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29Sharing in Truth: Phenomenology of Epistemic CommonalityIn Dan Zahavi (ed.), The Oxford handbook of contemporary phenomenology, Oxford University Press. 2012.This chapter investigates the idea of collective epistemic commonality suggested by Charles Taylor's example, and contrasts it with a distributive notion of epistemic commonality. It describes a number of accounts of collective epistemic commonality, and then argues that, contrary to what Taylor suggests, conversation is not constitutive of collective epistemic commonality as such, but rather presupposes basic forms of collective epistemic commonality. Taylor's remarks indicate that understandin…Read more
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43Plural ActionPhilosophy of the Social Sciences 38 (1): 25-54. 2008.In this paper, I distinguish three claims, which I label individual intentional autonomy, individual intentional autarky, and intentional individualism. The autonomy claim is that under normal circumstances, each individual's behavior has to be interpreted as his or her own action. The autarky claim is that the intentional interpretation of an individual's behavior has to bottom out in that individual's own volitions, or pro-attitudes. The individualism claim is weaker, arguing that any interpre…Read more
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“Robot” as a Life-Form WordIn Raul Hakli & Johanna Seibt (eds.), Sociality and Normativity for Robots. Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality., Springer. 2017.
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227Philosophical egoism: Its nature and limitationsEconomics and Philosophy 26 (2): 217-240. 2010.Egoism and altruism are unequal contenders in the explanation of human behaviour. While egoism tends to be viewed as natural and unproblematic, altruism has always been treated with suspicion, and it has often been argued that apparent cases of altruistic behaviour might really just be some special form of egoism. The reason for this is that egoism fits into our usual theoretical views of human behaviour in a way that altruism does not. This is true on the biological level, where an evolutionary…Read more
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12Social Capital and Self-Alienation: An Augustinian Look at the Dark Heart of CommunityIn Hans Bernhard Schmid, Christoph Henning & Dieter Thomä (eds.), Social Capital, Social Identities: From Ownership to Belonging, De Gruyter. pp. 105-122. 2014.
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Of the Structure of Commitment and the Role of Shared DesiresIn Fabienne Peter (ed.), Rationality and Commitment, Oxford University Press, Usa. 2007.
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24Pluralsubjektivität – „Fichtes ursprüngliche Einsicht“ und die Ontologie der GemeinschaftIn Christian Krijnen & Stephan Zimmermann (eds.), Sozialontologie in der Perspektive des Deutschen Idealismus: Ansätze, Rezeptionen, Probleme, De Gruyter. pp. 75-92. 2018.
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3Shared Intentionality and the Origins of Human CommunicationIn Salice Alessandro (ed.), Intentionality, Philosophia-verlag. 2013.
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4Otfried Höffes transzendental-anthropologische MenschenrechtsbegründungArchiv für Rechts- Und Sozialphilosophie 81 (4). 1995.
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“Lebenswelt” zwischen Universalismus und Relativismus.Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Soziologie 22. 1996.
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11Index of SubjectsIn Hans Bernhard Schmid, Christoph Henning & Dieter Thomä (eds.), Social Capital, Social Identities: From Ownership to Belonging, De Gruyter. pp. 231-234. 2014.
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Malentendus collectifs. Réflexions sceptiques sur la théorie type de l'identité politique.In Laurence Kaufmann & Danny Trom (eds.), Qu’est-ce qu’un collectiv ? Du commun à la politique. Raisons pratiques vol. 20, Éditions De L’école Des Hautes Études En Sciences Sociales. pp. 197-220. 2010.
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6Holding random collections collectively responsible: An introductionFilozofija I Društvo 28 (4): 997-1034. 2017.nema nema
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19Ist Vertrauenswürdigkeit das formale Objekt des Vertrauens?Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 64 (1): 89-102. 2016.Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 64 Heft: 1 Seiten: 89-102
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1Heidegger and the ‚Cartesian Brainwash‘. Towards a Non-Individualistic Account of ‚Dasein‘‘. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 35 (2): 132-156. 2004.
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10IntroductionIn Hans Bernhard Schmid, Christoph Henning & Dieter Thomä (eds.), Social Capital, Social Identities: From Ownership to Belonging, De Gruyter. pp. 1-6. 2014.
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Kollektive SelbstmissverständnisseIn Georg Bertram, Robin Celikates & David Lauer (eds.), Expérience et réflexivité. Perspectives au-delà de l'empirisme et de l'idéalisme., Harmattan. pp. 135-156. 2011.
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22Heidegger and the ‘Cartesian Brainwash’—Towards a Non-Individualistic Account of ‘Dasein’Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 35 (2): 132-156. 2004.
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11Notes on ContributorsIn Hans Bernhard Schmid, Christoph Henning & Dieter Thomä (eds.), Social Capital, Social Identities: From Ownership to Belonging, De Gruyter. pp. 225-228. 2014.
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10Index of PersonsIn Hans Bernhard Schmid, Christoph Henning & Dieter Thomä (eds.), Social Capital, Social Identities: From Ownership to Belonging, De Gruyter. pp. 229-230. 2014.
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73Expressing Group Attitudes: On First Person Plural AuthorityErkenntnis 79 (S9): 1685-1701. 2014.Under normal circumstances, saying that you have a thought, a belief, a desire, or an intention differs from saying that somebody (who happens to be you) has that attitude. The former statement comes with some form of first person authority and constitutes commitments that are not involved in the latter case. Speaking with first person authority, and thereby publicly committing oneself, is a practice that plays an important role in our communication and in our understanding of what it means to b…Read more
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183Can brains in vats think as a team?Philosophical Explorations 6 (3): 201-218. 2003.Abstract The specter of the ?group mind? or ?collective subject? plays a crucial and fateful role in the current debate on collective intentionality. Fear of the group mind is one important reason why philosophers of collective intentionality resort to individualism. It is argued here that this measure taken against the group mind is as unnecessary as it is detrimental to our understanding of what it means to share an intention. A non-individualistic concept of shared intentionality does not nec…Read more
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15Gemeinsames Dasein und die Uneigentlichkeit von Individualität. Elemente einer nicht-individualistischen Konzeption des DaseinsDeutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 49 (5): 665-685. 2001.
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17Das Böse an Augustinus’ BirnendiebstahlDeutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 67 (4): 517-538. 2019.In the second book of theConfessions, Augustine flabbergasts his interpreters by exaggerating an adolescent escapade (a pear theft) and making it a monstrosity. He conjectures that the pear thieves might have commited the theft purely for the sake of thieving, and thus, that they displayed a kind of evil that is not even presented by the arch-villain of Ciceronian antiquity, the conspirer Catilina. Following Aquinas’ interpretation this comparison has been considered a reductio in most of the re…Read more
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Communal Feelings and Implicit Self-Knowledge. Hermann Schmalenbach on the Nature of the Social BondIn Alessandro Salice & Hans Bernhard Schmid (eds.), The Phenomenological Approach to Social Reality: History, Concepts, Problems, Springer Verlag. 2016.
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University of ViennaRegular Faculty