-
79Facts in Question: A Response to Dodd and to CandlishProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1): 241-246. 1999.Jennifer Homsby; The Facts in Question: A Response to Dodd and to Candlish, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 99, Issue 1, 1 June 1999, Pages 241–
-
159Speech Acts and PerformativesIn Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press. 2006.This article aims to connect Austin's seminal notion of a speech act with developments in philosophy of language over the last forty odd years. It starts by considering how speech acts might be conceived in Austin's general theory. Then it turns to the illocutionary acts with which much philosophical writing on speech acts has been concerned, and finally to the performatives which Austin's own treatment of speech as action took off from.
-
458Basic ActivityAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1): 1-18. 2013.I present a view of activity, taking it that an agent is engaged in activity so long as an action of hers is occurring. I suggest that this view (a) helps in understanding what goes wrong in an argument in Thompson (2008) known sometimes as the ‘initial segment argument’, and (b) enables us to see that there could be an intelligible conception of what is basic when agents' knowledge is allowed into an account of that.
-
105Ryle's Knowing how and knowing how to actIn John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action, Oxford University Press, Usa. pp. 80. 2011.
-
326Personal and sub‐personal; A defence of Dennett's early distinctionPhilosophical Explorations 3 (1): 6-24. 2000.Since 1969, when Dennett introduced a distinction between personal and sub- personal levels of explanation, many philosophers have used 'sub- personal ' very loosely, and Dennett himself has abandoned a view of the personal level as genuinely autonomous. I recommend a position in which Dennett's original distinction is crucial, by arguing that the phenomenon called mental causation is on view only at the properly personal level. If one retains the commit-' ments incurred by Dennett's early disti…Read more
-
53Arm Raising and Arm RisingPhilosophy 55 (211). 1980.I. It is a necessary condition of the truth of ‘I raised my arm’ that my arm rose; but it is not a sufficient condition. Is there some further necessary condition which, when conjoined with the condition that my arm rose, does give a sufficient condition of the truth of ‘I raised my arm’?
-
276Agency and causal explanationIn Alfred R. Mele (ed.), The philosophy of action, Oxford University Press. 1997.I. There are two points of view: ___ From the personal point of view, an action is a person's doing something for a reason, and her doing it is found intelligible when we know the reason that led her to it. ___ From the impersonal point of view, an action would be a link in a causal chain that could be viewed without paying any attention to people, the links being understood by reference to the world's causal workings
-
15II—Jason Stanley: Hornsby on the Phenomenology of SpeechAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 79 (1): 131-145. 2005.
-
149Trying to ActIn Timothy O'Connor & Constantine Sandis (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, Wiley‐blackwell. 2010.This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction The Extent of Trying Trying to Move the Body Trying and Intending References Further reading.
-
243The Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Philosophy (edited book)Cambridge University Press. 2000.The thirteen specially-commissioned essays in this volume are written by philosophers at the forefront of feminist scholarship, and are designed to provide an accessible and stimulating guide to a philosophical literature that has seen massive expansion in recent years. Ranging from history of philosophy through metaphysics to philosophy of science, they encompass all the core subject areas commonly taught in anglophone undergraduate and graduate philosophy courses, offering both an overview of …Read more
-
67Review of 'Know How', by Jason Stanley.
-
3Actions in their circumstancesIn Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby & Frederick Stoutland (eds.), Essays on Anscombe's Intention, Harvard University Press. 2011.
-
125On functionalism, and on Jackson, Pargetter, and prior on functionalismPhilosophical Studies 46 (July): 75-96. 1984.
-
249Agency and AlienationIn Mario De Caro & David Macarthur (eds.), Naturalism In Question, Harvard University Press. pp. 173-87. 2004.It is argued that the standard story of human action, as it is standardly naturalistically understood, should be rejected. Rather than seeking an agent amidst the workings of the mind (as in Velleman's "What Happens When Someone Acts"), we need to recognize an agent’s place in the world she inhabits. And in order to do so we have to resist the naturalistic assumptions of the standard causal story.
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Language |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Language |