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195Causality and “the mental”Humana Mente 8 (29). 2015.Many analytic philosophers of mind take for granted a certain conception of causality. Assumptions deriving from that conception are in place when they problematize what they call mental causation or argue for physicalism in respect of the mental. I claim that a different conception of causality is needed for understanding many ordinary causal truths about things which act, including truths about human, minded beings — sc. rational beings who lead lives.
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2Physics, biology, and common-sense psychologyIn David Charles & Kathleen Lennon (eds.), Reduction, Explanation and Realism, Oxford University Press. 1992.
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75Bodily Movements, Actions, and Mental EpistemologyMidwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1): 275-286. 1986.
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9Reading Philosophy: Selected Texts with a Method for BeginnersWiley-Blackwell. 2002.This flexible introductory textbook explores several key themes in philosophy, and helps the reader learn to engage with the key arguments by introducing and analysing a selection of classic readings. Fully integrated introductory text with readings for beginning students of philosophy. Each chapter focusses on a core philosophical topic, and contains an introduction to the topic, 2 classic readings and interactive commentaries on the readings. An introductory book which doesn't merely _tell_ th…Read more
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135Truth: the identity theoryIn , . 1997.Book synopsis: "What is truth?" has long been the philosophical question par excellence. The Nature of Truth collects in one volume the twentieth century's most influential philosophical work on the subject. The coverage strikes a balance between classic works and the leading edge of current philosophical research. The essays center around two questions: Does truth have an underlying nature? And if so, what sort of nature does it have? Thus the book discusses both traditional and deflationary th…Read more
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139Dealing with factsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research. 2001.This is a contribution to a symposium on Stephen Neale's Facing Facts. I bring to the discussion a different theory of facts from any Neale considers, and argue that it avoids flaws in Russell’s theory.
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8B. Vermazen and M. B. Hintikka, "Essays on Davidson: Actions and Events" (review)Philosophical Quarterly 36 (43): 296. 1986.
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454Actions and activityPhilosophical Issues 22 (1): 233-245. 2012.Contemporary literature in philosophy of action seems to be divided overthe place of action in the natural causal world. I think that a disagreementabout ontology underlies the division. I argue here that human action isproperly understood only by reference to a category of process or activity,where this is not a category of particulars
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122V*—Which Physical Events are Mental Events?Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81 (1): 73-92. 1981.Jennifer Hornsby; V*—Which Physical Events are Mental Events?, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 81, Issue 1, 1 June 1981, Pages 73–92, https://do.
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145The presidential address: Truth: The identity theoryProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97 (1). 1997.I want to promote what I shall call ‘the identity theory of truth’. I suggest that other accounts put forward as theories of truth are genuine rivals to it, but are unacceptable. A certain conception of thinkables belongs with the identity theory’s conception of truth. I introduce these conceptions in Part I, by reference to John McDowell’s Mind and World; and I show why they have a place in an identity theory, which I introduce by reference to Frege. In Part II, I elaborate on the conception of…Read more
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35Davidson and Dummett on the social character ofIn Maria Cristina Amoretti & Nicla Vassallo (eds.), Knowledge, Language, and Interpretation: On the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, Ontos Verlag. pp. 14--107. 2008.
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112Simple Mindedness: In Defense of Naive Naturalism in the Philosophy of MindHarvard University Press. 1996.These questions provide the impetus for the detailed discussions of ontology, human agency, and everyday psychological explanation presented in this book.
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57Reply to Jackson, IPhilosophical Explorations 3 (2): 193-195. 2000.This Article does not have an abstract
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496ActionsRoutledge and Kegan Paul. 1980.This book presents an events-based view of human action somewhat different from that of what is known as "standard story". A thesis about trying-to-do-something is distinguished from various volitionist theses. It is argued then that given a correct conception of action's antecedents, actions will be identified not with bodily movements but with causes of such movements.
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Language |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Language |