University of Texas at Austin
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1981
Tempe, Arizona, United States of America
  •  66
    Common decency
    In Setting the moral compass: essays by women philosophers, Oxford University Press. pp. 128--142. 2004.
    I suggest that the normative expectations connected with common decency do not derive from a conception of what we owe each other. Instead, they derive from a constructed concept of what can be expected of a minimally well formed moral agent.
  •  1
    Sexuality Injustice
    Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics and Public Policy 9 (1): 241-274. 1995.
    Sexuality injustice differs significantly in form from racial and gender injustice. Because persons who are gay or lesbian can evade being publicly identified and treated as gays or lesbians, sexuality injustice does not consist, as racial and gender injustice does, in the disproportionate occupation of disadvantaging and highly exploitable places in the socio-economic structure. Instead, sexuality injustice consists in the displacement of homosexuality and lesbianism to the outside of society. …Read more