Jennifer Hornsby

Book synopsis: Background In 1998 Routledge published the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy to critical acclaim. The first multi-volume Encyclopedia to be published in the discipline in over thirty years, REP is now regarded as the definitive resource in the field. Featuring 2,000 original entries from a team of over 1,300 of the world's most respected scholars and philosophers, REP swiftly accumulated rave reviews and awards, including selection by Library Journal as one of its 50 Sources for the Millenium, and recognition as an Outstanding Reference Source by the American Library Association. Not content with resting on their laurels, the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy editorial team, led by Professor Edward Craig, then began work on a fully searchable and extensively cross-referenced dynamic Web version, the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online. REP Online expands this acclaimed Encyclopedia well beyond print reference boundaries. The full content of the classic 10-volume set remains at its core, but REP Online is also a living, growing resource designed to grow along with the discipline itself. Taking full advantage of the flexibility of the Web format, each year the REP editorial team brings a diverse range of new material, including newly commissioned entries by leading scholars, making REP Online the essential philosophy reference for faculty and students in a wide range of disciplines. As well as regular additions of new articles, REP Online also provides editorially reviewed links to other sites and resources on the web, revisions and updates of key entries, and periodic upgrades of the user environment. In keeping with the 1998 print set's tradition of first class editorial work and unparalleled breadth of subject matter, all new and revised entries are carefully integrated into the REP style and format and are connected to earlier material by the same kind and level of cross-referencing. Key Features · Covers an unparalleled breadth of subject matter, including Anglo-American, ethical and political, cross-cultural, interdisciplinary, continental and contemporary philosophy · Over 25,000 hot-linked cross-references between articles and new links to other editorially reviewed websites · An invaluable resource for all levels of users - students and general readers gain a rapid orientation with accessible summaries at the beginning of every in-depth article. There are 30 overview (signpost) articles which map their subject areas · Regularly upgraded with new material, revisions, and bibliographic updates, REP provides access to the latest scholarship and major developments in philosphical inquiry worldwide

A disjunctivist conception of acting for reasons is introduced by way of showing that a view of acting for reasons must give a place to knowledge. Two principal claims are made. 1. This conception has a rôle analogous to that of the disjunctive conception that John McDowell recommends in thinking about perception; and when the two disjunctivist conceptions are treated as counterparts, they can be shown to have work to do in combination. 2. This conception of acting for reasons safeguards the connection between considerations that move us to act in particular ways and considerations that favour our acting in particular ways.

Frank Jackson and the author each take the other to hold a position in philosophy of mind that it is extremely difficult to sustain. This chapter tries to say something about how that can be. It seeks to demonstrate the sanity of Jackson's opponents and the fragility of his own position than to hold out for the truth of any particular doctrine. It wants to bring to the surface an assumption in ontology, which is seen as a crucial part of the grounding of Jackson's particular version of physicalism. Once it is appreciated that this assumption is contestable, Jackson's opponents may be seen in a different light from the one in which they appear in his writings. More generally, a connection will appear between the vast literature on physicalism as a topic in philosophy of mind and the equally vast literature on material constitution as a topic in metaphysics

Since 1969, when Dennett introduced a distinction between personal and sub- personal levels of explanation, many philosophers have used 'sub- personal ' very loosely, and Dennett himself has abandoned a view of the personal level as genuinely autonomous. I recommend a position in which Dennett's original distinction is crucial, by arguing that the phenomenon called mental causation is on view only at the properly personal level. If one retains the commit-' ments incurred by Dennett's early distinction, then one has a satisfactory anti-physicalistic, anti-dualist philosophy of mind. It neither interferes with the projects of sub- personal psychology, nor encourages ; instrumentalism at the personal level

The thirteen specially-commissioned essays in this volume are written by philosophers at the forefront of feminist scholarship, and are designed to provide an accessible and stimulating guide to a philosophical literature that has seen massive expansion in recent years. Ranging from history of philosophy through metaphysics to philosophy of science, they encompass all the core subject areas commonly taught in anglophone undergraduate and graduate philosophy courses, offering both an overview of and a contribution to the relevant debates. Together they testify to the intellectual value of feminism as a radicalizing energy internal to philosophical inquiry. This volume will be essential reading for any student or teacher of philosophy who is curious about the place of feminism in their subject.