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14Children's Action Control and Awareness: Comment on Frye and ZelazoIn Johannes Roessler & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology, Clarendon Press. 2003.Book synopsis: Seventeen brand-new essays by leading philosophers and psychologists Genuinely interdisciplinary work, at the forefront of both fields Includes a valuable introduction, uniting common threads.
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11Acts and Other Events By Judith Jarvis Thomson Cornell University Press, 1977, 274 pp., £10.50 (review)Philosophy 54 (208): 253-. 1979.
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434Agency and ActionsRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 55 1-23. 2004.Among philosophical questions about human agency, one can distinguish in a rough and ready way between those that arise in philosophy of mind and those that arise in ethics. In philosophy of mind, one central aim has been to account for the place of agents in a world whose operations are supposedly ‘physical’. In ethics, one central aim has been to account for the connexion between ethical species of normativity and the distinctive deliberative and practical capacities of human beings. Ethics th…Read more
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353Intending, knowing how, infinitivesCanadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (1): 1-17. 2016.Intellectualists tell us that a person who knows how to do something therein knows a proposition. Along with others, they may say that a person who intends to do something intends a proposition. I argue against them. I do so by way of considering ‘know how ——’ and ‘intend ——’ together. When the two are considered together, a realistic conception of human agency can inform the understanding of some infinitives: the argument need not turn on what semanticists have had to say about ‘the subjects of…Read more
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106The standard story of action: an exchangeIn J. H. Aguilar & A. A. A. A. Buckareff (eds.), Causing Human Actions: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action, Mit Press. pp. 57-68. 2010.Book synopsis: The causal theory of action is widely recognized in the literature of the philosophy of action as the "standard story" of human action and agency—the nearest approximation in the field to a theoretical orthodoxy. This volume brings together leading figures working in action theory today to discuss issues relating to the CTA and its applications, which range from experimental philosophy to moral psychology. Some of the contributors defend the theory while others criticize it; some …Read more
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255Essays on Anscombe's Intention (edited book)Harvard University Press. 2011.This collection of ten essays elucidates some of the more challenging aspects of Anscombe’s work and affirms her reputation as one of our most original ...
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148Dualism in actionRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 43 377-401. 1993.We know what one dualist account of human action looks like, because Descartes gave us one. I want to explore the extent ot which presnet-day accounts of physical action are vulnerable to the charges that may be made against Descartes's dualist account. I once put forward an account of human action, and I have always maintained that my view about the basic shape of a correct ‘theory of aciton’ can be combined with a thoroughgoing opposition to dualism. But the possibility of the combination has …Read more
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38Simple mindedness: in defense of naive naturalism in the philosophy of mindHarvard University Press. 1997.Jennifer Hornsby offers here detailed discussions of ontology, human agency, and everyday psychological explanation. In her distinctive view of questions about the mind's place in nature she argues for a particular position in philosophy of mind: naive naturalism.
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61Anomalousness in actionIn , . 1999.Book synopsis: The latest volume of the critically acclaimed Library of Living Philosophers series is devoted to the work of analytic philosopher Donald Davidson. Following the standard LLP format, Davidson discusses his life and philosophical development in an intellectual autobiography. This is followed by 31 critical essays by distinguished scholars; Davidson replies to each of these essays. Although Donald Davidson is considered an analytic philosopher, his thought straddles many areas of ph…Read more
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266Physicalist thinking and conceptions of behaviourIn Philip Pettit (ed.), Subject, Thought, And Context, Clarendon Press. 1986.
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284Meaning and uselessness: How to think about derogatory wordsMidwest Studies in Philosophy 25 (1). 2001.Williams explains why there might have been some point to a linguistic approach in ethics. I suggest that there might be some point to paying attention to an ethical dimension in philosophy of language. I shall consider words that I label ‘derogatory’, and questions they raise about linguistic meaning.
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314Feminism in philosophy of language: Communicative speech actsIn Miranda Fricker & Jennifer Hornsby (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Philosophy, Cambridge University Press. pp. 87--106. 2000.Book synopsis: The thirteen specially-commissioned essays in this volume are written by philosophers at the forefront of feminist scholarship, and are designed to provide an accessible and stimulating guide to a philosophical literature that has seen massive expansion in recent years. Ranging from history of philosophy through metaphysics to philosophy of science, they encompass all the core subject areas commonly taught in anglophone undergraduate and graduate philosophy courses, offering both …Read more
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79Facts in Question: A Response to Dodd and to CandlishProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1): 241-246. 1999.Jennifer Homsby; The Facts in Question: A Response to Dodd and to Candlish, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 99, Issue 1, 1 June 1999, Pages 241–
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159Speech Acts and PerformativesIn Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press. 2006.This article aims to connect Austin's seminal notion of a speech act with developments in philosophy of language over the last forty odd years. It starts by considering how speech acts might be conceived in Austin's general theory. Then it turns to the illocutionary acts with which much philosophical writing on speech acts has been concerned, and finally to the performatives which Austin's own treatment of speech as action took off from.
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453Basic ActivityAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1): 1-18. 2013.I present a view of activity, taking it that an agent is engaged in activity so long as an action of hers is occurring. I suggest that this view (a) helps in understanding what goes wrong in an argument in Thompson (2008) known sometimes as the ‘initial segment argument’, and (b) enables us to see that there could be an intelligible conception of what is basic when agents' knowledge is allowed into an account of that.
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105Ryle's Knowing how and knowing how to actIn John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action, Oxford University Press, Usa. pp. 80. 2011.
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274Agency and causal explanationIn Alfred R. Mele (ed.), The philosophy of action, Oxford University Press. 1997.I. There are two points of view: ___ From the personal point of view, an action is a person's doing something for a reason, and her doing it is found intelligible when we know the reason that led her to it. ___ From the impersonal point of view, an action would be a link in a causal chain that could be viewed without paying any attention to people, the links being understood by reference to the world's causal workings
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325Personal and sub‐personal; A defence of Dennett's early distinctionPhilosophical Explorations 3 (1): 6-24. 2000.Since 1969, when Dennett introduced a distinction between personal and sub- personal levels of explanation, many philosophers have used 'sub- personal ' very loosely, and Dennett himself has abandoned a view of the personal level as genuinely autonomous. I recommend a position in which Dennett's original distinction is crucial, by arguing that the phenomenon called mental causation is on view only at the properly personal level. If one retains the commit-' ments incurred by Dennett's early disti…Read more
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53Arm Raising and Arm RisingPhilosophy 55 (211). 1980.I. It is a necessary condition of the truth of ‘I raised my arm’ that my arm rose; but it is not a sufficient condition. Is there some further necessary condition which, when conjoined with the condition that my arm rose, does give a sufficient condition of the truth of ‘I raised my arm’?
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15II—Jason Stanley: Hornsby on the Phenomenology of SpeechAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 79 (1): 131-145. 2005.
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149Trying to ActIn Timothy O'Connor & Constantine Sandis (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, Wiley‐blackwell. 2010.This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction The Extent of Trying Trying to Move the Body Trying and Intending References Further reading.
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Language |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Language |