Daniel Dahlstrom

There are several difficulties, largely the product of the distinctive question and paths of Heidegger's thinking, that beset any attempt to determine his philosophical heritage. In the first part of the following paper, after reviewing these difficulties, the author argues that Heidegger is, nonetheless, singularly and quite rightly preoccupied with the heritage of his thinking. In the second part an attempt is made to show how a particular understanding of being, namely, being as presence and absence, motivates various paths taken by his thinking, paths which, indeed, have given rise to several appropriations of his thinking in the present: pragmatic, religious, hermeneutical as well as in the philosophy of art and technology. In the final part of the paper the author identifies some of these ongoing "Heideggerian heritages," but with the aim of underscoring their dependence upon what for the author is the principal heritage of his thinking, a way of thinking about being that recovers its fundamentally historical character. /// Existem várias dificuldades, as quais são em larga medida produto da questão distintiva e dos diversos caminhos do pensamento de Heidegger, que condicionam toda e qualquer tentativa de determinar a sua herança filosófica. Na primeira parte do presente artigo, o autor, depois de mencionar as sobreditas dificuldades, argumenta que Heidegger, apesar de tudo, está singularmente, e apropriadamente, preocupado com a herança do seu pensamento. Na segunda parte, é feita uma tentativa no sentido de mostrar até que ponto uma compreensão particular do ser, nomeadamente do ser como presença e ausência, deu lugar a diversas apropriações do pensamento heideggeriano no presente: apropriação pragmática, religiosa, hermenêutica, bem como no âmbito da filosofia da arte e da tecnologia. Finalmente, na sua última parte, o presente artigo identifica algumas das "heranças heideggerianas" correntes, mas com a intenção de sublinhar a sua dependência em relação àquilo que para o autor constitui a principal herança do seu pensamento, nomeadamente, um modo de pensar acerca do ser que recupera o seu carácter fundamentalmente histórico.

This well-written, ambitious, and admirably condensed reconstruction of Kant's concept of God in relation to his theoretical and moral philosophy, from the precritical writings to the Opus Postumum, is by its very nature an uneven survey of the works and problems treated. The author strives for a new interpretation of Kant's moral theology by interpreting Kant's practical postulate of God as "eine qualitätive neue Metaphysik," making possible "subjektiven moralischen Glauben an einen wirklichen transzendenten Gott." The author faithfully exposits how Kant conceived divinity and man's relation to God. But beyond the exposition there is a paucity of elaboration or critical consideration. The author is more intent on articulating the consistency of Kant's conception than in entertaining the rationale, if any, of its critics.

The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science was conceived by Kant as an application of the positive conclusions or "general metaphysics" demonstrated in the Analytic of Principles of the Critique of Pure Reason to the specialized objects of knowledge that fall under the concept of matter. The application was meant to provide a metaphysical foundation for natural science, capable of explaining, among other things, how mathematics as an a priori discipline is necessarily applicable to the empirical objects encountered in nature. How to understand the precise meaning of this application has, however, been a recurring problem for students of Kant's thought. First published in 1965 as "an interpretation of the Preface of MF," Peter Plaass' Kants Theorie der Naturwissenschaft attempts to resolve this problem by clarifying the meaning of "metaphysical construction," Kant's term for the method introduced and employed in the MF alone. As Plaass construes it, the method consists in constructing the specific, pure concepts required to entertain the existence of a special kind of objects. More precisely, the metaphysical construction specifies the system of pure concepts of the understanding in terms of the content of the empirical concept of matter, namely, "the movable in space." That empirical character applies only to the objective reality of the concept, leaving the way open for the determination of the content of the concept insofar as it is thought in terms of the categories, a determination purportedly conducted in the MF and resulting in the a priori foundations of natural science.

Hegel's Encyclopaedia Logic constitutes the foundation of the system of philosophy presented in his Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences. Together with his Science of Logic, it contains the most explicit formulation of his enduringly influential dialectical method and of the categorical system underlying his thought. It offers a more compact presentation of his dialectical method than is found elsewhere, and also incorporates changes that he would have made to the second edition of the Science of Logic if he had lived to do so. This volume presents it in a new translation with a helpful introduction and notes. It will be a valuable reference work for scholars and students of Hegel and German idealism, as well as for those who are interested in the post-Hegelian character of contemporary philosophy.