Daniel Dahlstrom

This contribution departs from a latent social-ontological diagnosis in Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy concerning modernity: Gleichgültigkeit, that is, the equivalence of beings turning into an indifference of Being. The paper argues that the notions of “the gigantic” (das Riesenhafte) and “lived experience” (Erlebnis), which Heidegger develops in this context, should be understood as unfolding phenomena of Gleich-Gültigkeit. The main claim is that both “the gigantic” and “lived experience” acquire a new significance in today’s “society of singularities.” A gigantic success is defined not only by doing what has never been done before, but also by accomplishing what is considered impossible. Such success produces an “extraordinary” lived experience. The paper takes Elon Musk as an avant-garde figure of gigantic success in the twenty-first century and interprets the contemporary regime of one-upmanship as the culmination of what Heidegger anticipated: the loss of greatness in the culmination of “gigantic” successes.

This contribution departs from a latent social-ontological diagnosis in Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy concerning modernity: Gleichgültigkeit, that is, the equivalence of beings turning into an indifference of Being. The paper argues that the notions of “the gigantic” (das Riesenhafte) and “lived experience” (Erlebnis), which Heidegger develops in this context, should be understood as unfolding phenomena of Gleich-Gültigkeit. The main claim is that both “the gigantic” and “lived experience” acquire a new significance in today’s “society of singularities.” A gigantic success is defined not only by doing what has never been done before, but also by accomplishing what is considered impossible. Such success produces an “extraordinary” lived experience. The paper takes Elon Musk as an avant-garde figure of gigantic success in the twenty-first century and interprets the contemporary regime of one-upmanship as the culmination of what Heidegger anticipated: the loss of greatness in the culmination of “gigantic” successes.

This volume identifies and develops how philosophy of mind and phenomenology interact in both conceptual and empirically-informed ways. The objective is to demonstrate that phenomenology, as the first-personal study of the contents and structures of our mentality, can provide us with insights into the understanding of the mind and can complement strictly analytical or empirically informed approaches to the study of the mind. Insofar as phenomenology, as the study or science of phenomena, allows the mind to appear, this collection shows how the mind can _reappear_ through a constructive dialogue between different ways—phenomenological, analytical, and empirical—of understanding mentality.

This paper examines Husserl's phenomenological understanding of logical principles, based principally upon his scattered remarks on the topic in his Logical Investigations. It aims to show how Husserl's phenomenological analysis ventures to shed light on logical principles in a way that preserves their ontological valence while unpacking the nature of our access to them. After recounting his view of how categorial intuitions in particular are said to ground logical principles, I argue that this view comes up short in regard to principles of negation and noncontradiction. The paper ends with a suggestion of how a phenomenological interpretation of logical principles might be redirected to make up for this deficit.

LECTURE NOTES MAY BE "MURKY SOURCES," yet during the past decade "murky" manuscripts have been instrumental in the publication of many of Heidegger's own legendary lectures during the years between the world wars. To be sure, the Heidegger of these lectures is very much, as he puts it, "under way." His motto for the complete edition of his works reads: "Ways--not works." Nevertheless, as might be expected from lectures, the wording is simpler, the style more casual, and the chain of thoughts more suited to an introduction than is the thick prose of Holzwege, Wegmarken, or Unterwegs zur Sprache. In this respect at least, a certain similarity to Hegel's lectures within the Hegelian corpus is indisputable.

This volume identifies and develops how philosophy of mind and phenomenology interact in both conceptual and empirically-informed ways. The objective is to demonstrate that phenomenology, as the first-personal study of the contents and structures of our mentality, can provide us with insights into the understanding of the mind and can complement strictly analytical or empirically informed approaches to the study of the mind. Insofar as phenomenology, as the study or science of phenomena, allows the mind to appear, this collection shows how the mind can reappear through a constructive dialogue between different ways—phenomenological, analytical, and empirical—of understanding mentality.