Jennifer Hornsby

Book synopsis: The book illustrates the concept of action in three different contexts - the justification of actions, people's life history, and pragmatism. The special feature of this book is that a comprehensive view of this kind marks a departure from the atomistic approach of action theory, which in itself raises a number of questions. If actions are not justified by mental states, how can persons then act for reasons? How can persons' actions over time be described, and what is the connection with the question of personal identity? If there is to be a unified understanding of the person, does the practical have to take precedence over the theoretical, and what does this mean for epistemology, for example? The ten contributors to this volume engage in an instructive manner with these and similar questions in the three sections of the book.

Book synopsis: This volume contains nine previously unpublished papers which were originally given at the conference «Thought and Ontology» held in the Centro di Studi sulla Filosofia Contemporanea in Genova.The general theme is the relation between thought and the world.Must we regard thought and world as distinct categories? Might there be quite different conceptual schemes? Can either the content of thought or the way thought is justified be independent of the world? Is truth some kind of match between thought and world, or could the relevant relation be identity? Does the distinction between veridical and illusory perception lie wholly outside the subject? Is language, the main vehicle of thought, just a natural phenomenon, or does its special involvement with normativity place it in a special category? What lesson can be drawn from our use of language to refer?

Book synopsis: In "Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature" Richard Rorty presented his vision of post-philosophical culture, calling upon professional philosophers to accept that epistemology is dead, that the analytic method is a myth, and that philosophy and science are merely forms of literature. This volume is an examination of the conclusions drawn by Richard Rorty. Discussions, by philosophers such as W.V. Cline, Donald Davidson, Bernard Williams, Charles Taylor, John Yolton and Martin Hollis, cover Rorty's views on truth, language, knowledge and the self, together with his pragmatism, his "continental turn" and his regard for the literary potential of philosophical writing.

This flexible introductory textbook explores several key themes in philosophy, and helps the reader learn to engage with the key arguments by introducing and analysing a selection of classic readings. Fully integrated introductory text with readings for beginning students of philosophy. Each chapter focusses on a core philosophical topic, and contains an introduction to the topic, 2 classic readings and interactive commentaries on the readings. An introductory book which doesn't merely _tell_ the reader about the subject, but requires them to engage philosophically with the text. A pedagogical resource developed in the classroom by the authors at the University of London

This chapter raises the question of how far some recent philosophy of action assists in explicating the moral psychological notions that are of concern in jurisprudence. The focus of the overall argument is on a distinction used by Antony Duff in his Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability — a distinction, Duff says, between ‘a broader and a narrower conception of intention’. It is doubtful that the distinction can do the work that Duff wants it to. Duff rests as much upon it as he does only because of a certain optimism: he hopes that conceptual analysis of intention may reveal what many of the interesting questions about mens rea really turn on, and so deliver the goods for the criminal lawyer. But this hope is vain. The chapter begins with some basic philosophy of action. A presentation of an account of actions which highlights some essential conceptual connections, and which introduces the concept of attempt into the framework, can provide a setting for a clear view of Duff's distinction. Exposition of this material takes up the first part of the chapter. This is brought into relation with issues in criminal liability in the second part, where its connection with the notions of actus reus and mens rea is shown. The third part explains and argues for the view taken of Duff's distinction, which differs from his. The remainder of the chapter considers how far an understanding of the concept of intention can take the criminal lawyer.