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353Agency and causal explanationIn Alfred R. Mele (ed.), The philosophy of action, Oxford University Press. 1997.I. There are two points of view: ___ From the personal point of view, an action is a person's doing something for a reason, and her doing it is found intelligible when we know the reason that led her to it. ___ From the impersonal point of view, an action would be a link in a causal chain that could be viewed without paying any attention to people, the links being understood by reference to the world's causal workings
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200Know How, by Jason Stanley,(Oxford University Press), $45/£ 25The Philosophers' Magazine 57 (57): 120-121. 2012.
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56Acts and Other Events By Judith Jarvis Thomson Cornell University Press, 1977, 274 pp., £10.50 (review)Philosophy 54 (208): 253-. 1979.
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197Dealing with factsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research. 2001.This is a contribution to a symposium on Stephen Neale's Facing Facts. I bring to the discussion a different theory of facts from any Neale considers, and argue that it avoids flaws in Russell’s theory.
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150The standard story of action: an exchangeIn Jesús H. Aguilar & Andrei A. Buckareff (eds.), Causing Human Actions: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action, Bradford. pp. 57-68. 2010.Book synopsis: The causal theory of action is widely recognized in the literature of the philosophy of action as the "standard story" of human action and agency—the nearest approximation in the field to a theoretical orthodoxy. This volume brings together leading figures working in action theory today to discuss issues relating to the CTA and its applications, which range from experimental philosophy to moral psychology. Some of the contributors defend the theory while others criticize it; some …Read more
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88B. Vermazen and M. B. Hintikka, "Essays on Davidson: Actions and Events" (review)Philosophical Quarterly 36 (43): 296. 1986.
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244Speech Acts and PerformativesIn Ernie Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press. 2005.This article aims to connect Austin's seminal notion of a speech act with developments in philosophy of language over the last forty odd years. It starts by considering how speech acts might be conceived in Austin's general theory. Then it turns to the illocutionary acts with which much philosophical writing on speech acts has been concerned, and finally to the performatives which Austin's own treatment of speech as action took off from.
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146Ryle's Knowing how and knowing how to actIn John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action, Oxford University Press Usa. pp. 80. 2011.
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64Davidson and Dummett on the social character ofIn Maria Cristina Amoretti & Nicla Vassallo (eds.), Knowledge, Language, and Interpretation: On the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, De Gruyter. pp. 14--107. 2008.
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802Physicalist thinking and conceptions of behaviourIn Philip Pettit (ed.), Subject, Thought, And Context, Clarendon Press. 1986.
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422Meaning and uselessness: How to think about derogatory wordsMidwest Studies in Philosophy 25 (1). 2001.Williams explains why there might have been some point to a linguistic approach in ethics. I suggest that there might be some point to paying attention to an ethical dimension in philosophy of language. I shall consider words that I label ‘derogatory’, and questions they raise about linguistic meaning.
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139Arm Raising and Arm RisingPhilosophy 55 (211). 1980.I. It is a necessary condition of the truth of ‘I raised my arm’ that my arm rose; but it is not a sufficient condition. Is there some further necessary condition which, when conjoined with the condition that my arm rose, does give a sufficient condition of the truth of ‘I raised my arm’?
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368Essays on Anscombe's Intention (edited book)Harvard University Press. 2011.This collection of ten essays elucidates some of the more challenging aspects of Anscombe’s work and affirms her reputation as one of our most original ...
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240Trying to ActIn Timothy O'Connor & Constantine Sandis (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, Wiley-blackwell. 2010.This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction The Extent of Trying Trying to Move the Body Trying and Intending References Further reading.
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38Children's Action Control and Awareness: Comment on Frye and ZelazoIn Johannes Roessler & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology, Oxford University Press. 2003.Book synopsis: Seventeen brand-new essays by leading philosophers and psychologists Genuinely interdisciplinary work, at the forefront of both fields Includes a valuable introduction, uniting common threads.
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512Personal and sub‐personal; A defence of Dennett's early distinctionPhilosophical Explorations 3 (1): 6-24. 2000.Since 1969, when Dennett introduced a distinction between personal and sub- personal levels of explanation, many philosophers have used 'sub- personal ' very loosely, and Dennett himself has abandoned a view of the personal level as genuinely autonomous. I recommend a position in which Dennett's original distinction is crucial, by arguing that the phenomenon called mental causation is on view only at the properly personal level. If one retains the commit-' ments incurred by Dennett's early disti…Read more
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Birkbeck, University of LondonProfessor (Part-time)
Areas of Specialization
| Philosophy of Action |
| Philosophy of Language |
Areas of Interest
| Philosophy of Action |
| Philosophy of Language |