Jukka Mikkonen

There have recently been calls to incorporate empathy and compassion into human relationships with nature. A new, emotionally grounded moral framework has also been proposed for nature conservation. “Compassionate conservation” holds that animals should be treated as individuals and should not be harmed even in the context of conservation. However, according to many conservation biologists, empirical research does not support the ideas of compassionate conservation—which, in their view, are not ultimately very compassionate. On the contrary, numerous biologists consider compassionate conservation to be harmful to both biodiversity and animal welfare. For example, Don A. Driscoll and Maggie J. Watson argue that “the outcome of applying a compassionate conservation priority is likely to be increased land degradation, species extinctions, biotic homogenization, and in many cases, increased animal suffering.” The debate represents a new manifestation of a long-standing tension between conservation biology and the animal rights movement, in which the former prioritizes the status of endangered species and their habitats, while the latter emphasizes the welfare of individual animals. In the future, conflicts can be expected to intensify as human impacts on ecosystems grow and our understanding of animals’ cognitive and emotional capacities deepens.

Recently, literature and the arts have been called upon to help address climate change, biodiversity loss, and other global environmental problems. Armies of artists, art scholars, philosophers, psychologists, sociologists, and communication theorists, among others, have proposed that literature and the arts could significantly contribute to fostering pro-environmental attitudes and behaviors. Nevertheless, the scholarly discourse around art and climate change is often filled with unfounded optimism and vague proposals. Views of the value of art should not be accepted uncritically, as artworks might also distort our understanding of environmental crises and the measures required for sustainability transformations. In this article, I will first explore some common views on the potential contributions of art to pro-environmental attitudes and behaviors, highlighting the weak parts in these proposals. In the latter part, I will examine the potentially positive aspects of the role of art in addressing the climate crisis.

For several decades, there has been interest in traditional ecological knowledge (TEK) in ecological research and conservation. Traditional knowledge and practices are recognized as essential for understanding sustainable uses of natural resources and for developing enduring eco-social policies and cross-cultural conservation ethics. In addition, there has been a growing effort in environmental policy to recognize aesthetic and spiritual values that indigenous peoples attribute to nature. In philosophy, some Western aestheticians have turned their attention to aesthetic diversity and initiated cross-cultural approaches. Nonetheless, environmental aestheticians have so far paid little attention to the potential of TEK in nature appreciation. In this article, I examine Sámi notions of landscape, the environmental knowledge of Sámi reindeer herders, and their appreciation of what is commonly referred to as the natural environment. I challenge scientific cognitivism, arguing that Sámi TEK employs perceptual categories that could provide the basis for a robust ‘cognitivist’ approach and, furthermore, that Sámi appreciation of nature exemplifies a unified view that Allen Carlson called for in his late work. However, I also argue that for cultural outsiders, acquiring TEK is fraught with epistemic and ethical challenges and requires humility and diligence.

In her study Fiction and Imagination: The Anthropological Function of Literature (2000), Margit Sutrop criticizes Gregory Currie’s theory of fiction-making, as presented in The Nature of Fiction(1990), for using an inappropriate conception of the author’s ‘fictive intention.’ As Sutrop sees it, Currie is mistaken in reducing the author’s fictive intention to that of achieving a certain response in the audience. In this paper, I shall discuss Sutrop’s theory of fiction-making and argue that although her view is insightful in distinguishing the illocutionary effect and the perlocutionary effect in the author’s fictive intention, there are flaws in it. My aim is to show that, first, Sutrop’s critique of Currie’s view is misguided and, second, her own definition of fiction as the author’s expression of her imagination is problematic in not distinguishing literary fiction-making from other discursive functions and in dismissing the literary practice which regulates the production of literary fictions.

Analytic philosophy of literature explores general concepts, such as ‘literature’, ‘fiction’, ‘narrative’, and ‘meaning’, on the one hand, and the practice of literature, on the other hand. Typical for the approach are the application of formal logic, conceptual analysis, and rational argument; the focus on detail and distinctions and the orientation to narrowly demarcated problems; the emphasis on objectivity and a view of philosophical problems as timeless; and a respect for clarity. The chapter introduces the main conceptions of the analytic enterprise in aesthetics and exhibits analytic philosophers’ work on the theory and ontology of literature, fiction, narrative, interpretation, and cognitive, moral, and emotive dimensions of literature.

Biodiversity loss is an immense ecological crisis of our time. But while “biodiversity” has become a buzzword in media and policy, conservationists have found it difficult to build a common understanding on the nature and severity of biodiversity loss and the means to tackle it. Perhaps surprisingly, many biologists and philosophers have proposed that biodiversity might be best defended with reference to its aesthetic value. This article explores whether aesthetic values could provide strong support for biodiversity conservation. By exploring the question from the viewpoints of species diversity, ecosystem diversity, and genetic diversity, we argue that there is a mismatch between apparent and real biodiversity and that aesthetics can, at best, give only limited support for biodiversity conservation.

In this paper, the author argues that literary works have distinct cognitive significance in changing their readers’ beliefs. In particular, he discusses ‘philosophical fictions’ and truth-claims that they may imply. Basing himself broadly on Aristotle’s view of the enthymeme, he argues that a work of literary fiction persuades readers of its truths by its dramatic structure, by illustrating or implying the suppressed conclusion (or other parts missing in the argument). Further, he suggests that it is exactly this ‘literary persuasion’ which distinguishes literary works from merely didactic works prone to overt ‘argumentation’ and instruction. AbstraktDer Autor dieser Studie stellt die These auf, dass literarische Werke auf seine eigene Weise erkenntnisrelevant sind, wenn sie die Meinung ihrer Leser beeinflussen. Er widmet sich insbesondere der sog. philosophischen Belletristik (philosophical fiction) und dem mit ihr verknüpften Wahrheitsanspruch. Indem er sich stark auf Aristoteles’ Konzept der enthymeme stützt, argumentiert er, dass das literarische Werk die Leser von seinen Wahrheiten durch seine dramatische Struktur überzeugt, indem es einen nicht gezogenen Schluss (oder andere nicht argumentativ ausgeführte Teile) entweder illustriert oder impliziert. Außerdem vertritt er die Meinung, dass es eben diese ‘literarische Überzeugung’ist, die literarische Werke von bloß didaktischen Werken unterscheidet, die sich auf eine unverhüllte ‘Argumentation’ und Belehrung beschränken.

Kommentoin artikkelissa Hanna Meretojan The Ethics of Storytelling -teoksessa esittämiä näkemyksiä kaunokirjallisten kertomusten eettisestä arvosta. Kritisoin Meretojan edustamaa lähestymistapaa, jossa kaunokirjallisten teosten vaikutuksista teoretisoidaan ilman empiirisiä viitepisteitä taikka pohdintaa siitä, mistä väitteille voitaisiin löytää tukea tai kuinka teoriaa voitaisiin koetella. Lisäksi esitän huomioita muun muassa kaunokirjallisten kertomusten soveltamisesta arkeen sekä kertomusten kontingenteista vaikutuksista.

In this paper, I shall examine two types of assertions in literary narrative fiction: direct assertions and those I call literary assertions. Direct assertions put forward propositions on a literal level and function as the author’s assertions even if detached from their original context and applied in so-called ordinary discourse. Literary assertions, in turn, intertwine with the fictional discourse: they may be, for instance, uttered by a fictional character or refer to fictitious objects and yet convey the author’s genuine assertions. The structure of the paper is twofold. The first, descriptive part is a question–answer type of discussion in which I shall introduce general philosophical arguments against assertions in fiction and present counter-arguments to them, paving the road to my account of literary assertions. In the second, argumentative part, in turn, I shall examine the nature of literary assertions, such as their semantic and ‘aspectival’ characteristics and their peculiar illocutionary force as well as the reader’s stance toward them.

Appeals to the actual author's intention in order to legitimate an interpretation of a work of literary narrative fiction have generally been considered extraneous in Anglo-American philosophy of literature since Wimsatt and Beardsley's well-known manifesto from the 1940s. For over sixty years now so-called anti-intentionalists have argued that the author's intentions – plans, aims, and purposes considering her work – are highly irrelevant to interpretation. In this paper, I shall argue that the relevance of the actual author's intentions varies in different approaches to fiction, and suggest that fictions are legitimately interpreted intentionally as conversations in a certain kind of reading. My aim is to show that the so-called conversational approach is valid when emphasizing the cognitive content of a fiction and truths it seem to convey, for example, in a philosophical approach to fictions which contain philosophical purport using Sartre's fictional works as paradigmatic, and that anti-intentionalists' arguments against intentionalism do not threaten such an approach.

Challenging existing methodological conceptions of the analytic approach to aesthetics, Jukka Mikkonen brings together philosophy, literary studies and cognitive psychology to offer a new theory on the cognitive value of reading fiction. Philosophy, Literature and Understanding defends the epistemic significance of narratives, arguing that it should be explained in terms of understanding rather than knowledge. Mikkonen formulates understanding as a cognitive process, which he connects to narrative imagining in order to assert that narrative is a central tool for communicating understanding. Demonstrating the effects that literary works have on their readers, he examines academic critical analysis, responses of the reading public and nonfictional writings that include autobiographical testimony to their writer's influences and attitudes to life. In doing so, he provides empirical evidence of the cognitive benefits of literature and of how readers demonstrate the growth of their understanding. By drawing on the written testimony of the reader, this book is an important intervention into debates on the value of literature that incorporates understanding in new and imaginative ways.

The debate on the cognitive value of literature is undergoing a change. On the one hand, several philosophers recommend an epistemological move from “knowledge” to “understanding” in describing the cognitive benefits of literature. On the other hand, skeptics call for methodological discussion and demand evidence for the claim that readers actually learn from literature. These two ideas, the notion of understanding and the demand for evidence, seem initially inconsistent, for the notion of understanding implies that the cognitive benefits of literature are ultimately nonverbal and thus inarticulate. In this article, I defend both the move from knowledge to understanding and the demand for evidence. After proposing that the cognitive value of literature is best construed in terms of enhancing the reader's understanding, I argue that the place to look for evidence for the cognitive benefits of literature is not the laboratory but the practice of literature

In literary aesthetics, the debate on whether literary fictions provide propositional knowledge generally centres around the question whether there are authors’ explicit or implicit truth-claims in literary works and whether the reader’s act of looking for and assessing such claims as true or false is an appropriate stance toward the works as literary works. Nevertheless, in reading literary fiction, readers cannot always be sure whether the author is actually asserting or suggesting a view she expresses or presents because of the artistic and imaginative nature of the work. In this essay, I shall argue that in addition to asserting and suggesting, authors make use of a third way of conveying knowledge by their works: they invite the reader to genuinely or extra-fictionally contemplate unasserted thoughts or viewpoints to a given issue, or they offer hypotheses or provide the reader fictional material for constructing a hypothesis. The aim of this essay is to examine this rather unanalyzed but extremely wide grey zone: the author’s act of ‘contemplating’ and the cognitive value of its products which I shall call ‘literary hypotheses.’

In analytic aesthetics, a popular ‘cognitivist’ line of thought maintains that literary works of fictional kind may ‘imply’ or ‘suggest’ truths. Nevertheless, so-called anti-cognitivists have considered the concepts of implication and suggestion both problematic. For instance, cognitivists’s use of the word ‘implication’ seems to differ from all philosophical conceptions of implication, and ‘suggestion’ is generally left unanalysed in their theories. This paper discusses the role, kinds and conception of implication or suggestion in literature, issues which have received little attention in contemporary literary aesthetics. In the first part, the author shall examine classic views on implication in literature and introduce objections to the views. In the latter part, in turn, the author shall propose a definition of the ‘literary suggestion’ and discuss issues related to its interpretation.

Can literary fictions convey significant philosophical views, understood in terms of propositional knowledge? This study addresses the philosophical value of literature by examining how literary works impart philosophy truth and knowledge and to what extent the works should be approached as communications of their authors. Beginning with theories of fiction, it examines the case against the prevailing ‘pretence’ and ‘make-believe’ theories of fiction hostile to propositional theories of literary truth. Tackling further arguments against the cognitive function and value of literature, this study illustrates how literary works can contribute to knowledge by making assertions and suggestions and by providing hypotheses for the reader to assess. Through clear analysis of the concept of the author, the role of the authorial intention and the different approaches to the ‘meaning’ of a literary work, this study provides an historical survey to the cognitivist—anti-cognitivist dispute, introducing contemporary trends in the discussion before presenting a novel approach to recognizing the cognitive function of literature. An important contribution to philosophical studies of literature and knowledge.