Anna Puzio

With death bots, AI-enabled digital representations of deceased individuals can be created. While religions have long played a central role in death and mourning practices, this domain is increasingly being taken over by companies and commercial enterprises. In this article, I aim to reintroduce the perspective of religions, specifically that of Christian ethics, into the emerging discourse on death tech. I ask how a Christian ethical perspective might approach death technology, whether such technology is compatible with Christianity, whether it is meaningful, what challenges it presents, and how it can be responsibly shaped. The article introduces three key ethical lenses from the standpoint of Christian ethics: (a) Anthropology and Relationality, (b) Vulnerability and Deception, and (c) Justice: Humans and Earth. Here, in addition to necessary critique, I also explore constructive ways in which technology can be beneficial for religious communities. I conclude with a perspective of hope (Jürgen Moltmann)—a hope grounded in the present.

In this reply, we respond to Hayate Shimizu’s and Masaki Ooka’s commentary “Relational Selfhood, Queering and Design Risks: A Commentary on van der Horst and Puzio” (2026) on our article “Queering Sex Robots Beyond Diversifying Design? Insights from Queer Lacanian Psychoanalysis and New Materialism” (van der Horst & Puzio, 2026) in which we explore the possibilities of diversifying the debate on queering sex robots. In this reply to their commentary, we respond to their two main claims - regarding the ontological status of the relational sexual self and the ethical sensitivity necessary to translate ‘designing for friction’ from theory to practice – and aim to continue the discussion on queering sex robots.

Contemporary humanoid sex robots have been rightfully criticized for their heteronormative and misogynistic design. In this article, we aim to explore the diverse possibilities of queering sex robots. While previous research on queering sex robots has predominantly suggested making humanoid sex robots more diverse by offering more options in terms of the designed gender, age, skin color, body shape, etc. of the robot, our aim is to think the question of queering sex robots beyond diversifying humanoid design options alone. To do this, we present two theories in tandem — Queer Lacanian Psychoanalysis and New Materialism — to approach this possibility. Our paper, therefore, accomplishes two things: first, we provide philosophical and ethical foundations for queering sex robots based on Queer Lacanian Psychoanalysis and New Materialism. Second, we derive implications from these insights on how sex robots can be queered beyond multiplying humanoid design options.

We endorse policymakers’ efforts to address the negative consequences of the attention economy’s technology but add that these approaches are often limited in their criticism of the systemic context of human attention. Starting from Buddhist philosophy, we advocate a broader approach: an ‘ecology of attending’ that centers on conceptualizing, designing, and using attention (1) in an embedded way and (2) focused on the alleviating of suffering. With ‘embedded’ we mean that attention is not a neutral, isolated mechanism but a meaning-engendering part of an ‘ecology’ of bodily, sociotechnical and moral frameworks. With ‘focused on the alleviation of suffering’ we mean that we explicitly move away from the (often implicit) conception of attention as a tool for gratifying desires. We analyze existing inquiries in these directions and urge them to be intensified and integrated. As to the design and function of our technological environment, we propose three questions for further research: How can technology help to acknowledge us as ‘ecological’ beings, rather than as self-sufficient individuals? How can technology help to raise awareness of our moral framework? And how can technology increase the conditions for ‘attending’ to the alleviation of suffering, by substituting our covert self-driven moral framework with an ecologically attending one? We believe in the urgency of transforming the inhumane attention economy sociotechnical system into a humane ecology of attending, and in our ability to contribute to it.

Philosophers love a hierarchy. Nothing seems to fit the needs and desires of the moral imagination more than the promise of a clean, orderly ladder of moral worth with (not surprisingly) humans at the top, a few “higher” animals somewhere beneath, plants and rocks at the bottom, and now, far outside the frame, artificial agents politely waiting their turn. In addition, it is in the context of AI that this impulse to police the moral boundary has returned with renewed urgency. Many commentators, including Adrianna de Ruiter in her recently published essay ‘Dangerous Liaisons’ (2025), warn that relational approaches to AI moral status are dangerous, misleading, or lacking philosophical rigor. They insist that we must firmly anchor moral considerability in some intrinsic, scientifically respectable property (i.e., sentience, consciousness, phenomenal experience, and vulnerability) and that anything less—especially when it comes to AI—is dangerous.

Healthcare is one of the domains in which artificial intelligence (AI) is already having a major impact. Of interest is the idea of the digital twin (DT), an AI-powered technology that generates a real-time representation of the patient’s body, offering the possibility of more personalised care. Our main thesis in this paper is that the DT does not merely represent the patient’s body but produces a specific body. We argue, from a philosophical perspective and an ethical-phenomenological approach, that the virtual body created by the DT has a major impact on one’s self-understanding, having consequences for gender expression and identification, and for health. This has deep implications for people who do not conform to gender normativity, for example, trans individuals. We advocate that, with thoughtful development, DT technology can and should be empowering, contributing to better addressing the diversity of bodies and facilitating trans people’s experience in healthcare contexts.

In the field of ethics of LLMs, agency is a highly contested topic: Can LLMs perform agency? The current discourse on the agency of LLMs is heavily shaped by a traditional, properties-based, individualistic, and anthropocentric approach. In contrast, I propose a relational and network-based approach to agency, drawing on Actor-Network Theory and New Materialism, which is open to non-human agency and a plurality of agencies. Building on this relational, non-anthropocentric per- spective, I also introduce a material perspective that has been largely overlooked in the LLM discourse. While LLMs are often thought of as immaterial, I develop a framework that distinguishes various dimensions of their materiality. I refer both to their material production and conditions, as well as how they concretely materialize in our devices and the materializing effects they have on us and our bodies. This perspective highlights the connection of LLMs with culture and material practices, cultural and social values: they are part of us, our culture, our time, politics, and our society. It also shifts the focus from human users as individual agents and opens up a view of the hidden network of multiple agents – human workers, big tech actors, environmental and technological non-human agents, and more – while drawing attention to the diversity and specificities of agencies. This shift transforms the questions currently posed in the ethics of LLMs and opens up new avenues for ethical inquiry.

Wie verändern sich Mensch und Körper durch Technik? Und welches Menschenverständnis vertritt der Transhumanismus? Anna Puzio befasst sich in der ersten philosophischen Studie zur Anthropologie des Transhumanismus mit führenden Personen des Feldes, u. a. mit Nick Bostrom, David Pearce und Natasha Vita-More. Neben Körperoptimierung und Medizintechnologien beleuchtet sie auch Alltagstechnologien wie Wearables. Dabei entwickelt sie einen neuen Ansatz zur Technikanthropologie und ein neues inklusives Menschen- und Körperverständnis im Anschluss an Donna Haraway und den Kritischen Posthumanismus im amerikanischen Raum.

In ‘Digital Twins for Trans People in Healthcare: Queer, Phenomenological and Bioethical Considerations’,1 we examine the use of digital twin (DT) technology for transgender individuals. Our central thesis is that a DT does not merely represent the patient’s body, but actively produces a specific kind of body, thereby exerting significant influence on gender identity, self-understanding and embodiment. We propose a framework for the development and use of DTs for trans persons in healthcare as a starting point for future discussions on inclusive DT technology. This challenge has been taken up by many scholars, who have responded with commentaries that offer valuable insights and contributions to the ongoing discourse. Boretti highlights the practical and ethical challenges of creating inclusive DTs. Boretti proposes reinterpreting biomedical principles through a queer bioethical framework, reflects on more inclusive methods of data collection and explores participatory co-design for developing DTs that integrate the lived experiences of trans persons.2 Boretti also provides a helpful figure outlining the key ethical considerations. Wang focuses on how DTs can create false expectations at the physiological level, with patients relying more on the information provided by the technology than on their own bodily experiences.3 As a …

The AI Act advances a risk-based approach to the legal regulation of AI systems in the European Union. While we support this development, we argue that adequate AI governance requires paying attention to the broader implications of AI systems on the socio-technical landscape in which they are designed, developed, and used. In addition to risk-based impact assessments, this involves coming to terms with the socially disruptive implications of AI, which should be governed and guided in a dynamic ecosystem of regulation, law, ethics, and evolving human practice. In this paper, we outline a ‘social disruptiveness-based’ approach to AI governance aimed at addressing disruptions by AI that are not easily captured by legal regulation, but that are nonetheless of great societal and ethical concern. We argue that integrating the AI Act risk-based approach with a social disruptiveness-based approach can offer a more nuanced understanding of the dimensions of impact of AI systems on society at large, thus enhancing the governance of AI and other socially disruptive technologies.

In response to the increasing interest in (designing for) human vulnerability within the field of responsible computing, we articulate the multi-dimensionality of the concept of vulnerability to deepen and enrich the conversations about the relationship between vulnerabilities and the design of assistive technologies. Drawing on different philosophical traditions and insights from critical disability studies, we introduce three perspectives on vulnerability–the individualist, relationalist, and enactivist perspectives–that each emphasize a different aspect of what it means to be vulnerable. We argue that, for engineers in the field of responsible computing, it is key to be able to adopt all three perspectives and explicitly and critically reflect upon what each perspective or combination of perspectives brings to the design context at hand. When used in conjunction, the three perspectives together can mitigate the risk of creating technological interventions that may aim to ameliorate vulnerabilities but instead exacerbate or create new ones. To move forward, we call for further reflections and practical considerations on how to best integrate the three perspectives on vulnerability into participatory design practices; how to distribute responsibilities within design teams to ensure that all perspectives are genuinely adopted and engaged with; and how to foster creative, out-of- the- box thinking for assistive technology design.

The new avatars and bots modeled after humans, the large language models with a “persona,” and the seemingly autonomously acting robots raise the question of whether AI technologies can also possess personhood or at least be part of our personhood. Do we extend our personhood through living or death bots in the digital realm? This article explores the application of the moral concept of personhood to AI technologies. It presents a twofold thesis: first, it illustrates, through various examples, how the concept of personhood is being disrupted in the context of AI technologies. Second, it discusses the potential evolution of the concept and argues for abandoning the personhood concept in AI ethics, based on reasons such as its vagueness, harmful and discriminatory character, and disconnection from society. Finally, the article outlines future perspectives for approaches moving forward, emphasizing the need for conceptual justice in moral concepts.

We endorse policymakers’ efforts to address the negative consequences of the attention economy’s technology but add that these approaches are often limited in their criticism of the systemic context of human attention. Starting from Buddhist philosophy, we advocate a broader approach: an ‘ecology of attending’ that centers on conceptualizing, designing, and using attention (1) in an embedded way and (2) focused on the alleviating of suffering. With ‘embedded’ we mean that attention is not a neutral, isolated mechanism but a meaning-engendering part of an ‘ecology’ of bodily, sociotechnical and moral frameworks. With ‘focused on the alleviation of suffering’ we mean that we explicitly move away from the (often implicit) conception of attention as a tool for gratifying desires. We analyze existing inquiries in these directions and urge them to be intensified and integrated. As to the design and function of our technological environment, we propose three questions for further research: How can technology help to acknowledge us as ‘ecological’ beings, rather than as self-sufficient individuals? How can technology help to raise awareness of our moral framework? And how can technology increase the conditions for ‘attending’ to the alleviation of suffering, by substituting our covert self-driven moral framework with an ecologically attending one? We believe in the urgency of transforming the inhumane attention economy sociotechnical system into a humane ecology of attending, and in our ability to contribute to it.

The new pope - an American! What amazes and concerns the whole world is particularly relevant here in California - and brings the question of artifi-cial intelligence into play. We are on site, Anna Puzio at the University of California Berkeley, Alexander Filipović at Santa Clara University in Silicon Valley. Having been here for a few weeks, we are still impressed by the Californian way of life: friendly, relaxed people, welcoming encounters in eve-ry situation, people who are still fit in old age, theologians who are open-minded and curiously critical when it comes to technology and digital life-styles. Pope Leo XIII fits the bill: casual and friendly, emotional and ap-proachable, good-looking, healthy, obviously interested in sport and sporty - and with a smartwatch on his wrist. He could also have been cast in the “Conclave” movie. Our local friends and acquaintances are thrilled. David writes right after the election: "I'm in shock", while another colleague comments with relief: "He's a very good guy and not a nut for sure." Suggested citation: Puzio, Anna/Filipovic, Alexander: Leo XIV - An AI Pope? Insights and Perspectives from California. In: Feinschwarz (2025). English Translation. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.24700.45446. Link

Der neue Papst - ein Amerikaner! Was die ganze Welt verwundert und beschäftigt, löst hier in Kalifornien besondere Relevanz aus - und bringt die Frage nach der Künstlichen Intelligenz ins Spiel. Wir sind vor Ort, Anna Puzio an der University of California Berkeley, Alexander Filipovic an der Santa Clara University im Silicon Valley. Seit ein paar Wochen hier sind wir immer noch beeindruckt von der Kalifornischen Lebensweise, freundliche entspannte Menschen, einladende Begegnungen in jeder Situation, Menschen im hohen Alter noch fit, Theolog:innen offen und neugierig-kritisch im Blick auf Technik und digitale Lebensweisen. Papst Leo XIII. passt ins Bild: Lässig-freundlich, emotional und nahbar, gut aussehend, gesund, offenbar sportinteressiert und sportlich – und am Handgelenk eine Smartwatch. Mit ihm hätte man auch den Konklave-Film besetzen können. Unsere Bekannten und Freunde hier vor Ort sind begeistert. David schreibt unmittelbar nach der Wahl: “I’m in shock”, ein weiterer Kollege schreibt erleichtert: "He’s a very good guy and not a nut for sure.” Unser Leben in den USA wird aber auch geprägt von Trump und seinem Druck auf Hochschulbildung, Diversity und Migrierende. Seit Wochen macht Trump natürlich auch hier die Schlagzeilen. Die Stimmung im aufgeweckten, demoratisch-offenen Kalifornien mit seiner großen LQBTQ+ Community ist gedrückt. News-Avoiding ist auch ein kalifornischer “Sport” - um nicht sehen zu müssen, was sich Trump heute wieder einfallen lässt. Der örtliche Tesla-Händler in Berkeley in der 4th Street wird zum Nukleus der Anti-Musk Proteste. Schlagzeile: “How Tesla’s Berkeley showroom became a ground zero for anti-Trump protests”. In vielen Fenstern in Berkeley hängt ein schlichtes Schild: “Resist!”. Über “Alcatraz”, das Trump wieder als Gefängnis reaktivieren will – nur fassungsloses Kopfschütteln. Nun aber Leo, der Amerikaner. Was können wir, mit einem amerikanischen Blick der Westküste, für sein Pontifikat erwarten? Zitationsvorschlag: Puzio, Anna/Filipovic, Alexander: Leo XIV. – Ein KI-Papst? Einsichten und Perspektiven aus Kalifornien. In: Feinschwarz (2025).

Healthcare is one of the domains in which artificial intelligence (AI) is already having a major impact. Of interest is the idea of the digital twin (DT), an AI-powered technology that generates a real-time representation of the patient’s body, offering the possibility of more personalised care. Our main thesis in this paper is that the DT does not merely represent the patient’s body but produces a specific body. We argue, from a philosophical perspective and an ethical-phenomenological approach, that the virtual body created by the DT has a major impact on one’s self-understanding, having consequences for gender expression and identification, and for health. This has deep implications for people who do not conform to gender normativity, for example, trans individuals. We advocate that, with thoughtful development, DT technology can and should be empowering, contributing to better addressing the diversity of bodies and facilitating trans people’s experience in healthcare contexts.

In times of rapid technological progress, transhumanism, which strives for radical technological transformations of the human being, spreads its ideas with great publicity and media impact. Although these ideas are directed towards the future, they influence how we understand humans, bodies, and technology today. T his article exam­ ines the anthropology of transhumanism and investigates the extent to which it offers approaches for the contemporary anthropology of body optimisation. T he article comes to the conclusion that the understanding of the human being in transhumanism is prob­ lematic in many respects and therefore not suitable for the further development of a contemporary philosophical anthropology. Nevertheless, corrective perspectives for an anthropology of contemporary body optimisation can be derived from these problems.

Self-tracking-technologies can serve as a prominent example of how digital technologies put to test established practices, institutions, and structures of medicine and healthcare. While proponents emphasize the potentials, e.g., for individualized healthcare and new research data, opponents stress the risk that these technologies will reinforce gender-related inequalities. While this has been made clear from—often intersectional—feminist perspectives since the introduction of such technologies, we aim to provide a queer-feminist perspective on self-tracking applications in healthcare by analyzing three concrete cases. In this way, we want to show why such a perspective is helpful in assessing self-tracking technologies and how such a perspective might contribute to a queering of healthcare. After a short introduction to self-tracking in healthcare and the corresponding risks of reproducing gender-related inequalities, we introduce queer bioethics as a methodology to examine structural discrimination and marginalization in bioethical research. We apply this framework in the analysis of three exemplary self-tracking applications from the areas of nutrition/fitness, reproductive health, and mental health. In the subsequent discussion of these results against the backdrop of already existing queer-sensitive technologies, we identify an equal access, a subversive design, an inclusive database, and a diversity-sensitive and discriminatory-critical definition of purposes as well as individualized usage possibilities as first possible starting points for a queering of self-tracking applications. Finally, we draw conclusions, how such a critical perspective on self-tracking applications might also contribute to a queering of the healthcare system at a structural level.

Technological advancements raise anthropological questions: How do humans differ from technology? Which human capabilities are unique? Is it possible for robots to exhibit consciousness or intelligence, capacities once taken to be exclusively human? Despite the evident need for an anthropological lens in both societal and research contexts, the philosophical anthropology of technology has not been established as a set discipline with a defined set of theories, especially concerning emerging technologies. In this paper, I will utilize a New Materialist approach, focusing particularly on the theories of Donna Haraway and Karen Barad, to explore their potential for an anthropology of technology. I aim to develop a techno-anthropological approach that is informed and enriched by New Materialism. This approach is characterized by its relational perspective, a dynamic and open conception of the human being, attention to diversity and the dynamics of power in knowledge production and ontology, and an emphasis on the non-human. I aim to outline an anthropology of technology centered on New Materialism, wherein the focus, paradoxically, is not exclusively on humans but equally on non-human entities and the entanglement with the non-human. As will become clear, the way we understand humans and their relationship with technology is fundamental for our concepts and theories in ethics of technology.

Existing ethical guidelines that aim to guide the development of mental health apps tend to overemphasize the role of Western conceptual frameworks. While such frameworks have proved to be a useful first step in introducing ethics to a previously unregulated industry, the rapid global uptake of mental health apps requires thinking more deeply about the diverse populations these apps seek to serve. One way to do this is to introduce more intercultural ethical perspectives into app design and the guidelines that aim to encourage best practices. In addition to this, existing ethical guidelines can also benefit from the ethical scholarship from the feminist and disability traditions, both of which highlight specific ethical considerations for vulnerable users. Rethinking the ethical responsibilities of mental health app designers through the prisms of feminism, disability studies, and intercultural philosophy leads us to a more global and inclusive set of ethical considerations in app design. This white paper explores what existing guidelines for the regulation of mental health apps are missing. It also explores how these guidelines could be improved for users who inhabit an increasingly diverse and globalized world.

In Sect. 2, I will introduce what religious robots are and present examples of such robots. Then, in Sect. 3, I will discuss my project with a NAO robot at the Katholikentag. In Sect. 4, I will discuss anthropological and ethical questions related to religious robots. Thus, I will outline the direction in which research on religious robots can go, where the challenges lie, and highlight two key advantages. Finally, in Sect. 5, I conclude with an outlook for future research on religious robots. - Puzio, Anna: A NAO Robot Performing Religious Practices. In: ET-Studies 15/1 (2024), pp. 129-140. DOI: 10.2143/ETS.15.1.3293070.

In this reply, I respond to Joshua C. Gellers’ commentary on my article “Not Relational Enough? Towards an Eco-Relational Approach in Robot Ethics” (Puzio, 2024a), in which I present a deeply relational, “eco-relational approach”. This approach asserts that it is necessary to consider the relationality with non-human entities such as animals and technology on a deeper level than has been done in robot ethics so far. This disrupts traditional ethical concepts. In his commentary “Not Ecological Enough: A Commentary on an Eco-Relational Approach in Robot Ethics” (2024), Gellers raises criticisms of my method and the consequences of the eco-relational approach. In this reply, I address these criticisms and focus especially on the ecological responsibility of the eco-relational approach.

This report aims to offer insights into cutting-edge research on digital well-being. Many of these insights come from a 2-day academic-impact event, The Future of Digital Well-Being, hosted by a team of researchers working with the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW) in February 2024. Today, achieving and maintaining well-being in the face of online technologies is a multifaceted challenge that we believe requires using theoretical resources of different research disciplines. This report explores diverse perspectives on how digital well-being can be actively cultivated, while also emphasising the importance of considering individual differences, societal contexts, and nuanced cultural factors. We aim to offer a holistic view of the future of digital well-being, one that will inspire the next generation of designers of online tools, as well as policymakers who will regulate these tools. We start by asking what digital well-being is – how we can best define a concept that is used by diverse stakeholders and researchers from many disciplines in various ways. To do this, we explore the classic ethical theories of well-being, showing how they can give us insights into how the term digital well-being is currently deployed. We then move to look at the existing strategies that have been proposed to actively cultivate digital well-being, exploring the business models that threaten digital well-being and the relative advantages of the digital and non-digital solutions that are currently proposed. On the one hand, digital tools – such as Apple’s Screen Time and app blockers such as Opal and Forest – integrate seamlessly with the digital lifestyles of users. They also create precise metrics for digital well-being, which facilitates their solutions to reduce screen time. On the other hand, non-digital solutions, including mindfulness practices, digital detoxes, and digital well-being coaching, offer a new set of tools to reconnect individuals to their natural rhythms and help to actively promote offline activities. We then move to discuss diversity and how various groups of users have strikingly different digital well-being needs. Embracing neurodiversity in digital well-being is crucial as it strongly impacts the users’ experience of online technologies. When designing for diversity, organisations and designers alike need to prioritise customization for people with physical disabilities, mitigate harmful content for users with mental well-being conditions, address gender stereotypes and online harassment, and be designed in ways that recognize the very real risks of online technologies. This report closes by examining cultural differences. We believe that non-Western conceptions of well-being offer rich sources for enhancing digital well-being insofar as these traditions can inform and inspire the designers of future online technologies. We focus on East-Asian and South-Asian traditions, although in further work we recognise it would be useful to investigate conceptions of well-being that are influential in the Gulf region, Africa, and South America. Each of these areas have ethical frameworks that discuss well-being in depth as well as a rich cultural heritage. In conclusion, this report’s insights underscore the imperative of recognizing diversity in digital well-being, both in terms of cultural contexts and disciplinary perspectives. It emphasises the need for culturally responsive design methodologies and the integration of non-Western philosophical perspectives into current digital well-being research. Embracing this diversity, we believe, offers the best chance to create digital environments that prioritise well-being for users and the societies they live in across the world. Ultimately, we believe that it is not only about designing better online products; it’s about shaping a digital landscape that promotes well-being and flourishing for everyone.

Relational approaches are gaining more and more importance in philosophy of tech-nology. This brings up the critical question of how they can be implemented in applied ethics, law, and practice. In “Extremely Relational Robots: Implications for Law and Ethics”, Nancy S. Jecker (2024) comments on my article “Not Relational Enough? Towards an Eco-Relational Approach in Robot Ethics” (Puzio, 2024), in which I present a deep relational, “eco-relational approach”. In this reply, I address two of Jecker’s criticisms: in section. 3, I deal with the connection of personhood and human identity with relationality, and in section. 4, I discuss the consequences of relational approaches for practical ethics and law. Unlike Jecker, I am strongly convinced that relational approaches can and should be implemented in applied ethics and law.

Mit den Fortschritten in Generativer Künstlicher Intelligenz, Large Language Models, Brain-Computer Interfaces und genetischen Eingriffen gewinnt auch der Transhumanismus an Relevanz. Der Transhumanismus ist ein beliebtes Thema der Medien und wird in Tages- und Wochenzeitungen sowie im Fernsehen gerne aufgegriffen. Außerdem gibt es inzwischen viele Filme, die den Transhumanismus thematisieren, z. B. die Dokumentation „Endlich unendlich“ (2021, Regie: Stephan Bergmann). Der Transhumanismus wurde in Österreich auch Gegenstand einer Verschwörungserzählung, über die der Bayrische Rundfunk aufgeklärt hat. Auf den Wahlplakaten der „Partei für Gesundheitsforschung“ ist der Transhumanist Aubrey de Grey abgebildet, der ein in Cambridge lebender Brite ist, aber auf Plakaten in Deutschland dargestellt wird. Diese und weitere Entwicklungen machen es notwendig, sich mit dem Transhumanismus aus wissenschaftlicher Perspektive auseinanderzusetzen. Was ist der Transhumanismus? Alle sprechen von Transhumanismus, aber was der Transhumanismus letztlich ist, bleibt häufig unklar. Der Transhumanismus (TH) ist eine philosophisch-technologische Bewegung des 20. und 21. Jahrhunderts, die es sich zum Ziel setzt, mittels neuer Technologien den Menschen grundlegend zu transformieren. Wichtig ist dabei, dass sich der TH nicht mit den Optimierungsbestrebungen in der Gesellschaft oder technologischem Fortschritt gleichsetzen lässt. Vielmehr verstehe ich unter TH die Gruppe, die sich um die Organisation Humanity+ in Kalifornien versammelt und die Personen, die sich explizit alsVertreter*innen des TH verstehen. Der TH hat eine ganz eigene Agenda, eigene Institutionen, Organisationen und Publikationsorgane.4 Zu den Themen und Visionen gehören die Lebensverlängerung von mehreren Hundert Jahren bis zur Unsterblichkeit, Kryonik (das Einfrieren des Körpers, der wieder aufgetaut werden soll, wenn nach transhumanistischer Vorstellung Unsterblichkeit ermöglicht werden kann), umfassendes Enhancement und die Verschmelzung von Körper und Technik sowie Beseitigung allen Leids, aller Krankheiten und Aufhebung des Alterns. Der TH strebt danach, mittels Technik neue Sinnesfähigkeiten zu erlangen und neue (virtuelle) Erfahrungswelten zu erschließen. Außerdem wird von vielen Transhumanist*innen auch die hochspekulative Vision des Mind Uploading vertreten, die streng genommen dem Posthumanismus zugeordnet werden muss Gemäß dieser Vision soll durch das maschinelle Lesen des Gehirns der ganze Mensch auf ein externes Medium hochgeladen werden können. Die Vision des Mind Uploadings ist aus naturwissenschaftlicher Perspektive hochumstritten, ist aber ein sehr beliebtes Motiv, das auch außerhalb des TH Wirkung zeigt und in viele Science-Fiction- Filme Eingang gefunden hat (z.B. die Amazon Serie „Upload“, 2020, Regie: Greg Daniels). Das Bestreben des TH, den Menschen grundlegend zu transformieren, wirft zunächst die Frage auf, wie der TH den Menschen überhaupt versteht. Dieser Frage nach dem Menschenverständnis des TH habe ich mich in meinem Buch „Über-Menschen. Philosophische Auseinandersetzung mit der Anthropologie des Transhumanismus“ gewidmet. Philosophische Anthropologie bezeichnet die wissenschaftlichen, philosophischen Reflexionen auf den Menschen. Welches Menschenverständnis vertritt der TH und lässt sich unsere Anthropologie auf dieser Grundlage weiterentwickeln? Das Buch gliedert sich in drei Teile: Teil 1 führt zuerst in die Bewegung des TH ein, worauf Teil II aufbaut, der sich mit dem Menschenverständnis des TH beschäftigt. Teil III betrachtet schließlich heutige Optimierungsbestrebungen in der Gesellschaft sowie neue Ansätze für die Technikanthropologie (z. B. Kritischer Posthumanismus und Neuer Materialismus). Die nachfolgenden Kapitel dieses Aufsatzes sind ein Ausschnitt aus Teil II, der Untersuchung des transhumanistischen Menschenverständnisses. Dieser Aufsatz widmet sich dem „genetisch codierten Menschen“ im TH, also der transhumanistischen Sicht auf den Menschen als jemanden, die*der vollständig von ihren*seinen Genen bestimmt ist. Der genetische Diskurs ist nur einer von fünf im TH dominanten Diskursen, die das transhumanistische Menschenverständnis ausmachen. Zu den anderen Diskursen bzw. transhumanistischen Bestimmungen des Menschen gehören: der Diskurs um die „Natur des Menschen“, der Maschinendiskurs – die Bestimmung des Menschen als Maschine –, der neurowissenschaftliche Diskurs – die Gleichsetzung des Menschen mit dem Gehirn bzw. Neuronalem und zuletzt die metaphysischen Verhältnisbestimmungen von Geist und Körper (PUZIO, Über-Menschen, Kap. 4). Diese transhumanistischen Bestimmungen des Menschen werden am Ende ausgewertet. Ohne die Ergebnisse dieses Kapitels im Detail vorwegnehmen zu wollen, kann für die Gesamtuntersuchung des TH gesagt werden, dass das transhumanistische Menschenverständnis sich als hochproblematisch erweist. Die transhumanistischen Argumentationsstrukturen sind nicht tragfähig und der TH behauptet sich auf die Naturwissenschaften zu berufen, widerspricht allerdings den aktuellen Ergebnissen der Naturwissenschaften. Dies wird in den nachfolgenden Kapiteln gut deutlich werden. Der TH hat ein reduktionistisches Menschenverständnis und reduziert den Menschen beispielsweise auf „Information“. Viele Ausführungen sind diskriminierend z. B. gegenüber Kranken, Alternden und Menschen mit Behinderungen und letztendlich wird sogar jeder Mensch, auch der gesunde junge Mensch, gegenüber der Maschine abgewertet, die aus transhumanistischer Sicht den Menschen weit übertrifft. Im weiteren Verlauf der Arbeit werden sogar „ideologische Elemente“ im TH identifiziert. Daher wird in der Arbeit abgelehnt, den TH als Grundlage für die Weiterentwicklung der Anthropologie zu verwenden und stattdessen werden im letzten Teil der Arbeit alternative Ansätze für die Technikanthropologie präsentiert. Wie bereits erwähnt, richtet sich die Kritik am TH jedoch nicht gegen die heutige Optimierung in der Gesellschaft, die ebenfalls im letzten Teil der Arbeit diskutiert wird. Optimierungsbestrebungen hat es schon immer gegeben und sie werden nun durch neue Technologien weiter verändert, sie sind aber nicht mit der Bewegung des TH gleichzusetzen. Das Kapitel ist eingebettet zwischen dem Maschinendiskurs (Mensch als Maschine) mit seinen Ausführungen zu Information und Kybernetik und dem neurowissenschaftlichen Diskurs („Der Mensch ist ihr*sein Gehirn“). Es wird im Folgenden der genetische Diskurs im TH untersucht, also wie der TH den Menschen vollständig auf Gene zurückführt, und dies schließlich kritisch geprüft. Sind „gute Gene“ alles? Kann der Mensch vollständig über ihre*seine Gene bestimmt werden? Und was hat es mit der trügerischen „genetischen Information“ auf sich? Zunächst wird der genetische Diskurs im TH dargestellt, also die genetischen Ausführungen des TH präsentiert (Kap. 2), danach wird der Blick auf den Gebrauch der genetischen Metaphern im TH gerichtet (Kap. 3) und zuletzt werden die genetischen Vorstellungen des TH kritisiert (Kap. 4). Der Aufsatz schließt in Kap. 5mit einer (vorläufigen) Zusammenführung der Ergebnisse und einem Ausblick.

With robots increasingly integrated into various areas of life, the question of relationships with them is gaining prominence. Are friendship and partnership with robots possible? While there is already extensive research on relationships with robots, this article critically examines whether the relationship with non-human entities is sufficiently explored on a deeper level, especially in terms of ethical concepts such as autonomy, agency, and responsibility. In robot ethics, ethical concepts and considerations often presuppose properties such as consciousness, sentience, and intelligence, which are exclusively aligned with humans. I will challenge the understanding of these properties by anchoring them in contexts, bodies, and actions. This approach allows to consider the specific ways of being of various human and non-human entities and to identify these properties in non-human entities as well. My “eco-relational” approach posits that it is crucial to consider the relationality with non-human entities such as animals and technology in central ethical concepts from the beginning. This approach reflects the “eco”, the entire house in which we live including animals and robots. To support this, I examine two dominant approaches in robot ethics within the contemporary Western tradition: the “properties approach” and modestly relational approaches. I will develop an eco-relational approach as an alternative. Employing a phenomenological method, I will demonstrate through various examples that our properties and actions are inherently connected with non-human entities. I will show that robots play a central role in our properties and actions, leading to concepts such as hybrid actions and non-human agency. It becomes clear that technology and our relationships with it disrupt traditional ethical concepts.

Wenn man heute Instagram öffnet, begegnen vielfältige Beiträge zu Gendervielfalt, sexueller Aufklärung, Umweltengagement und Körperoptimierung. Auf Instagram gibt es Queerness ebenso wie neue Lebensformen, ein neues Verhältnis zur Umwelt, veränderte Selbstverständnisse, eine breite Varianz von Formen der Selbstdarstellung und Körperinszenierung. Die hier gezeigten veränderten Lebenswirklichkeiten und Selbstverständnisse der Menschen legen nahe, dass diese neuen Entwicklungen in eine zeitgenössische Anthropologie, die sich mit dem menschlichen Selbstverständnis wissenschaftlich auseinandersetzt, aufgenommen werden müssen. Der Aufsatz nimmt die Social-Media-Plattform Instagram als Anlass, um Perspektiven für eine zeitgenössische Anthropologie aufzuzeigen. Dazu wird untersucht, durch welche Perspektiven die Anthropologie ergänzt werden muss und wie die theoretischen Ansätze des Neuen Materialismus dafür fruchtbar gemacht werden können. Im ersten Schritt wird in die Themen auf Instagram sowie den Zusammenhang von Instagram und Anthropologie eingeführt (2). Davon ausgehend werden drei Themen für eine zeitgemäße Anthropologieuntersucht: Technik (Technikanthropologie), Körper und Körperoptimierung sowie Umwelt und die Beziehungen zu nichtmenschlichen Entitäten (3). Anschließend werden der Neue Materialismus (4) vorgestellt und dazu die Ansätze von Donna Haraway und Karen Barad skizziert, sodass daraus Schlüsse für eine zeitgemäße Anthropologie gezogen werden können (5). Dies mündet in einen Ausblick auf die weitere anthropologische Forschung (6).