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328Truth without truthmaking entitiesIn Helen Beebee & Julian Dodd (eds.), Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate, Clarendon Press. pp. 33. 2005.This chapter replies to arguments, advanced by Gonzalo Rodriguez–Pereyra, for thinking that the intuitions that have inspired theories of truthmaking cannot be accommodated without commitment to truth-making entities. It contains a suggestion about why, even if there are no entities that make propositions true, we should nonetheless be apt to think of truth as grounded. The advocates of truthmakers engage sometimes in a specifically ontological enquiry of a wide-ranging sort, sometimes in the pr…Read more
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318Causality and “the mental”Humana Mente 8 (29). 2015.Many analytic philosophers of mind take for granted a certain conception of causality. Assumptions deriving from that conception are in place when they problematize what they call mental causation or argue for physicalism in respect of the mental. I claim that a different conception of causality is needed for understanding many ordinary causal truths about things which act, including truths about human, minded beings — sc. rational beings who lead lives.
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353Agency and causal explanationIn Alfred R. Mele (ed.), The philosophy of action, Oxford University Press. 1997.I. There are two points of view: ___ From the personal point of view, an action is a person's doing something for a reason, and her doing it is found intelligible when we know the reason that led her to it. ___ From the impersonal point of view, an action would be a link in a causal chain that could be viewed without paying any attention to people, the links being understood by reference to the world's causal workings
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56Acts and Other Events By Judith Jarvis Thomson Cornell University Press, 1977, 274 pp., £10.50 (review)Philosophy 54 (208): 253-. 1979.
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200Know How, by Jason Stanley,(Oxford University Press), $45/£ 25The Philosophers' Magazine 57 (57): 120-121. 2012.
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150The standard story of action: an exchangeIn Jesús H. Aguilar & Andrei A. Buckareff (eds.), Causing Human Actions: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action, Bradford. pp. 57-68. 2010.Book synopsis: The causal theory of action is widely recognized in the literature of the philosophy of action as the "standard story" of human action and agency—the nearest approximation in the field to a theoretical orthodoxy. This volume brings together leading figures working in action theory today to discuss issues relating to the CTA and its applications, which range from experimental philosophy to moral psychology. Some of the contributors defend the theory while others criticize it; some …Read more
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197Dealing with factsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research. 2001.This is a contribution to a symposium on Stephen Neale's Facing Facts. I bring to the discussion a different theory of facts from any Neale considers, and argue that it avoids flaws in Russell’s theory.
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244Speech Acts and PerformativesIn Ernie Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press. 2005.This article aims to connect Austin's seminal notion of a speech act with developments in philosophy of language over the last forty odd years. It starts by considering how speech acts might be conceived in Austin's general theory. Then it turns to the illocutionary acts with which much philosophical writing on speech acts has been concerned, and finally to the performatives which Austin's own treatment of speech as action took off from.
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88B. Vermazen and M. B. Hintikka, "Essays on Davidson: Actions and Events" (review)Philosophical Quarterly 36 (43): 296. 1986.
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146Ryle's Knowing how and knowing how to actIn John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action, Oxford University Press Usa. pp. 80. 2011.
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64Davidson and Dummett on the social character ofIn Maria Cristina Amoretti & Nicla Vassallo (eds.), Knowledge, Language, and Interpretation: On the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, De Gruyter. pp. 14--107. 2008.
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803Physicalist thinking and conceptions of behaviourIn Philip Pettit (ed.), Subject, Thought, And Context, Clarendon Press. 1986.
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139Arm Raising and Arm RisingPhilosophy 55 (211). 1980.I. It is a necessary condition of the truth of ‘I raised my arm’ that my arm rose; but it is not a sufficient condition. Is there some further necessary condition which, when conjoined with the condition that my arm rose, does give a sufficient condition of the truth of ‘I raised my arm’?
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368Essays on Anscombe's Intention (edited book)Harvard University Press. 2011.This collection of ten essays elucidates some of the more challenging aspects of Anscombe’s work and affirms her reputation as one of our most original ...
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Birkbeck, University of LondonProfessor (Part-time)
Areas of Specialization
| Philosophy of Action |
| Philosophy of Language |
Areas of Interest
| Philosophy of Action |
| Philosophy of Language |