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49Meaning, Bivalence and RealismProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81. 1981.Dorothy Edgington; X*—Meaning, Bivalence and Realism, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 81, Issue 1, 1 June 1981, Pages 153–174, https://doi.org/1.
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43I-CounterfactualsProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt1): 1-21. 2008.I argue that the suppositional view of conditionals, which is quite popular for indicative conditionals, extends also to subjunctive or counterfactual conditionals. According to this view, conditional judgements should not be construed as factual, categorical judgements, but as judgements about the consequent under the supposition of the antecedent. The strongest evidence for the view comes from focusing on the fact that conditional judgements are often uncertain; and conditional uncertainty, wh…Read more
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42The Inaugural Address: Two Kinds of PossibilityAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 1-22. 2004.I defend a version of Kripke's claim that the metaphysically necessary and the knowable a priori are independent. On my version, there are two independent families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, neither stronger than the other. Metaphysical possibility is constrained by the laws of nature. Logical validity, I suggest, is best understood in terms of epistemic necessity.
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37The mystery of the missing boundary (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3). 2005.
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36The Presidential Address: CounterfactualsProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3). 2008.
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34X*—Meaning, Bivalence and RealismProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81 (1): 153-174. 1981.Dorothy Edgington; X*—Meaning, Bivalence and Realism, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 81, Issue 1, 1 June 1981, Pages 153–174, https://doi.org/1.
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27Ramsey's Legacies on Conditionals and TruthIn Hallvard Lillehammer & D. H. Mellor (eds.), Ramsey's Legacy, Oxford University Press. 2005.Book synopsis: The Cambridge philosopher Frank Ramsey died tragically young, but had already established himself as one of the most brilliant minds of the twentieth century. Besides groundbreaking work in philosophy, particularly in logic, language, and metaphysics, he created modern decision theory and made substantial contributions to mathematics and economics. In these original essays, written to commemorate the centenary of Ramsey's birth, a distinguished international team of contributors o…Read more
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26Changing Beliefs Rationally: Some PuzzlesIn Jes Ezquerro (ed.), Cognition, Semantics and Philosophy, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 47--73. 1992.
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25Graeme Forbes, "The Metaphysics of Modality" (review)Philosophical Quarterly 38 (52): 365. 1988.
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23Causation First: Why Causation is Prior to CounterfactualsIn Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Sarah R. Beck (eds.), Understanding Counterfactuals, Understanding Causation, Oxford University Press. pp. 230. 2011.
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22The Concept of Probability by J. R. Lucas. (Oxford University Press, 1970. Pp. viii + 220. £2.10.)Philosophy 47 (182): 375-. 1972.
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21The Pragmatics of the Logical ConstantsIn Ernest Lepore & Barry Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press. pp. 768--793. 2006.The logical constants are technical terms, invented and precisely defined by logicians for the purpose of producing rigorous formal proofs. Mathematics virtually exhausts the domain of deductive reasoning of any complexity, and it is there that the benefits of this refined form of language are felt. Pragmatic issues may arise — issues concerning the point of making a certain statement — for there will be more or less perspicuous and illuminating ways of presenting proofs in this language, and we…Read more
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15And AssertionIn Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes From the Philosophy of Frank Jackson, Oxford University Press. pp. 283. 2009.
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14The Mystery of the Missing BoundaryPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3): 704-711. 2005.
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13What if? Questions About ConditionalsMind and Language 18 (4): 380-401. 2003.Section 1 briefly examines three theories of indicative conditionals. The Suppositional Theory is defended, and shown to be incompatible with understanding conditionals in terms of truth conditions. Section 2 discusses the psychological evidence about conditionals reported by Over and Evans (this volume). Section 3 discusses the syntactic grounds offered by Haegeman (this volume) for distinguishing two sorts of conditional.
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9ConditionalsIn Lou Goble (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic, Blackwell. 2017.It is controversial how best to classify conditionals. According to some theorists, the forward‐looking indicatives (those with a ‘will’ in the main clause) belong with the subjunctives (those with a ‘would’ in the main clause), and not with the other indicatives. The easy transition from typical ‘wills’ to ‘woulds’ is indeed a datum to be explained. Still, straightforward statements about the past, present or future, to which a conditional clause is attached—the traditional class of indicative …Read more
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3Conditionals, truth and assertionIn Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes From the Philosophy of Frank Jackson, Oxford University Press. 2009.
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2Iterated attitudes. CommentaryIn J. W. Davis (ed.), Philosophical logic, D. Reidel. pp. 85-158. 1969.
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1Sorensen on Vagueness and ContradictionIn Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Cuts and Clouds: Vaguenesss, its Nature and its Logic, Oxford University Press. 2010.
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1Analysis 52.4 october 1992In Delia Graff & Timothy Williamson (eds.), Vagueness, Ashgate. pp. 27--207. 2002.
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1MACKIE, J. L. "Truth, Probability and Paradox: Studies in Philosophical Logic" (review)Mind 85 (n/a): 303. 1976.
London, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Probability |