Daniel Dahlstrom

To criticize a philosopher’s views properly a primary requirement is an accurate understanding of the questions he raises, the problems he acknowledges, and the procedures he follows. In the following study I attempt to identify the specific question of truth which Hegel addresses, the basis of the sort of skepticism posing a serious threat to its resolution, and finally a strategy he adopts. The specific question of truth for Hegel is a question of metaphysical truth or, in the Cartesian terms which Hegel willingly employed, the question of the objectivity of thoughts. The sort of skepticism he has in mind is one which, based on certain purported conditions of human knowing, rejects the possibility of metaphysical truth. While Hegel’s strategy is to analyze those various conditions in an encyclopedic fashion, my concern in this paper is his analysis of the logical conditions of human knowing.

The work of the author's serious revisions of his earlier analyses of belief-locutions, this crisply argued essay has an impressive range and force, with important ramifications for ontology, epistemology, and theory of reference. Chisholm takes as the primary form of belief and reference the non-propositional belief expressed in the locution "he believes himself to be..." and explicates this basic sort of belief without recourse to such "impure" Platonic entities as indexical properties and singular propositions. In the opening chapter and appendix, Chisholm outlines his own "purified" Platonic ontology. In addition to individual things, their parts, aggregates, and boundaries, he countenances only properties and states of affairs. "Times," "possible worlds," and propositions are reducible to states of affairs.

Somewhat rambling and loosely structured in the manner of an essay about a subject matter with no fixed parameters, Modern German Philosophy succeeds in presenting a lively picture of the contemporary German philosophical scene, and not least because of the author's critical participation in it. The book's origin in a native German speaker is fairly evident despite the curiosity that the book was apparently intended, not for German publication, but solely for its English translation. The expositions of Germany's major thinkers in the past few decades are clear, succinct, and fairly accurate, given the author's avowed proclivities and presuppositions. Bubner has the good sense to intersperse his expositions with critical reflections, often open-ended, and even occasionally with a précis of his own systematic thinking. The result is a never dull, very engaging introduction to contemporary German philosophy that may surprise its English-speaking readers with the level of criticism and argumentation animating the latter. An additional boon to the reader is the fairly extensive and up-to-date references in the footnotes, especially to English translations when available.

From a phenomenological point of view, others present themselves as unities within my intentional life as a whole, constituted ‘for’ me even while maintaining a certain reserve. This ‘reserve’ is meant to indicate that the consciousness of alter egos involves the consciousness of a breach that does not obtain between consciousness and its other ‘objects’. Indeed, there is an obvious sense in which this very consciousness requires a considerable modification of the phenomenological understanding of the ego itself and the way in which intentional life is constituted. As a means of accounting for intersubjectivity without reducing it to the ego or vice versa, the author of this short, but densely written volume focuses on the body as the place in which the above mentioned breach is constituted and countenanced in tandem with a transformed conception of the ego. The rationale for this strategy is outlined in chapter one, “Alterity and Otherness: The Problem of the Body in the Cartesian Meditations,” where the author observes, to begin with, that “the reduced ownness” cannot be defined as ‘nonalien’ since it is embodied and, as such, includes its “own inescapable otherness... thus indicating that the ‘inside’ of the ‘I’ is ordered in such a way that the experience of alterity is possible.” While providing some important clues, this observation does not explain how alterity in fact is experienced. The beginning of an explanation, Dodd suggests, is to be found in the passive synthesis of my body and another’s and, on the basis of that pairing, the interpretation of the other’s body in analogy with the way the ego mundanely expresses itself in its body. Thus, the most basic answer to the question of how another ego-life can be constituted in its alterity yet in my consciousness is provided by “expression” as a mundane and mutual modification of my life and others, in short, by their encounter, not as transcendental subjects, but as living bodies. The remainder of the book accordingly focuses on the body as “the basic element of the encounter between two lives”, based upon Husserl’s account of the three essential features of a “physical thing”: extendedness, materiality, and temporality.

After reviewing basic features of language, this paper reviews a central debate among twentieth-century philosophers over the proper analysis of linguisticmeaning. While some center the analysis of meaning in language’s capacity to be true, others locate meaning in the communicative intentions of the users of thelanguage. As a means of addressing this impasse and suggesting its unfounded character, the paper draws on recent studies of language acquisition and relates them to existential dimensions of language.

This engaging work explores how Hegel's philosophy both entails and is entailed by a certain conception of Christianity. What distinguishes Burbidge's exploration is the emphasis that he places on an interpretation of Hegel's logic, in which a central role is assigned to the understanding. The first set of essays elaborates the operation of the understanding in relation to the operations of dialectic and speculative reason in Hegel's logic. The first essay concentrates on Hegel's attempt to display the universal movement of pure thought in terms of all three operations. Complementing his earlier work, On Hegel's Logic, Burbidge argues that, given the appropriate interpretation of these operations, the absolute difference between "being" and "nothing" can be said to be sustained, even as these concepts are held together in "becoming," which in turn disappears into "a being". Burbidge's second essay presents an interpretive sketch of Hegel's logic as a whole, based upon a consistent, thorough, and self-referential application of the understanding. The essay's title "Transition or Reflection" refers to the distinction, characteristic of dialectical development, between inherent and posited concepts. The movement of thought between members of the first set of concepts is immediate and hence a "transition," while that between members of the second set is mediated by "reflection." Burbidge argues that the logic of concepts in Part 3 of Hegel's logic, construed as the understanding applied to itself, specifies within itself these two contradictory moments. The same theme informs Burbidge's third essay as he identifies the understanding, not as the beginning, but as the culmination of Hegel's logic, holding together in the disjunctive judgment of the logic of concepts both the dialectic emphasized by the left wing of Hegel scholars and the speculation championed by the right wing. Burbidge argues for what might be called the ironic interpretation of Hegel's claim to an absolute method, namely, the understanding that "no immediate transition, no comprehensive vision, and no philosophical wisdom will ever be the last word". The final essay of this first part discussed the necessity of contingency in the context of Hegel's logic.

BOOK REVIEWS 473 Chapter 4 concerns Peirce's "pragmatic metaphysics" and is the culmination of the development of Rosenthal's pluralism thesis. Together with the observation that the categories are categories of process, and through a close examination of the category of Firstness, she emphasizes the importance of sense-qualities that are inseparable from negative and positive possibilities Cmay-bes" and "would-bes") and their relevance to the controversies over whether Peirce is a realist, an idealist, or a phenomenalist. She says that Peirce did not see that the language he had available from the tradition was not adequate; thus, he proposed that objective idealism is the best answer to the question of whether the universe is mind or matter, even though he in fact repudiated objective idealism. In considering Peirce's cosmology, Rosenthal draws on Peirce's discussions of the law of mind, considering the ineradicable place of spontaneity in the emergence of new intelligibility or the evolution of laws. She concludes with a reiteration of the point that although knowledge involves convergence, convergences are always within a common world that inquirers partially but continually remake. Rosenthal's book is far too rich to do it justice in this short space. It challenges the reader to see why Peirce's thought is particularly relevant to contemporary debates, not only over how to interpret Peirce but, more importantly, about how his philosophy may help..

The aim of this paper is to revisit Heidegger’s phenomenological reading of Rilke with a view to eliciting its implications for our future and that of phenomenology. The paper focuses on how Heidegger, despite regarding Rilke as a much-needed poet in these destitute times, criticises the metaphysical and Nietzschean underpinnings of his poetic account of the open and animal existence within it. In addition to shedding considerable light on Heidegger’s own conception of the open and human existence within it, focusing on this criticism unde rscores how the sort of phenomenological thinking exemplified in Heidegger’s reading of Rilke essentially and uniquely provides an opening of the future.

This paper elaborates four asymmetrical, developmental stages of the phenomenon of human freedom, starting with a rudimentary sort of freedom, thebasic experience of a relatively unencumbered power to act in alternative ways. The paper argues that structural elements of this rudimentary form of freedomare demonstrable in three distinct, supervening forms of freedom: instrumental freedom, the experience of the self-reflective ability to pursue certain aims, perfectionist freedom, the experience of the capacity to master oneself according to some ideal, and, finally, interpersonal freedom, the experience of empowerment and alternatives only available through commitments to others.

This essay takes a critical look at a specific altruistic interpretation of the moral nature, legitimacy, and value of unselfish actions. The aim of the essay is to raise questions about this altruistic attitude toward the morality of unselfish actions by focussing on certain assumptions that inform that attitude. It is argued that, among those assumptions, the most counterintuitive and deleterious is the notion that the morality of an unselfish action can and should be established by appeal to the possibility of resentment springing from the performance or non-performance of the action. After a short presentation and explanation of these assumptions and their questionableness, the essay investigates the extent to which an altruistic attitude animates contemporary discussion of the moral character of unselfish actions. This investigation is limited to a sketch of a particular development of contemporary ethical theory, from Thomas Nagel's initial attempt to explain the possibility of pure altruism to his revisions of his early theory into a concept of a revised altruism, and culminating in the intersubjective altruism, elaborated by Christine Korsgaard as a consequence of her critique of Nagel's moral theory. In conclusion, after iterating the fundamental inadequacy of appeals to possibilities of resentment, an explanation for the altruistic attitude is ventured. This explanation tries to secure the measure of validity of the assumptions of the altruistic attitude as well as its limitations by suggesting its grounding in an ethics of honor, delimited by an ethics of love and friendship.

Immanuel Kant's "critical philosophy" is rightly renowned for its criticism of the metaphysical pretensions of reason unaided by experience. It therefore seems ironic that, within a single generation, some of Kant's most important followers argued that the critical philosophy could be made fully critical only by recourse to the very metaphysical themes that Kant had apparently criticized. The story of the emergence of German Idealism has never been fully told. The story is full of tensions, contradictions, and reversals, all of which seemingly conspire to render a meaningful and unified account impossible. While defying any simple or simplistic explanation, the various and sometimes conflicting impulses that led to the emergence of German Idealism together constitute an intelligible and rich line of development. In this volume, an international group of leading scholars shows how the various aspirations at work in the emergence of German Idealism―moral, religious, aesthetic, political, and epistemological―can be understood as both consummating and overcoming Kant's critical philosophy. The volume also includes a chronology of the major works in the development of German Idealism, as well as a new translation of the seminal and still-controversial essay, "The Earliest System Programme of German Idealism."

This paper attempts to marshall some of the evidence of the transcendental character of Heidegger's later thinking, despite his repudiation of any form of transcendental thinking, including that of his own earlier project of fundamental ontology. The transcendental significance of that early project is first outlined through comparison and contrast with the diverse transcendental turns in the philosophies of Kant and Husserl. The paper then turns to Heidegger's account of the historical source of the notion of transcendence in Plato's thinking, its legacy in various forms of transcendental philosophy, and his reasons for attempting to think in a post-transcendental way. The paper concludes by identifying four vestiges of the transcendental turn in Heidegger's later thinking.

Challenging twentieth-century skepticism regarding the notion of subjectivity, the author sets for himself the task of elaborating several models of self-consciousness, each differentiated by an advancing degree of complexity. Düsing’s book is accordingly both critical and constructive; its aim is to construct a viable theory of subjectivity and a clear foundation for scientific research, thereby forestalling the naive practice, common among researchers of neural processes, of assuming an arbitrary conception of consciousness and self-consciousness. At the same time, Düsing creatively appropriates theories of subjectivity produced in the period from Kant to Hegel and distinguished by a sophisticated differentiation and combination of concepts of pure self-consciousness and a concrete self.

Morning Hours is the first English translation of Morgenstunden by Moses Mendelssohn, the foremost Jewish thinker of the German Enlightenment. Published six months before Mendelssohn's death on January 4, 1786, Morning Hours is the most sustained presentation of his mature epistemological and metaphysical views, all elaborated in the service of presenting his son with proofs for the existence of God. But Morning Hours is much more than a theoretical treatise. It also plays a central role in the drama of the Pantheismusstreit, Mendelssohn's "dispute" with F. H. Jacobi over the nature and scope of Lessing's attitude toward Spinoza and "pantheism". In Morning Hours Mendelssohn attempts to set the record straight regarding his beloved Lessing in this connection, not least by demonstrating the absence of any practical difference between theism and a "purified pantheism".