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458Actions and activityPhilosophical Issues 22 (1): 233-245. 2012.Contemporary literature in philosophy of action seems to be divided overthe place of action in the natural causal world. I think that a disagreementabout ontology underlies the division. I argue here that human action isproperly understood only by reference to a category of process or activity,where this is not a category of particulars
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122V*—Which Physical Events are Mental Events?Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81 (1): 73-92. 1981.Jennifer Hornsby; V*—Which Physical Events are Mental Events?, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 81, Issue 1, 1 June 1981, Pages 73–92, https://do.
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149The presidential address: Truth: The identity theoryProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97 (1). 1997.I want to promote what I shall call ‘the identity theory of truth’. I suggest that other accounts put forward as theories of truth are genuine rivals to it, but are unacceptable. A certain conception of thinkables belongs with the identity theory’s conception of truth. I introduce these conceptions in Part I, by reference to John McDowell’s Mind and World; and I show why they have a place in an identity theory, which I introduce by reference to Frege. In Part II, I elaborate on the conception of…Read more
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35Davidson and Dummett on the social character ofIn Maria Cristina Amoretti & Nicla Vassallo (eds.), Knowledge, Language, and Interpretation: On the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, Ontos Verlag. pp. 14--107. 2008.
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113Simple Mindedness: In Defense of Naive Naturalism in the Philosophy of MindHarvard University Press. 1996.These questions provide the impetus for the detailed discussions of ontology, human agency, and everyday psychological explanation presented in this book.
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58Reply to Jackson, IPhilosophical Explorations 3 (2): 193-195. 2000.This Article does not have an abstract
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504ActionsRoutledge and Kegan Paul. 1980.This book presents an events-based view of human action somewhat different from that of what is known as "standard story". A thesis about trying-to-do-something is distinguished from various volitionist theses. It is argued then that given a correct conception of action's antecedents, actions will be identified not with bodily movements but with causes of such movements.
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142Know How, by Jason Stanley,(Oxford University Press), $45/£ 25The Philosophers' Magazine 57 (57): 120-121. 2012.
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232Truth without truthmaking entitiesIn Helen Beebee & Julian Dodd (eds.), Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate, Clarendon Press. pp. 33. 2005.This chapter replies to arguments, advanced by Gonzalo Rodriguez–Pereyra, for thinking that the intuitions that have inspired theories of truthmaking cannot be accommodated without commitment to truth-making entities. It contains a suggestion about why, even if there are no entities that make propositions true, we should nonetheless be apt to think of truth as grounded. The advocates of truthmakers engage sometimes in a specifically ontological enquiry of a wide-ranging sort, sometimes in the pr…Read more
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15Children's Action Control and Awareness: Comment on Frye and ZelazoIn Johannes Roessler & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology, Clarendon Press. 2003.Book synopsis: Seventeen brand-new essays by leading philosophers and psychologists Genuinely interdisciplinary work, at the forefront of both fields Includes a valuable introduction, uniting common threads.
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436Agency and ActionsRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 55 1-23. 2004.Among philosophical questions about human agency, one can distinguish in a rough and ready way between those that arise in philosophy of mind and those that arise in ethics. In philosophy of mind, one central aim has been to account for the place of agents in a world whose operations are supposedly ‘physical’. In ethics, one central aim has been to account for the connexion between ethical species of normativity and the distinctive deliberative and practical capacities of human beings. Ethics th…Read more
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12Acts and Other Events By Judith Jarvis Thomson Cornell University Press, 1977, 274 pp., £10.50 (review)Philosophy 54 (208): 253-. 1979.
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256Essays on Anscombe's Intention (edited book)Harvard University Press. 2011.This collection of ten essays elucidates some of the more challenging aspects of Anscombe’s work and affirms her reputation as one of our most original ...
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356Intending, knowing how, infinitivesCanadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (1): 1-17. 2016.Intellectualists tell us that a person who knows how to do something therein knows a proposition. Along with others, they may say that a person who intends to do something intends a proposition. I argue against them. I do so by way of considering ‘know how ——’ and ‘intend ——’ together. When the two are considered together, a realistic conception of human agency can inform the understanding of some infinitives: the argument need not turn on what semanticists have had to say about ‘the subjects of…Read more
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106The standard story of action: an exchangeIn J. H. Aguilar & A. A. A. A. Buckareff (eds.), Causing Human Actions: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action, Mit Press. pp. 57-68. 2010.Book synopsis: The causal theory of action is widely recognized in the literature of the philosophy of action as the "standard story" of human action and agency—the nearest approximation in the field to a theoretical orthodoxy. This volume brings together leading figures working in action theory today to discuss issues relating to the CTA and its applications, which range from experimental philosophy to moral psychology. Some of the contributors defend the theory while others criticize it; some …Read more
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Language |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Language |