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32The essential tie between knowing and believing: a causal account of knowledge and epistemic reasonsEdwin Mellen Press. 2011.This book offers a causal-explanatory account of knowledge as true belief caused by the worldly state of affairs that explains its existence. It also defends a contextual account of epistemic reasons, arguing that both foundationalism and coherentism cannot provide a satisfactory account of such reasons. Skeptical arguments are answered against a historical background from Plato to the present day.
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302PerversityPhilosophical Quarterly 26 (104): 229-242. 1976.I argue that there are perverse actions, in the sense that they are acts performed in the belief that they are wrong. They are also, however, acts done in the belief that they are right. What makes them perverse is, not only that they have conflicting motivations, but that the motivation that wins out is not in accord with reason. That is, a perverse act is one resulting from one's strongest motivation but not based on all one's available reasons.
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145The time-gap argumentAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 47 (3): 263-272. 1969.I argue that the time-gap argument poses no objection to Direct Realism. In the case of exploded stars many light years from us, what we see is no longer the star, but its light. I argue that in all cases of seeing we see light, but only when physical objects exist at the time of our seeing do we see them.
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83Skepticism DisarmedCanadian Journal of Philosophy 13 (1): 107-114. 1983.If skepticism is once again fashionable, then much of the credit must go to Peter Unger who gives a sustained defense of an ultra-pyrrhonian position in his book, Ignorance: A case for Skepticism. Starting with a version of the traditional argument that we know nothing about the external world, Unger plunges deeper into skeptical waters by next arguing that there is at most hardly anything which we know to be so; and he scarcely pauses before proceeding to defend the stronger conclusion of ‘univ…Read more
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36Experience And The Objects Of PerceptionUniversity Press Of America. 1967.This work argues for a Direct Realist view of the perception of public objects. It argues against the need for special intermediary sensory objects, or sense impressions, requiring only stages in a physical process beginning with events at the surface of a physical object, the resultant stimulation of one's sense organs, and finally the excitation of the sensory portions of one's brain.
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173The impossibility of massive errorPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (2): 405-409. 1993.I argue that Davidson's anti-skeptical thesis can survive objections made against it by treating skepticism as logically possible, but not epistemically possible. That is, the skeptical hypothesis of massive error conflicts with what we must take ourselves to know if we are to have coherent thought and speech.
Coral Gables, Florida, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
1 more
| Epistemology |
| Metaphysics |
| Philosophy of Mind |
| Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy |
| 20th Century Philosophy |
| 17th/18th Century Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
| Social and Political Philosophy |