H Kim

This article examines whether people share the Gettier intuition (viz. that someone who has a true justified belief that p may nonetheless fail to know that p) in 24 sites, located in 23 countries (counting Hong Kong as a distinct country) and across 17 languages. We also consider the possible influence of gender and personality on this intuition with a very large sample size. Finally, we examine whether the Gettier intuition varies across people as a function of their disposition to engage in “reflective” thinking.

Philosophers have long debated whether, if determinism is true, we should hold people morally responsible for their actions since in a deterministic universe, people are arguably not the ultimate source of their actions nor could they have done otherwise if initial conditions and the laws of nature are held fixed. To reveal how non-philosophers ordinarily reason about the conditions for free will, we conducted a cross-cultural and cross-linguistic survey (N = 5,268) spanning twenty countries and sixteen languages. Overall, participants tended to ascribe moral responsibility whether the perpetrator lacked sourcehood or alternate possibilities. However, for American, European, and Middle Eastern participants, being the ultimate source of one’s actions promoted perceptions of free will and control as well as ascriptions of blame and punishment. By contrast, being the source of one’s actions was not particularly salient to Asian participants. Finally, across cultures, participants exhibiting greater cognitive reflection were more likely to view free will as incompatible with causal determinism. We discuss these findings in light of documented cultural differences in the tendency toward dispositional versus situational attributions.

Does the Ship of Theseus present a genuine puzzle about persistence due to conflicting intuitions based on “continuity of form” and “continuity of matter” pulling in opposite directions? Philosophers are divided. Some claim that it presents a genuine puzzle but disagree over whether there is a solution. Others claim that there is no puzzle at all since the case has an obvious solution. To assess these proposals, we conducted a cross-cultural study involving nearly 3,000 people across twenty-two countries, speaking eighteen different languages. Our results speak against the proposal that there is no puzzle at all and against the proposal that there is a puzzle but one that has no solution. Our results suggest that there are two criteria—“continuity of form” and “continuity of matter”— that constitute our concept of persistence and these two criteria receive different weightings in settling matters concerning persistence.

In the remainder of this article, we will disarm an important motivation for epistemic contextualism and interest-relative invariantism. We will accomplish this by presenting a stringent test of whether there is a stakes effect on ordinary knowledge ascription. Having shown that, even on a stringent way of testing, stakes fail to impact ordinary knowledge ascription, we will conclude that we should take another look at classical invariantism. Here is how we will proceed. Section 1 lays out some limitations of previous research on stakes. Section 2 presents our study and concludes that there is little evidence for a substantial stakes effect. Section 3 responds to objections. The conclusion clears the way for classical invariantism.

Since at least Hume and Kant, philosophers working on the nature of aesthetic judgment have generally agreed that common sense does not treat aesthetic judgments in the same way as typical expressions of subjective preferences—rather, it endows them with intersubjective validity, the property of being right or wrong regardless of disagreement. Moreover, this apparent intersubjective validity has been taken to constitute one of the main explananda for philosophical accounts of aesthetic judgment. But is it really the case that most people spontaneously treat aesthetic judgments as having intersubjective validity? In this paper, we report the results of a cross‐cultural study with over 2,000 respondents spanning 19 countries. Despite significant geographical variations, these results suggest that most people do not treat their own aesthetic judgments as having intersubjective validity. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for theories of aesthetic judgment and the purpose of aesthetics in general.

This article examines whether people share the Gettier intuition (viz. that someone who has a true justified belief that p may nonetheless fail to know that p) in 24 sites, located in 23 countries (counting Hong Kong as a distinct country) and across 17 languages. We also consider the possible influence of gender and personality on this intuition with a very large sample size. Finally, we examine whether the Gettier intuition varies across people as a function of their disposition to engage in “reflective” thinking.

This article traces the divergent approaches to the scientific analysis of facial and bodily movement from the 1950s to the 1970s. Drawing on the writings and exchanges of anthropologists Margaret Mead and Ray Birdwhistell, as well as psychologists Paul Ekman and Silvan Tomkins, it shows how their intellectual divide was sustained through different uses of visual technologies and coding practices. Cultural anthropologists working in dialogue with cybernetic thought prioritized the interpretive role of culturally patterned observers and remained cautious about relying on visual instruments to extend human perception. Psychologists, in contrast, oriented their attention toward the measurable physical changes captured in film and photographs, treating images less as interpretive mediators than as naturalistic recordings of human behavior. This divide crystallized around the concepts of code : either as culturally shaped rules that could be deciphered by trained observers or as discrete, machine-readable units inscribed through computerized techniques. By examining how professional identities, technological instruments, and the definitions of facial expressions as a scientific object took shape in the mid-20 th -century, this article demonstrates why these historical dynamics remain crucial for understanding the stakes of living with our faces coded in the era of automated facial expression analysis.

Philosophers have argued that stakes affect knowledge: a given amount of evidence may suffice for knowledge if the stakes are low, but not if the stakes are high. By contrast, empirical work on the influence of stakes on ordinary knowledge ascriptions has been divided along methodological lines: “evidence‐fixed” prompts rarely find stakes effects, while “evidence‐seeking” prompts consistently find them. We present a cross‐cultural study using both evidence‐fixed and evidence‐seeking prompts with a diverse sample of 17 populations in 11 countries, speaking 14 languages. Our study is the first to use an evidence‐seeking prompt cross‐culturally, and includes several previously untested populations (including indigenous populations). Across cultures, we do not find evidence of a stakes effect with our evidence‐fixed prompt, but do with our evidence‐seeking prompt. We argue that the divergent results reveal a tension within folk epistemology: people's beliefs about when it is appropriate to ascribe knowledge differ significantly from their actual practice in ascribing knowledge.

Under capitalist healthcare, nursing labour is vulnerable to subordination to institutional efficiency and profit, fostering the risk that nurses are reduced to functional instruments and thereby eroding the ethical essence of care. Within this structure, nurses are prone to experiencing objectification—by others, of themselves and towards others—resulting in moral fatigue and the loss of subjectivity. This paper critically examines capitalism's impact on nursing and reconceptualises self‐care as both moral agency and self‐transcendence. Drawing on Marxian labour theory and integrating Maslow's extended hierarchy with Orem's self‐care deficit theory and Watson's caring science, the dimensions of self‐care are clarified. On this basis, self‐care is conceptualised as a process whereby nurses reclaim autonomy and restore relational integrity, ultimately yielding moral agency and self‐transcendence. Self‐care begins with reclaiming agency amid commodified labour, progresses through reflective awareness and moral practice and culminates in transcendence—whereby caring becomes an authentic, liberating expression of being. Repositioned in this manner, nurse self‐care transforms from an individual‐level coping mechanism into a collective ethical practice, challenging capitalism's dehumanising logic and rehumanising the nursing profession itself.Trial Registration: Not applicable.

In this chapter, I identify and analyze the emotion of fulfillment and explain its evaluative phenomenology and the value thereof. I build on Susan Wolf’s account of meaning in life and argue that meaningfulness consists in correct fulfillment (Section 1). I analyze fulfillment into attraction and satisfaction, and argue that its evaluations are non-conceptual (Section 2). I argue that fulfillment has a distinctive evaluative phenomenology that is irreducible to sensory, cognitive, or agentive phenomenology (Section 3). Finally, I argue that the evaluative phenomenology of fulfillment has hedonic, epistemic, and motivational values (Section 4).

In this paper, I argue that we do not know how to implement abstract principles of liberal egalitarian justice. Starting with Scheffler’s Rawlsian diagnosis of the retreat of liberal democracy in the United States, I argue that it may be due to our lack of knowledge about how to institutionalize a Rawlsian just liberal society. To illustrate the difficulty or challenge, I examine several policy proposals to help build human capital for property-owning democracy and argue that they can fail for various reasons. The main problem is that the changing ways in which diverse individuals respond to policies and interact with one another affect policy consequences, but their complexity surpasses our limited knowledge. The ignorance gives us reason to be patient with the slow pace of building an ideal liberal society, tolerant of those who are sceptical about interventions to implement liberal egalitarian principles, and open to policy experimentation and learning. I further argue that we should publicly acknowledge our ignorance about policy outcomes, as it can reduce political polarization, by moderating policy positions and interpreting policy disagreements as empirical rather than moral, and counter democratic backsliding.

Th is essay is an attempt to inquire into the recent literature on risk and bring out a fundamental category of humanity, which is the unpreparedness of man’s Being-in-the-World. It will begin with Ralph Nader’s Unsafe at Any Speed (1965) and follow through to Ulrich Beck’s Risk Society: Toward a New Modernity (1986). These points will then be related to the arguments of Husserl and Heidegger. In this way, the fundamental category of modern man is disclosed in its Being-in-the-World-for-which-no-one-Being-prepared.

In this study, we investigate important decisional factors for the purchase intention of animal welfare labeled beef in Korea considering direct and indirect paths (trust and attitudes). Using a structural equation model with 300 samples from the Korea consumer panel survey, we find that perceived knowledge and revealed information positively affect consumer purchase intention for beef labeled as supporting animal welfare. Our results also show that a subjective norm (positive opinions of friends or family on animal welfare) has a positive effect on the purchase of beef labeled as “welfare conscious.” Based on our results, we can derive policy implications for expanding animal welfare raising practices to achieve sustainable development in the livestock sector without ethical and environmental side effects. Three possible policy alternatives include an online word-of-mouth strategy for improving subjective norms, enhancing animal welfare labeling information, and setting up public education for such labeling.

The purpose of this study is to explore the possibility of reconciliation between Kant’s transcendental idealism and McCarthy’s epistemological point of view on artificial intelligence, which are at the first glance likely to be considered contradictory. For this, characterizing the standpoint of McCarthy who coined the word ‘artificial intelligence’ as scientific realism and that of Turing who provided a crucial thought experiment that shaped the contemporary conception of artificial intelligence as behaviorism, we shall compare these two standpoints with the transcendental idealism of Kant who conferred on us a monumental indicator for understanding human reason. Through this comparison, we shall argue that scientific realism which is currently a prominent philosophical standpoint of artificial intelligence is not compatible with Kant’s transcendental idealism but assumes a standpoint strikingly analogous to behaviorism. But we shall also argue that once transcendental idealism is looked at through viewpoint of behaviorism, scientific realism can be seen as compatible with transcendental idealism. This compatibility we name the possibility of artificial reason in this paper.

This chapter argues that the challenge of skepticism and the ensuing charge of nihilism are the main problems that Fichte tries to solve in his system of Wissenschaftslehre, and that his solution is offered via his recourse to a distinction between two standpoints: the standpoint of philosophy and the standpoint of ordinary life. In particular, I argue that Fichte regards it a virtue of his system to have resolved the seeming incompatibility of freedom and determinism by invoking that distinction. As a consequence, philosophy for Fichte turns out to be a radical discipline by which a unity of speculation and life—that of thought and action, together with the unity of the two standpoints—is prominently exemplified.