Genoveva Martí

We have witnessed a fundamental change of perspective in the conception of reference. What the proponents of the new approach criticized and what they proposed to abandon is relatively clear; it is much less clear though what is at the heart of the philosophy that inspired the change. The proponents of the new approach all agreed in disagreeing with Frege: natural languages may, and in fact do, contain expressions that refer without the mediation of a Fregean sense. The core motto of the revolution can thus be summarized in a phrase: there are linguistic devices of pure reference. It is difficult though to put one's finger on a clear characterization of what pure reference consists in. This is so, I believe, because, underlying the anti-Fregean slogans, there are two different ideas which are not just two conceptually different ways of characterizing the same phenomenon. The two conflict in the classifications that they generate, because they rely on different conceptions of the essence of pure, genuine reference.

The following Principle of Substitutivity holds for the former, but not for the latter sentence: (PS) The truth value of (the proposition expressed by) a sentence that contains an occurrence of t1 remains constant when t2 is substituted for t1, provided that t1 and t2 are codesignative singular terms. It is an undeniable fact that different sentences behave differently when it comes to which substitutions preserve their truth value. What is curious is that this fact has been presented by the philosophical tradition as a puzzle. To be more precise, what is supposed to be puzzling is the breakdown of PS in some sentences. Meanwhile, it is assumed that everything is as it should be, that nothing needs to be explained when we observe that the substitution of 'the number of planets' for 'nine' in 'nine is greater than seven' guarantees the preservation of truth value, in spite of the fact that the subject matter of the former sentence and the subject matter of 'the number of planets is greater than seven' are radically different. The former sentence expresses a claim about numbers and their relationships, whereas the latter sentence makes an assertion about our solar system.

This dissertation examines critically the assumptions of extensionalism and the traditional doctrine of substitutivity, according to which codesignativeness or coextensionality of terms should be a sufficient condition to guarantee intersubstitution of expression salva veritate. First, the discussion focuses on the traditional justifications of the extensionalist principles of substitutivity. The following alleged sources of support for extensionalism are examined: the claim that the extensionalist approach to substitutivity relies on fundamental principles outside the domain of semantics, like the Law of Indiscernibility of Identicals and Leibniz's Law of Substitutivity; the assumption that all sentences that exhibit failures of substitutivity have in common a certain structure, that they include explicit or implicit intensional operators, which cause failures of substitutivity; the presumption that the extensionalist principles of substitutivity follow from a thesis of compositionality of meaning,according to which the meaning of a complex expression is determined by the meanings of its components and the mode of composition. Second, the intuitive foundations of a theory about the contributions of terms to the assertions expressed by uses of sentences are explored. I claim that this theory provides strong reasons to reject the extensionalist approach to substitutivity

In this work we examine critically how two competing approaches to meaning account for disagreements. We will argue that Hart's conventionalist stance does not commit him to descriptivism. That non-descriptivist theories of reference, properly understood, can account for a vast array of cases of interpretive disagreement and that and that an account of different kinds of disagreement can be provided from a conventionalist perspective within the framework of non-descriptivist theories of reference

This paper examines and discusses an argument for the collapse of modal distincions offered by Quine in "Reference and Modality" and in Word and Object that relies exclusively on a version of the Principle of Substitution. It is argued that the argument does not affect its historical targets: Carnap's treatment of modality, presented in Meaning and Necessity, and Church's Logic of Sense and Denotation, developed by Kaplan; nor does it affect a treatment of modality inspired in Frege's treatment of oblique contexts. It is argued, nevertheless, that the immunity of those systems to Quine's argument depends on the success of their rejection of the Principle of Substitution presupposed by Quine

In this paper I examine two ways of defining the rigidity of general terms. First I discuss the view that rigid general terms express essential properties. I argue that the view is ultimately unsatisfactory, although not on the basis of the standard objections raised against it. I then discuss the characterisation in terms of sameness of designation in every possible world. I defend that view from two objections but I argue that the approach, although basically right, should be interpreted cautiously