L. S. Carrier

In this article it is argued that it is impossible to give a reductive analysis of knowledge, given that knowledge is an "epistemic" concept with these marks: (1) like necessity, it is only partially truth-functional; and, (2) unlike necessity, it includes an "intentional" component (belief) which is completely non-truth-functional. a reductive analysis would have to contain at least one extensional component, one intentional component, and none that is itself epistemic. but any plausible analysis then turns out either to be non-reductive, e.g., causal, or else falls prey to "gettier" counterexamples. my positive suggestion is that we eschew reductive analyses of epistemic concepts in favor of non-reductive analyses.

Edmund Gettier has cited familiar cases in which it seems plausible to conclude that a person has a true and justified belief, yet lacks knowledge. Robert Almeder denies that Gettier’s cases falsify the traditional account. What they show is that Gettier’s subjects lack knowledge because they are not completely justified in their beliefs, where being completely justified in believing that p entails the truth of the proposition that p. This move blocks Gettier’s counterexamples, which rely on the possibility that one might be justified in believing something false.