•  103
    Two spurious varieties of compositionality
    Minds and Machines 6 (2): 159-72. 1996.
      The paper examines an alleged distinction claimed to exist by Van Gelder between two different, but equally acceptable ways of accounting for the systematicity of cognitive output (two varieties of compositionality): concatenative compositionality vs. functional compositionality. The second is supposed to provide an explanation alternative to the Language of Thought Hypothesis. I contend that, if the definition of concatenative compositionality is taken in a different way from the official one…Read more
  •  61
    Putnam's Dewey lectures
    Theoria 12 (2): 213-223. 1997.
    This paper points out several difficulties to understand Putnam’s views in his recent “Dewey Lectures”, which involve a certain move away from his “internal realism”. The main goal is to set into relief tensions in Putnam’s thinking probably provoked by his philosophical development. Two such tensions are touched upon. In the first place, Putnam wants to reject an account of phenomenal consciousness (sensory experience in particular) he had subscribed to during his realist times, which he calls …Read more
  •  3112
    Filosofia da Linguagem
    In Pedro Galvão (ed.), Filosofia: Uma Introdução por Disciplinas, Edições 70. 2012.
    A filosofia da linguagem dedica-se ao estudo da linguagem natural. Não se dedica ao estudo de línguas particulares, tal como o português, o castelhano ou o inglês, mas sim ao estudo filosófico de características gerais da linguagem e da nossa capacidade e proficiência linguística enquanto seres humanos. A investigação do desenvolvimento da linguagem é uma tarefa a ser desenvolvida pela ciência – a paleontologia, a neurologia, etc. Mas a ciência ocupa-se de algo de que temos um conhecimento intu…Read more
  •  264
    Sense data: The sensible approach
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 62 (1): 17-63. 2001.
    In this paper, I present a version of a sense-data approach to perception, which differs to a certain extent from well-known versions like the one put forward by Jackson. I compare the sense-data view to the currently most popular alternative theories of perception, the so-called Theory of Appearing (a very specific form of disjunctivist approaches) on the one hand and reductive representationalist approaches on the other. I defend the sense-data approach on the basis that it improves substantia…Read more
  •  206
    Fregean versus Kripkean Reference
    Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 17 (1): 21-44. 1998.
    n this paper I take up these proposals, giving reasons to incorporate semantic features associated with proper names over and above their referent in any (genuine) semantic account of natural language. I also argue that my proposal is compatible with the main points made in Naming and Necessity, by contending that not Millianism but externalism was the claim most forcefully argued for in that impressive piece of work
  •  40
    A Non-modal Conception of Secondary Properties
    Philosophical Papers 36 (1): 1-33. 2007.
    There seems to be a distinction between primary and secondary properties; some philosophers defend the view that properties like colours and values are secondary, while others criticize it. The distinction is usually introduced in terms of essence; roughly, secondary properties essentially involve mental states, while primary properties do not. In part because this does not seem very illuminating, philosophers have produced different reductive analyses in modal terms, metaphysic or epistemic. He…Read more
  •  14
    Putnam’s Dewey Lectures
    Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 12 (2): 213-223. 1997.
    This paper points out several difficulties to understand Putnam’s views in his recent “Dewey Lectures”, which involve a certain move away from his “internal realism”. The main goal is to set into relief tensions in Putnam’s thinking probably provoked by his philosophical development. Two such tensions are touched upon. In the first place, Putnam wants to reject an account of phenomenal consciousness (sensory experience in particular) he had subscribed to during his realist times, which he calls …Read more
  •  71
    Doubts about Fregean reference
    Philosophical Issues 6 104-112. 1995.
    Questions Sosa's views on Fregean referece.
  •  682
    About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2016.
    Inspired by Castañeda (1966, 1968), Perry (1979) and Lewis (1979) showed that a specific variety of singular thoughts, thoughts about oneself “as oneself” – de se thoughts, as Lewis called them – raise special issues, and they advanced rival accounts. Their suggestive examples raise the problem of de se thought – to wit, how to characterize it so as to give an accurate account of the data, tracing its relations to singular thoughts in general. After rehearsing the main tenets of two contrasting …Read more
  •  382
    Searle on Perception
    Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 18 (1): 19-41. 1999.
    In the course of his discussion of perception, Searle criticizes representative theories in general. In this paper I will argue that, even though his criticisms may be adequate regarding a certain form of these theories, perhaps the most frequently defended by philosophers of perception, a version I will outline here scapes to them. A second issue I raise concerns Searle’s claim that his theory of perception is a form of direct realism. I will raise difficulties for Searle’s attempt to maintain …Read more
  •  11
    Norms of Presupposition
    In Erich Rast & Luiz Carlos Baptista (eds.), Meaning and Context, Peter Lang. pp. 2--17. 2010.
    This paper provides a normative/prescriptive account of the act of presupposing, and it argues that some presuppositions are conventionally triggered. After providing an initial intuitive characterization of presuppositions, the paper introduces the influential Stalnakerian account, and shows how the well-known practice of informative presupposition puts heavy strain on it. It then explains how a prescriptive account deals well with that problem, and how it accounts for what is known as the Trig…Read more