H Kim

This paper critically investigates the explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) project. I analyze the word “explain” in XAI and the theory of explanation and identify the discrepancy between the meaning of the explanation claimed to be necessary and that which is actually presented. After summarizing the history of AI related to explainability, I argue that American philosophy in the 1900s operated in the background of said history. I then extract the meaning of explanation in view of XAI, to elucidate the relationship among AI, logic, and the theory of explanation. In so doing, I aim to reveal DARPA’s surreptitious definitional retreat in terms of its contents and formal fallacy of sophisma figurae dictionis, drawing from Kant’s paralogism. I conclude that this intentional fallacy preexists the XAI project and that presumptuous use of reason, which Kant criticizes, is underlying.

This paper provides estimates of the economic welfare effects of tobacco taxation in India, S.Africa, S.Korea, Japan and the European Union. It argues that past studies of the cost-benefits of smoking are flawed as they fail to net out Paretoirrelevant pecuniary externalities. It estimates tobacco demand for both the myopic and rational addiction models and finds the latter invariably perform better. It finds that the net welfare losses associated with current tax levels an increase over current taxation of 10% and an increase of 10% a year for!0 years in all these countries, but particularly in the poorest, are large.Cet article fournit des estimations des effets des taxes sur le tabac sur le bien-être : l’Inde, l’Afrique du Sud, la Corée du Sud, le Japon et l’Union Européenne. L’article soutient que les analyses antérieures des coûts et des bénéfices de la cigarette sont erronées car elles ne tiennent pas compte des externalités pécuniaires non pertinentes dans un monde parétien. Il donne des estimations de la demande non tant pour les modèles myopes que pour ceux supposant une addiction rationnelle et constate que ces derniers donnent de meilleurs résultats. Il en ressort aussi que les pertes nettes de bien-être associées aux niveaux actuels de taxes, à une augmentation de 10% des taxes actuelles et à une augmentation annuelle de 10% des taxes sur 10 ans dans toutes les zones étudiées, mais particulièrement dans les plus pauvres d’entre elles, sont conséquentes.

This article interrogates the way/s in which rival schools studying hypnotism in late 19th-century France framed what counts as valid evidence for the purposes of science. Concern over the scientific reality of results is particularly situated in the notion of simulation (the faking of results); the respective approaches to simulation of the Salpêtrière and Nancy schools are analysed through close reading of key texts: Binet and Féré for the Salpêtrière, and Bernheim for Nancy. The article reveals a striking divergence between their scientific frames, which helps account for the bitterness of the schools’ disputes. It then explores Bernheim’s construction of scientific authority in more detail, for insights into the messiness entailed by theorizing hypnotism in psychical terms, while also attempting to retain scientific legitimacy. Indicative of this messiness, it is argued, is the way in which Bernheim’s (apparently inconsistent) approach draws on multiple epistemic frames.