A. C. Grayling

The ten essays gathered together in this book treat of truth, meaning, realism, natural kind terms, and related topics. Almost all began life as invited contributions to conferences. From the Preface we learn that Grayling, in contrast to those colleagues whose perfectionism leads them to publish too little, preferred to ‘venture ideas as if they were letters to friends’. The style could hardly be called epistolary, however; a high level of generality is maintained throughout, and there is much plotting of the relationships between philosophical positions. An aesthetic of tentativeness also prevails: at one point, for example, Grayling withdraws his too hasty offer of a sketch of an argument, in favour of ‘a sketch of how an argument might look in outline’. A sketch of a sketch, perhaps?Things are not so sketchy that one cannot discern some positive claims. One of these is embodied in what …

Within the history of western philosophy, there have been a number of classic ways of arguing for the existence of God. The most important of these are the teleological argument, the ontological argument, the cosmological argument, the moral argument, and a loose family of pragmatic considerations affirming the prudence or desirability of theistic belief. Demonstrating the weaknesses of these approaches is crucial for establishing the ‘negative’ case for atheism. This essay begins by defining what it is that philosophers normally means by ‘God’—i.e., what it is that the classic arguments in the philosophy of religion are arguing about. It then outlines and critiques each main approach in turn, focusing primarily on its most classic and influential expressions within the western philosophical tradition.

In this new collection A.C. Grayling adds to the variety of discussion and insight in his previous three essay collections. He returns to questions of personal ethics and the problems of the contemporary world, but also looks at the lives and ideas of great thinkers, the role of the arts in civilisation, and the need for reason everywhere Anthony Grayling illustrates in his celebrated accessible prose what each area offers to thought. In a wide-ranging array of illuminating topics, THE HEART OF THINGS shows how far-reaching Grayling's masterly, and timely, commentary on the humanities is to general readers.

_A renowned philosopher challenges long-held views on just wars, ethical conduct during war, why wars occur, how they alter people and societies, and more_ For residents of the twenty-first century, a vision of a future without warfare is almost inconceivable. Though wars are terrible and destructive, they also seem unavoidable. In this original and deeply considered book, A. C. Grayling examines, tests, and challenges the concept of war. He proposes that a deeper, more accurate understanding of war may enable us to reduce its frequency, mitigate its horrors, and lessen the burden of its consequences. Grayling explores the long, tragic history of war and how warfare has changed in response to technological advances. He probes much-debated theories concerning the causes of war and considers positive changes that may result from war. How might these results be achieved without violence? In a profoundly wise conclusion, the author envisions “just war theory” in new moral terms, taking into account the lessons of World War II and the Holocaust and laying down ethical principles for going to war and for conduct during war.

We have learned to be suspicious of the claim that a serious account of knowledge must begin at the Cartesian starting point, that is, with private data of consciousness serving as a basis for outward inferences to the world, these inferences proceeding on the security of one or another kind of epistemic collateral ranging from the goodness of a deity to the bruteness of the given. But the good reasons we have for dismissing the egocentric predicament as our motive for epistemology are not good reasons for dismissing a different predicament, one with which it is too often confused: namely, our finitary predicament, the fact that our powers of perception, memory and reason, even when co-operatively applied, are limited. For even if we are bound to conceive of general knowledge as the outcome of fundamental kinds of conceptual co-operation, the fact remains that our knowledge claims are underdetermined by the evidence we have for them; and that the framework, however collectively established, of what Quine calls our ‘immemorial theory’ of the world does not therefore protect particular knowledge-claims from defeasibility.