Tilo Wesche

Hegel′s concept of truth and contemporary theories of truth could mutually profit from one another in two regards. Hegel′s unity of truth and rationality makes an attempt to undermine the antagonism of internal and external concepts of knowledge and gives an account for truth in ethics. Ethical truth is accounted for by an external concept of practical rationality without assigning truth an epistemic design. To understand practical rationality, we must account for irrationality as a case of self-deception which seems to be incompatible with an external concept of rationality. Hegel′s 'inclusive monism′ elucidates a concept of rationality which complies with the requirements for ethical truth

Kant and Adorno alike have assumed that hope plays a central role in the relation between ethics and happiness. After comparing some of their different interpretations of hope, this paper traces the philosophical account of the concept of hope which Kant and Adorno, however, agree on. They both see hope as essential for bridging the gulf between normativity and realities. Hope, they argue, features a weaker doxastic state than belief but a stronger one than wishful thinking. For Kant, the question, "what may I hope?" is part of the interests of human reason. By modifying this conception of hope, Adorno advocates a notion of hope, which accounts for a critique of religion and metaphysics

Understanding the relationship of democracy and property ownership is one of the most important tasks for contemporary political philosophy. In his concept of property-owning democracy John Rawls explores the thesis that property in productive means has an indirect effect on the formation of true or false beliefs and that unequal ownership of productive capital leads to distorted and deceived convictions. The basic aspect of Rawls’s conception can be captured by the claim that for securing the fair value of the political liberties a widespread dispersal of property in productive resources is required that minimizes the formation of delusions and therefore improves the conditions of deliberative democracy.

Understanding the relationship of democracy and property ownership is one of the most important tasks for contemporary political philosophy. Surprisingly, philosophers writing on democracy and ownership rarely discuss their interconnectedness. This paper aims to clarify how a normative concept of property arrangements fosters democracy. On the one hand, it argues that democracy depends on a hybrid form of private and social ownership of productive assets that is a feature of economic democracy. The basic aspect of this conception can be captured by the claim that for securing the political liberties a widespread dispersal of property in productive resources is required that minimizes the formation of prejudices and therefore improves the conditions of deliberative democracy. On the other hand, this paper argues that freedom is most central for the justification of property rights. Instead of justifying property rights by external principles of justice, democracy and legitimacy, it argues that the notion of ownership is not intelligible as long as one leaves the concept of freedom aside.

The basic thesis of this article is that with his book on legal revolution Brunkhorst rewrites a dialectic of enlightenment. According to Brunkhorst, learning processes, which lead to the revolutionary institutionalization of a new constitutional order, are triggered by negativity. This begs the following questions. What is the account of the belief in a concurrency of dialectics of enlightenment and the learning process? Why do extreme forms of exploitation and oppression still lead to the learning process?