two major objections to the coherence of these two doctrines working together, namely that (1) there is no reality of the future sins that are atoned for, and (2) that since the past no longer exists, there no longer exists anything for which atonement is needed. We demonstrate that these objections are easily overcome by the PSA-affirming presentist. Lastly, we further argue that PSA seems to require presentism in order for such an atonement to obtain.

The cognitive science of religion (CSR) indicates that belief in supernatural agents, or “gods”, is underpinned by maturationally natural cognitive biases and systems (Natural Religion). It is unclear, however, whether theism is natural. Does the god concept that our cognitive biases and systems give rise to approximate theism? In other words, is Natural Religion “theism-tracking”? As Christian theologians have different views of what God is like, we argue that the answer depends partly on one’s model of God. We discuss two models: classical theism and open theism. We argue that classical theism is far from being natural. The classical divine attributes are very hard to comprehend. Moreover, people naturally conceptualize God as a special sort of person, but the classical God strongly deviates from our cognitive expectations about persons. Open theism is much more natural. However, recent findings in CSR challenge the suggestion that Natural Religion tracks open theism. The possibility that we are “born idolaters” rather than “born believers” might undermine the Christian doctrine of general revelation and attempts to make CSR compatible with theology.

Dean Zimmerman has made significant contributions to metaphysics, philosophy of time, and philosophy of religion. In this paper, I set my focus on Zimmerman’s approach to God, time, and creation. Zimmerman has defended a model of God called open theism on which God is essentially temporal. In this paper, I will first articulate open theism. Then I will explore a series of puzzles related to God’s perfect rationality and creation. These can be stated as the following three questions. Why didn’t God create sooner? Why did God create anything at all? Why did God create this universe in particular?

Have you ever wondered what God’s inner emotional life might be like? Within Christian thought, there are conflicting answers to this question. The majority of Christian theologians throughout history have said that God cannot be moved by creatures to feel anything. God does not literally have empathy, mercy, or compassion. Instead, God only feels pure undisturbed happiness. This view is called divine impassibility. In the 20 th Century, Christian theologians by and large came to reject this understanding of God in favour of divine passibility which affirms that God can be moved by creatures, and God can literally have empathy, mercy, and compassion. Yet the 21 st Century has seen a renewed interest in this more historical understanding of God. How Christianity came to have two radically different portrayals of God is a puzzle, to be sure, but that is not one that I shall try to address here. Instead, my interest is in unpacking these two different conceptions of God, and briefly offering reasons for affirming divine passibility. The reasons that I discuss centre around a central theme within Christian thought—the goal of entering into a close, personal relationship with God. I start by defining some key terms, and then proceed to offer two arguments in favour of divine passibility. The first is the problem of knowing God well, and the second is based on the human desire for empathy.

In recent years the doctrine of divine simplicity has become a topic of interest in the philosophical theological community. In particular, the modal collapse argument against divine simplicity has garnered various responses from proponents of divine simplicity. Some even claiming that the modal collapse argument is invalid. It is our contention that these responses have either misunderstood or misstated the argument, and have thus missed the force of the objection. Our main aim is to clarify what the modal collapse argument in fact says, and explain why the recent responses do not succeed. In order to argue our case, we will proceed in several steps. First, we aim to systematically articulate the doctrine of divine simplicity. Second, articulate the Christian conviction that God is free to create any feasible world or no world at all. Third, argue that divine simplicity suffers a modal collapse and thus undermines God's freedom. Fourth, respond to potential objections to modal collapse. Fifth, we offer some concluding remarks.

Open theism denies that God has definite exhaustive foreknowledge, and affirms that God takes certain risks when creating the universe. Critics of open theism often complain that the risks are too high. Perhaps there is something morally wrong with God taking a risk in creating a universe with an open future. Open theists have tried to respond by clarifying how much risk is involved in God creating an open universe, though we argue that it remains unclear how much risk is actually involved. We claim that open theists need to start developing theories about how God manages risks in order to bring about His purposes for the universe. In this article, we will take a philosophical and biological perspective on risk management that adds plausibility to open theism. We will consider how God can use different risk‐management, surveillance, and redundancy systems in the natural world in order to accomplish His goals.

Christian theism claims that God is in some sense responsible for the existence and nature of time. There are at least two options for understanding this claim. First, the creationist option, which says that God creates time. Second, the identification view, which says that time is to be identified with God. Both options will answer the question, “what is time?” differently. I shall consider different versions of the creationist option, and offer several objections that the view faces. I will also consider different versions of the identification view, and argue that the objections it faces can be refuted.

We argue that there is a conflict among classical theism's commitments to divine simplicity, divine creative freedom, and omniscience. We start by defining key terms for the debate related to classical theism. Then we articulate a new argument, the Aloneness Argument, aiming to establish a conflict among these attributes. In broad outline, the argument proceeds as follows. Under classical theism, it's possible that God exists without anything apart from Him. Any knowledge God has in such a world would be wholly intrinsic. But there are contingent truths in every world, including the world in which God exists alone. So, it's possible that God contingently has wholly intrinsic knowledge. But whatever is contingent and wholly intrinsic is an accident. So, God possibly has an accident. This is incompatible with classical theism. Finally, we consider and rebut several objections.

According to classical theism, impassibility is said to be systematically connected to divine attributes like timelessness, immutability, simplicity, aseity, and self-sufficiency. In some interesting way, these attributes are meant to explain why the impassible God cannot suffer. I shall argue that these attributes do not explain why the impassible God cannot suffer. In order to understand why the impassible God cannot suffer, one must examine the emotional life of the impassible God. I shall argue that the necessarily happy emotional life of the classical God explains why the impassible God cannot suffer.

Within contemporary evangelical theology, a peculiar controversy has been brewing over the past few decades with regard to the doctrine of the Trinity. A good number of prominent evangelical theologians and philosophers are rejecting the doctrine of divine processions within the eternal life of the Trinity. In William Hasker’s recent Metaphysics and the Tri-Personal God, Hasker laments this rejection and seeks to offer a defense of this doctrine. This paper shall seek to accomplish a few things. In section I, I shall first set the stage for a proper understanding of the discussion. Section II will articulate the basic Trinitarian desiderata that must be satisfied by any model of the doctrine of the Trinity. This will help one understand the debate between Hasker and the procession deniers. Section III will offer an articulation of what the doctrine of divine processions teaches. Section IV will examine Hasker’s defense of the doctrine point by point. I shall argue that his defense of the doctrine of the divine processions fails.

I greatly appreciate Thomas Flint’s reply to my paper, “Flint’s ‘Molinism and the Incarnation’ is too Radical.” In my original paper I argue that the Christology and eschatology of Flint’s paper “Molinism and the Incarnation” is too radical to be considered orthodox. I consider it an honor that a senior scholar, such as Flint, would concern himself with my work in the first place. In this response to Flint’s reply I will explain why I still find Flint’s Christology and eschatology to be too radical. Below I shall attempt to address various issues raised by Flint in his reply.