Kazi A S M Nurul Huda

The article’s main argument is that by demonstrating where both Gideon Rosen and Martin Montiminy fall short, we may set up a discussion between their opposing perspectives on moral responsibility. Rosen argues that an agent is blameworthy for his wrongdoing only if his action is an episode of clear-eyed akrasia or an upshot of an episode of clear-eyed akrasia. Denying this epistemic condition for moral responsibility, Montminy argues that an agent is to blame for his wrongdoing only if his action is a result of his belief which is not compatible with his ability. He is blameworthy only if his wrongdoing is due to his underperformance. He is to blame for his action only if he fails to do his reasonable best. However, the paper argues that Rosen’s view is problematic because its procedural epistemic obligations are vague. Though mostly, Montminy’s account appears to be unproblematic, it suffers from two problems: there is no necessary connection between reasonable belief and moral responsibility, and underperformance does not always make agents blameworthy. In order to avoid these problems, the paper, based on Montminy’s view, proposes a brief alternative that needs improvement. According to this alternative view, an agent’s blameworthiness for wrongdoing is a matter of the degree of being consistent in holding an epistemically reasonable belief. Hence, one’s degree of responsibility for action depends on consistency with epistemically reasonable belief.

The discussion of time has held an important place in philosophy since ancient times. While characterizing time within this continuum, differences of opinion among philosophers on various issues have emerged, giving rise to various theories. One such theory is the moving spotlight theory, which conceptualizes the present as an instant of time akin to an object illuminated by a moving spotlight. Daniel Deasy highlights several misunderstandings surrounding the discussion of the moving spotlight theory. According to Deasy, one of the philosophers who misunderstood the moving spotlight theory is Theodore Sider. The main aim of this article is to present the debate between Sider and Deasy and to express my position in favor of Deasy. To achieve this goal, the present article discusses Deasy’s response to Sider’s position after explaining the moving spotlight theory from Sider’s perspective. Finally, the debate is critically assessed to demonstrate why Deasy’s position is more acceptable.

British philosopher John Locke provides a definition of knowledge at the beginning of the fourth part of his famous book, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. According to this definition, knowledge is the perception of agreement or disagreement between ideas. In this part, he mentions three types of knowledge according to degree: intuitive, demonstrative, and sensitive. Furthermore, propositions are divided into two classes based on idea-containment: trifling and instructive. On the basis of conformity to archetypes, he identifies two other types of propositions, namely chimerical and real. The primary objective of this article is to provide a description of such key issues in Locke’s epistemology, which will serve as the basis for discussing the Kantian framework of the analytic-synthetic distinction underlying his epistemology. Through this discussion, it is possible to demonstrate, contra Lex Newman, that there is an aspect of Locke’s epistemology equivalent to the Kantian synthetic proposition. As Brian Chance puts it more specifically, Locke can be regarded as a philosopher who believes that knowledge can be both analytic and synthetic. Trifling propositions are primarily analytic, but propositions that are both instructive and real are synthetic. This interpretation renders Lockean demonstrative and sensitive knowledge as synthetic. The above argument constitutes the main contribution of the present essay to the debate among Locke scholars regarding the analytic-synthetic proposition in the context of Locke’s epistemology.

As Bangladesh faces political transformation, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) grapples with existential threats amid rising grassroots movements. The emergence of a new political force from the 2024 student-public uprising poses a dual challenge for the BNP: it risks losing its voter base to this group, which effectively channels public frustrations, and it struggles against the perception of being part of a dysfunctional political system. This moment calls for the BNP to reinvent itself by bridging leadership gaps and connecting more effectively with voters, while the student leaders must consider the value of institutionalizing their movement to ensure lasting political transformation.

Dhaka University (DU) and its seven affiliated colleges face a crisis that requires profound reforms for a lasting solution. There is a need to restructure administrative policies and reconsider the educational roles of these colleges. One opinion suggests transforming these colleges into separate universities or adopting a federative university model, which is detached from reality. Alternatively, re-establishing these colleges at the higher secondary level could reduce the administrative burden on DU and ensure the enrollment of qualified students in universities.

The recurrent clashes between Dhaka University (DU) students and those from its seven affiliated colleges highlight deeper issues beyond mere administrative inefficiencies, pointing to a significant crisis of identity and governance. Central to this crisis is the duality within the faculty—DU professors rooted in academic autonomy versus BCS cadre teachers entrenched in civil service hierarchy, exacerbating tensions and undermining collaboration. For the students, the affiliation with DU has deepened feelings of alienation, as they are caught in a liminal status, neither fully part of DU nor detached. The suggested "respectful separation" fails to address these underlying issues, making it a short-term solution at best. Serious reforms are needed to address both the identity crisis and the structural divides, possibly involving significant changes in administrative practices or reconsidering the educational role of these colleges. Addressing these challenges is crucial for stability in the educational framework and for the students' sense of belonging and recognition.

In this column, I discuss that the 2024 mass uprising in Bangladesh, celebrated as an expression of "collective will," raises critical questions about inclusivity and representation. While the movement united diverse groups against authoritarian governance, marginalized communities, such as rural populations and indigenous groups, remain underrepresented. Drawing on critiques from philosophers like Nietzsche, Marx, and Hume, this paper examines the risks of using "collective will" as a rhetorical tool that masks inequalities and consolidates power. To ensure meaningful progress, the post-uprising leadership must implement structural reforms, address systemic inequalities, and foster inclusive governance. Without these efforts, the uprising risks becoming another unfulfilled promise.

In this column for New Age, I discuss the following a) the rhetoric of sacrifice from 1971, once inspiring, now distracts from pressing national issues; b) Emotional responses and symbolic gestures, like redrawing maps, harm diplomatic credibility and regional alliances; c) Leadership's overuse of sacrifice rhetoric undermines governance and deflects attention from issues like unemployment, corruption, and climate change; d) Ideological rhetoric burdens the younger generation, sidelining critical engagement and practical solutions; e) Bangladesh must prioritize reforms in job creation, institutional accountability, and climate adaptation over populist distractions. I claim that true patriotism lies not in clinging to hollow rhetoric but in building a system that values lives, ensures opportunities, and addresses the challenges of our time. It’s time to pivot from populism to pragmatism.

Bangladesh is stepping into a new chapter, asserting its sovereignty and challenging decades of asymmetrical ties with India. This commentary discusses this transformative shift, exploring what it means for both nations and the broader South Asian region. This moment is more than political—it is about dignity, justice, and building relationships rooted in equality and mutual respect. For Bangladesh, it’s a call to strengthen unity and democracy. For India, it’s a chance to move from dominance to ethical leadership. Together, Bangladesh and India can break free from historical cycles and shape a future of shared prosperity and cooperation.

Since the post-August 5 discourse among public intellectuals has centered around op-eds and commentaries, the buzzwords "reform" and "rewrite" dominate discussions about our Constitution. But how many of us have paused to explore what these terms truly mean? In this commentary, I delve into the ongoing debate about reforming vs. rewriting Bangladesh’s Constitution. My op-ed explores the semantics of these terms and insinuates a bold argument: You don’t need to invoke the “spirit of 2024” to justify rewriting the 1972 Constitution. Instead, the answer lies in returning to the core spirit of Bangladesh’s 1971 Liberation War: equality, human dignity, and social justice. Even substantial reformation may fall short to abolish all elements that contradict the Liberation War. A comprehensive rewrite is the only way to uphold the true spirit of our Liberation War and lay the foundation for a genuinely democratic Bangladesh, free from Hasinocratic authoritarianism.

The killing of a Muslim lawyer in Chattogram sparks critical discussions on interfaith relations in Bangladesh emphasizing shared responsibilities of majority and minority communities in fostering trust and coexistence. While the Muslim majority must safeguard minorities the Hindu community should resist external narratives reject reductive identities and engage in civic initiatives, affirming national unity. Drawing on philosophical ideas from Charles Taylor and Hannah Arendt, the essay highlights the ethical imperatives of mutual recognition justice and collective belonging. Trust as a shared responsibility becomes essential for shaping a pluralistic Bangladesh rooted in dignity equality and solidarity.

The paper argues that the concept of a civilizationally transformed state envisions a new governance paradigm that emphasizes moral values, collective responsibility, and compassion over traditional ideas of sovereignty and legality. This model emerges from the failure of conventional states to address global crises like climate change, economic instability, and democratic erosion. It proposes a state that prioritizes human dignity, justice, and the common good. Drawing from philosophical traditions such as Ubuntu, it seeks to foster mutual accountability and elevate compassion as a guiding principle of governance to ensure care for the vulnerable. The 2024 Bangladeshi student-public uprising reflects this vision by rejecting repressive governance and demanding moral accountability. Realizing this transformation requires a cultural and ethical shift where the state serves as a moral authority inspiring pluralism, collective growth, and humanity's highest aspirations.

This op-ed examines the philosophical foundation of the debate over the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh and whether it requires reform or a complete rewrite. Reform would involve specific amendments to address current issues while rewriting would involve a full reconsideration to eliminate authoritarian elements and restore alignment with the democratic ideals of the 1971 Liberation War. This perspective emphasizes the need to return to the roots of the 1971 Proclamation of Independence, issued on April 10, 1971, by the Provisional Government of Bangladesh in Mujibnagar. The proclamation championed the values of equality, human dignity, and social justice. Philosophy provides a framework for evaluating the Constitution’s core principles—nationalism, socialism, democracy, and secularism—and exposes how their misapplication has weakened democracy and marginalized citizens. A complete rewrite grounded in the first principles of equality, human dignity, and social justice could restore the Constitution’s role as both a moral and legal guide. Such an effort would ensure ethical governance and a democratic framework, providing stability and realigning the nation’s governance with its founding ideals. This perspective emphasizes the vital role of philosophy in advancing justice and democracy.

In this commentary published, I explore the difficult but urgent question: has civil society in Bangladesh failed to uphold its responsibility as a check on government power? Over the years, civil society’s silence has allowed concerning issues like electoral manipulation, human rights abuses, and corruption to go unchecked. From the forced resignation of Chief Justice Sinha to the tragic murder of Abrar Fahad, the lack of strong, collective action has left many crucial injustices unchallenged. Civil society has a fundamental duty to defend democratic principles, demand transparency, and hold power accountable. But too often, our intellectuals, academics, journalists, and human rights defenders avoided direct engagement, especially during moments that called for bold stances. This silence has enabled a climate of impunity and fear that damages the very foundations of democracy. I argue that civil society owes an apology for its inaction—this isn’t merely symbolic. Admitting these past failures is the first step toward rebuilding trust and credibility. Civil society must recommit to its role as the people's voice and stand firmly against abuses of power while protecting the rights and freedoms that all Bangladeshis deserve.

In this commentary, I explore the ongoing debate surrounding Bangladesh’s electoral reform as the interim government has launched a commission to examine alternatives to the First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) system. Proponents of Proportional Representation (PR) argue it could lead to fairer, more inclusive representation by better reflecting each party’s share of the vote. However, the reality is more complex: PR risks unintended consequences like weakened governance, legitimacy issues that may challenge democratic principles, and technical problems such as the “rounding problem,” where minor vote fractions can affect seat allocation. While the PR system sounds promising, especially to address concerns about the over-centralization of power, it’s essential to critically assess how this model might impact Bangladesh’s unique political landscape.

In today’s world of global university rankings, there’s an increasing push to prioritize STEM fields over the humanities, especially in Bangladesh. With so much emphasis on high publication counts, we risk sidelining disciplines that foster intellectual depth, ethical insight, and critical thinking, qualities essential for tackling complex societal challenges. But is this focus on quantity, or simply ticking off outcome-based education (OBE) requirements, really serving us? Take the call for constitutional reform: can scientists or engineers, however brilliant, lead such profound changes? It’s experts in the humanities, law, and social sciences who bring the skills needed for these issues. Education should be more than a numbers game. Instead of narrowly focusing on rankings and outputs, we need universities that contribute meaningfully to Bangladesh’s growth by valuing a balanced, well-rounded education that prepares reflective, engaged citizens for the challenges ahead.

The 2024 student-led uprising in Bangladesh was a powerful assertion of the nation’s demand for democracy and independence from foreign influence. Driven by youth, the movement emphasized self-determination and the need for a democratic future without external control. While the U.S. can play a supportive role, its involvement must respect Bangladesh's sovereignty by fostering dialogue, supporting civil society, and investing in key sectors like education. Ultimately, Bangladeshis seek a partnership based on mutual respect, not control, as they navigate their own path toward democracy.

কৌশলের আলোচনা সামাজিক বিজ্ঞানের দর্শনে একটি বিতর্কিত বিষয়। জন এলস্টারের মতে, এ মুহুর্তে সামাজিক বিজ্ঞানে আইনের মতো কোনো সার্বিকীকরণ না থাকলেও বা সম্ভব না হলেও সামাজিক ঘটনাবলীকে আইন এবং বর্ণনার মধ্যবর্তী কৌশলের মাধ্যমে ব্যাখ্যা করা সম্ভব। অন্যদিকে, পিটার ম্যাকামারের তত্ত্বায়ন ইঙ্গিত দেয় যে, সামাজিক বিজ্ঞানের চর্চাকে কৌশলের আবিষ্কার ও বর্ণনার আলোকে বোঝা উচিত। সামাজিক-বৈজ্ঞানিক কৌশলের আলোচনায় এ দুই উল্লেখযোগ্য দার্শনিকের বোঝাপড়া একই রকম কিনা তা পরীক্ষা করার জন্য বর্তমান প্রবন্ধের লক্ষ্য হলো কৌশল সম্পর্কিত কাঠামো বিষয়ক তাঁদের মতবাদের তুলনা করা। ফলশ্রুতিতে, তাঁদের কাঠামোদ্বয়ের মধ্যে কিছু সাদৃশ্য থাকা সত্ত্বেও এগুলো যে সংজ্ঞা এবং উদ্দেশ্যের দিক দিয়ে ভিন্ন তা বোঝা আমাদের জন্য সহজতর হবে। এ প্রবন্ধের তুলনামূলক আলোচনা সামাজিক বিজ্ঞানের দর্শন সম্পর্কিত জ্ঞানকাণ্ডে একটি গুরুত্বপূর্ণ সংযোজন। কারণ উভয়ই কৌশল সম্পর্কিত সামাজিক-বৈজ্ঞানিক দর্শনের সাম্প্রতিক জ্ঞানকাণ্ডের গুরুত্বপূর্ণ ব্যক্তিত্ব। তাই তাঁরা কৌশল সম্পর্কিত ঠিক একই ধরণের প্রকল্পে নিযুক্ত আছেন কিনা এ বিষয়টি আমাদের জানা দরকার। অধিকন্তু, তাঁরা উভয়ই ভিন্ন অনুষঙ্গে কাজ করে সামাজিক-বৈজ্ঞানিক কৌশল সম্বন্ধে তাঁদের ধারণা গঠন করেন বলে এ প্রশ্নের উত্তর অনুসন্ধান আরও জরুরী হয়ে পড়ে। এ ভিন্নতা সত্ত্বেও এলস্টার এবং ম্যাকামারের কৌশল সম্পর্কিত কাঠামোর বর্ণনা চেতনার দিক থেকে কিছুটা সাদৃশ্যপূণ্য। কিন্তু দিন শেষে মূলত কৌশলের উদ্দেশ্য সম্পর্কেই তাঁদের আলোচনার ভিন্নতা লক্ষ্য করা যায়: একজন এটিকে ব্যাখ্যামূলক এবং অন্যজন এটিকে ভবিষ্যদ্বাণীমূলক বলে দাবি করেন।

This commentary explores whether, in light of the 2024 uprising, Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami can participate in politics without acknowledging its role in the 1971 Liberation War. It contends that an apology from Jamaat is not merely a formality but a moral necessity. For Jamaat to claim legitimacy in a democratic Bangladesh, it must confront its past with honesty and integrity. Without a genuine apology, can the party realistically expect to build public trust and contribute to a future grounded in reconciliation? The piece examines how such acknowledgment affects our nation’s political landscape, detailing the ontological, epistemological, ethical, and socio-political reasons why Jamaat’s apology is crucial for its survival in mainstream politics.

Facing marginalization under the Awami League and historical stigma, the BNP’s recent outreach to India signals a pivotal shift. This commentary explores how the BNP seeks to establish legitimacy, distance itself from past associations, and connect with a younger electorate by advocating for democratic principles, social justice, and individual empowerment. It argues that a renewed commitment to ethical leadership and social justice will allow the BNP to bridge socio-economic divides and appeal to a disillusioned, younger electorate. This reorientation could shape a more inclusive, equitable political landscape, offering a foundation for Bangladesh’s democratic future.

The 2024 uprising in Bangladesh marks a significant victory in the fight against authoritarianism, yet it remains an incomplete revolution. Its true success will hinge on whether it can pave the way for a new political order that reflects the hopes and aspirations of its participants. In this commentary, I draw on Arendt’s concept of natality to explore this pivotal moment, as it emphasizes the need for ongoing creativity, active engagement, and the creation of new possibilities. I argue that Bangladesh’s future will be shaped by the movement’s ability to channel its momentum into building a lasting and visionary political landscape that embodies the collective will of its people.

The author discusses Mahfuj Alam's viral speech advocating for a shift from Bengali to Bangladeshi nationalism, which is more inclusive and tolerant. The core of Mahfuj's argument is that the reform of the state should begin with the moral reform of individuals, which then extends to societal change. He criticizes the historical application of Bengali nationalism for being exclusionary and contributing to the rise of authoritarianism, suggesting that a reformed secularism within a new nationalist framework could better embrace the diversity of Bangladesh. The author analyzes Mahfuj's perspective, noting its potential oversimplifications and exploring whether a new form of nationalism or a reimagined Bengali nationalism could more effectively address the country's challenges.

In Bangladesh, opposition parties like BNP and JI have struggled to mobilize support despite their claims of championing democracy. The 2024 Anti-Discrimination Student Movement, however, succeeded where these parties failed, uniting people across political divides. Though BNP and JI offered covert support, they hesitated to openly join the movement, reflecting deeper issues in their strategies. This commentary argues that the movement’s success highlighted public disillusionment with traditional politics and the need for trust and accountability in future political mobilization, showing a path to genuine, inclusive change.

This article explores the concept of degrees of epistemic responsibility by examining the debate between Michael Bishop and Katherine Puddifoot on the internalist perspective on epistemic responsibility. While Bishop’s empirical evidence challenges internalism, Puddifoot argues it can be supportive. The author presents an account of degrees of epistemic responsibility, drawing inspiration from Martin Montminy’s idea of moral responsibility. The central argument suggests that an agent is epistemically responsible only if her reasoning strategy aligns with her epistemic abilities, a concept referred to as epistemic par performance. The paper discusses how the Bishop-Puddifoot debate contributes to this perspective, presents Montminy’s view on moral responsibility, and applies it to epistemic responsibility, emphasizing the importance of matching reasoning strategies with individual abilities. The article ultimately highlights the contextual, ability-dependent, and effort-inclusive nature of epistemic responsibility and offers a framework to recognize and credit agents based on their contributions and endeavors in expanding our epistemic horizons.