Raja Bahlul

Doha Institute for Graduate Studies
  •  168
    Ghazali on the Creation vs. Eternity of the World
    Philosophy and Theology 6 (3): 259-275. 1992.
    There are two ways in which Ghazali contributes to the discussion of whether God exists: by arguing for the existence of God, and by arguing against certain views which, in his opinion, stand in the way of truly believing that God exists. In this paper I examine Ghazali’s argument from creation and his refutation or the philosophers’ second proof for the eternity or the world. My purpose will be to argue that: firstly, Ghazali’s argument and his refutation are based on incompatible views of time…Read more
  • Ash'ari's Theological Determinisma and the Senses of 'Can'
    Hamdard Islamicus 15 (1): 39-57. 1992.
    In this paper I argue that al Ash'ari was a Theological Determinist whose position on free will and human responsibility was marred by his failure to distinguish between two senses of the word 'can' (yastati'u ). I also compare al Ash'ari's position with that of the Mu'tazilite thinker al Qadi 'Abd al Jabbar. I conclude that their positions may not have been so much opposed to each other as merely different. This, I suggest, should invite us to re evaluate the nature and extent of the disagreeme…Read more
  •  257
    Ghazali on Miracles and Necessary Connection
    with George Giacaman
    Journal of Nietzsche Studies 9 (1): 39-50. 2000.
    The paper offers a critical examination of Ghazali’s main arguments against the views of the philosophers on causation. The authors argue that Ghazali’s definition of miracles as "departure from the usual course of events" carries at least two meanings, only one of which is in conflict with necessary causal relations. The authors also argue that Ghazali’s desire to uphold the possibility of miracles need not constrain him to repudiate the idea of necessary connection, since he is able to explain…Read more
  •  193
    Avicenna and the Problem of Universals
    Philosophy and Theology 21 (1-2): 3-25. 2009.
    The main object of this paper is to clarify and evaluate Avicenna’s view of universals, in light of some modern and contemporarydiscussions. According to Avicenna, universality is a contingent attribute of entities that are in themselves neither universal norparticular. An account of universality as a contingent attribute is offered which clarifies and gives additional support to Avicenna’sview. Nevertheless, it will be argued that Avicenna, through his use of such terms as “nature” and “quiddit…Read more