Samuel Guttenplan

With the same intellectual goals as the first edition, this innovative introductory logic textbook explores the relationship between natural language and logic, motivating the student to acquire skills and techniques of formal logic. This new and revised edition includes substantial additions which make the text even more useful to students and instructors alike. Central to these changes is an Appendix, 'How to Learn Logic', which takes the student through fourteen compact and sharply directed lessons with exercises and answers

Virtually all currently discussed accounts advert to a shift or replacement of a property or properties in describing what happens to the ordinary words in metaphors. And the mechanism of this shift tends to involve an overt or sometimes hidden appeal to similarity, or to some notion that is essentially connected to it. In the first part of the paper, I argue that this route is a dead end, and in the second part I offer my own preferred alternative. That alternative is not argued for, or developed in detail – that is done in my book Objects of Metaphor – but my main aim in the paper is simply showing how radically it differs from the property route.

The philosophy of mind is one of the fastest-growing areas in philosophy, not least because of its connections with related areas of psychology, linguistics and computation. This _Companion_ is an alphabetically arranged reference guide to the subject, firmly rooted in the philosophy of mind, but with a number of entries that survey adjacent fields of interest. The book is introduced by the editor's substantial _Essay on the Philosophy of Mind_ which serves as an overview of the subject, and is closely referenced to the entries in the Companion. Among the entries themselves are several "self-profiles" by leading philosophers in the field, including Chomsky, Davidson, Dennett, Dretske, Fodor, Lewis, Searle and Stalnaker, in which their own positions within the subject are articulated. In some more complex areas, more than one author has been invited to write on the same topic, giving a polarity of viewpoints within the book's overall coverage. All main entries have a full bibliography, and the book is indexed to the high standards set by other volumes in the Blackwell Companions to Philosophy series

In the first section of the paper, I set out a tripartite scheme for classifying philosophical accounts of metaphor. In the second and longest section, I explore a major difficulty for certain of these accounts, namely the need to explain what I describe as the 'transparency' of metaphor. In the third section, I describe two accounts which can overcome the difficulty. The first is loosely based on Davidson's treatment of metaphor, and, finding this to be inadequate for reasons having nothing to do with transparency, it will be used solely to show the way. The second is my own, and, without attempting to defend it at length, I will content myself with suggesting how it can cope with the difficulty discussed in this paper in a way which mimics the Davidsonian proposal. Finally, in the fourth section, I shall briefly mention several considerations independent of transparency for adopting my account.

This flexible introductory textbook explores several key themes in philosophy, and helps the reader learn to engage with the key arguments by introducing and analysing a selection of classic readings. Fully integrated introductory text with readings for beginning students of philosophy. Each chapter focusses on a core philosophical topic, and contains an introduction to the topic, 2 classic readings and interactive commentaries on the readings. An introductory book which doesn't merely _tell_ the reader about the subject, but requires them to engage philosophically with the text. A pedagogical resource developed in the classroom by the authors at the University of London.