•  25
    If ‘Leveson and Women’ were a headline in a tabloid newspaper, a salacious story would probably follow. ‘Leveson and Women’ is my title, but I have nothing salacious to say, although I shall talk about the scandalous behaviour of the British press. I gave evidence to the Leveson Inquiry into the culture, practice and ethics of the press. I write here about how I came to do so, about how the inquiry came into being, and about the controversy that the inquiry and its report continue to provoke.
  •  42
    Book synopsis: Background In 1998 Routledge published the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy to critical acclaim. The first multi-volume Encyclopedia to be published in the discipline in over thirty years, REP is now regarded as the definitive resource in the field. Featuring 2,000 original entries from a team of over 1,300 of the world's most respected scholars and philosophers, REP swiftly accumulated rave reviews and awards, including selection by Library Journal as one of its 50 Sources fo…Read more
  •  151
    A disjunctivist conception of acting for reasons
    In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: perception, action, knowledge, Oxford University Press. 2008.
    A disjunctivist conception of acting for reasons is introduced by way of showing that a view of acting for reasons must give a place to knowledge. Two principal claims are made. 1. This conception has a rôle analogous to that of the disjunctive conception that John McDowell recommends in thinking about perception; and when the two disjunctivist conceptions are treated as counterparts, they can be shown to have work to do in combination. 2. This conception of acting for reasons safeguards the con…Read more
  •  112
    The Poverty of Action Theory
    Philosophical Inquiry 21 (1): 1-19. 1999.
  •  439
    Frank Jackson and the author each take the other to hold a position in philosophy of mind that it is extremely difficult to sustain. This chapter tries to say something about how that can be. It seeks to demonstrate the sanity of Jackson's opponents and the fragility of his own position than to hold out for the truth of any particular doctrine. It wants to bring to the surface an assumption in ontology, which is seen as a crucial part of the grounding of Jackson's particular version of physicali…Read more
  •  67
    Review of 'Know How', by Jason Stanley.
  •  64
    Reply to Wreen
    Analysis 47 (4). 1987.
  •  3
    Actions in their circumstances
    In Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby & Frederick Stoutland (eds.), Essays on Anscombe's Intention, Harvard University Press. 2011.
  •  36
    Reasoned choice
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 32 (1). 1989.
  •  14
    Will and World: A Study in Metaphysics
    Philosophical Review 103 (1): 156. 1994.
  •  249
    Agency and Alienation
    In Mario De Caro & David Macarthur (eds.), Naturalism In Question, Harvard University Press. pp. 173-87. 2004.
    It is argued that the standard story of human action, as it is standardly naturalistically understood, should be rejected. Rather than seeking an agent amidst the workings of the mind (as in Velleman's "What Happens When Someone Acts"), we need to recognize an agent’s place in the world she inhabits. And in order to do so we have to resist the naturalistic assumptions of the standard causal story.
  •  1
    Thomson, Judith Jarvis "acts and other events" (review)
    Philosophy 54 (n/a): 253. 1979.
  •  4
    The Hornsby Discussion
    Philosophy International. 1997.
  •  71
    Frege's Puzzle (review)
    Philosophical Books 28 (3): 161-163. 1987.
  •  195
    Causality and “the mental”
    Humana Mente 8 (29). 2015.
    Many analytic philosophers of mind take for granted a certain conception of causality. Assumptions deriving from that conception are in place when they problematize what they call mental causation or argue for physicalism in respect of the mental. I claim that a different conception of causality is needed for understanding many ordinary causal truths about things which act, including truths about human, minded beings — sc. rational beings who lead lives.
  •  48
    Semantic innocence and psychological understanding
    Philosophical Perspectives 3 549-574. 1989.
  • Book Reviews (review)
    Mind 98 (392): 635-637. 1989.
  •  79
  •  75
    Bodily Movements, Actions, and Mental Epistemology
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1): 275-286. 1986.
  •  135
    Book synopsis: "What is truth?" has long been the philosophical question par excellence. The Nature of Truth collects in one volume the twentieth century's most influential philosophical work on the subject. The coverage strikes a balance between classic works and the leading edge of current philosophical research. The essays center around two questions: Does truth have an underlying nature? And if so, what sort of nature does it have? Thus the book discusses both traditional and deflationary th…Read more
  •  9
    This flexible introductory textbook explores several key themes in philosophy, and helps the reader learn to engage with the key arguments by introducing and analysing a selection of classic readings. Fully integrated introductory text with readings for beginning students of philosophy. Each chapter focusses on a core philosophical topic, and contains an introduction to the topic, 2 classic readings and interactive commentaries on the readings. An introductory book which doesn't merely _tell_ th…Read more
  •  7
    Knowing how and knowing that (review)
    The Philosophers' Magazine 57 120-121. 2012.
  • Saving of
    Analysis 37 (4): 177. 1977.
  •  139
    Dealing with facts
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 2001.
    This is a contribution to a symposium on Stephen Neale's Facing Facts. I bring to the discussion a different theory of facts from any Neale considers, and argue that it avoids flaws in Russell’s theory.
  •  63
    Reply to Weil and Thalberg
    Analysis 41 (1). 1980.