Nikos Psarros

In this article the problem of the so-called 'coinciding objects', i.e. the question whether a substantially homogeneous thing is something ontologically different from the corresponding 'piece of stuff' it is made of or not, is examined from a pragmatical and language-analytical point of view. Instead of recurring to ontological assertions, I propose to regard 'stuffs' or 'substances' as a mode of speaking about things that fulfil the condition of being homogeneous in respect to a certain kind of properties that are called substantial properties. The coincidence problem is resolved by demonstrating that terms for substantially homogeneous things and the corresponding 'pieces of stuff' are predicative expressions in an Aristotelian genus-species relationship

In this paper a concept of pain is introduced that regards pain as a formal entity that can be realized in various material ways, similarly to the concept of justice. Pain utterances have rather the character of evaluative judgments and not of propositional descriptions. They aren’t therefore true or false, but adequate or inadequate, correct or wrong, according to the circumstances and the context, in which they are made. Because pain is constituted by the interplay of individual and public attitudes also inside a given cultural context we are always capable of extending our concept of pain by integrating other cultural attitudes towards pain and also capable of giving arguments that shall convince the members of an other culture to accept our ideas about pain