•  486
    What is a complex system?
    with James Lambert and Karoline Wiesner
    European Journal for Philosophy of Science 3 (1): 33-67. 2013.
    Complex systems research is becoming ever more important in both the natural and social sciences. It is commonly implied that there is such a thing as a complex system, different examples of which are studied across many disciplines. However, there is no concise definition of a complex system, let alone a definition on which all scientists agree. We review various attempts to characterize a complex system, and consider a core set of features that are widely associated with complex systems in the…Read more
  •  393
    Physicalism, supervenience and the fundamental level
    with Robin Brown
    Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234): 20-38. 2009.
    We provide a formulation of physicalism, and show that this is to be favoured over alternative formulations. Much of the literature on physicalism assumes without argument that there is a fundamental level to reality, and we show that a consideration of the levels problem and its implications for physicalism tells in favour of the form of physicalism proposed here. Its hey elements are, fast, that the empirical and substantive part of physicalism amounts to a prediction that physics will not pos…Read more
  •  700
    The aim of this paper is to revisit the phlogiston theory to see what can be learned from it about the relationship between scientific realism, approximate truth and successful reference. It is argued that phlogiston theory did to some extent correctly describe the causal or nomological structure of the world, and that some of its central terms can be regarded as referring. However, it is concluded that the issue of whether or not theoretical terms successfully refer is not the key to formulatin…Read more
  •  387
    What's really wrong with constructive empiricism? Van Fraassen and the metaphysics of modality
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (4): 837-856. 2000.
    Constructive empiricism is supposed to offer a positive alternative to scientific realism that dispenses with the need for metaphysics. I first review the terms of the debate before arguing that the standard objections to constructive empiricism are not decisive. I then explain van Fraassen's views on modality and counterfactuals, and argue that, because constructive empiricism recommends on epistemological grounds belief in the empirical adequacy rather than the truth of theories, it requires t…Read more
  •  83
    Big data
    The Philosophers' Magazine 72 69-70. 2016.
    [no abstract]
  •  316
    Reinflating the semantic approach
    International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 13 (2). 1999.
    The semantic, or model-theoretic, approach to theories has recently come under criticism on two fronts: (i) it is claimed that it cannot account for the wide diversity of models employed in scientific practice—a claim which has led some to propose a “deflationary” account of models; (ii) it is further contended that the sense of “model” used by the approach differs from that given in model theory. Our aim in the present work is to articulate a possible response to these claims, drawing on recent…Read more
  •  1606
    There is good reason to believe that scientific realism requires a commitment to the objective modal structure of the physical world. Causality, equilibrium, laws of nature, and probability all feature prominently in scientific theory and explanation, and each one is a modal notion. If we are committed to the content of our best scientific theories, we must accept the modal nature of the physical world. But what does the scientific realist’s commitment to physical modality require? We consider w…Read more
  •  63
    Supervenience: Not local and not two-way
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5): 630-630. 2004.
    This commentary argues that Ross & Spurrett (R&S) have not shown that supervenience is two-way, but they have shown that all the sciences, including physics, make use of functional and supervenient properties. The entrenched defender of Kim's position could insist that only fundamental physics describes causal relations directly, but Kim's microphysical reductionism becomes completely implausible when we consider contemporary physics.
  •  30
    Review: Discussion: Empiricism versus Metaphysics (review)
    Philosophical Studies 121 (2). 2004.
  •  5
    Editorial
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (1): 1-2. 2005.
  •  117
    A field guide to the Higgs
    The Philosophers' Magazine 59 (59): 21-22. 2012.
  •  28
    S cientific S tructuralism: O n the I dentity and D iversity of O bjects in a S tructure
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1): 23-43. 2007.
  •  356
    Criteria of identity and structuralist ontology
    with Hannes Leitgib
    Philosophia Mathematica 16 (3): 388-396. 2008.
    In discussions about whether the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles is compatible with structuralist ontologies of mathematics, it is usually assumed that individual objects are subject to criteria of identity which somehow account for the identity of the individuals. Much of this debate concerns structures that admit of non-trivial automorphisms. We consider cases from graph theory that violate even weak formulations of PII. We argue that (i) the identity or difference of places in a s…Read more
  •  249
    Constructive empiricism and modal metaphysics: A reply to Monton and Van Fraassen
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (4): 755-765. 2004.
    , I argued that Bas van Fraassen's constructive empiricism was undermined in various ways by his antirealism about modality. Here I offer some comments and responses to the reply to my arguments by Bradley Monton and van Fraassen [2003]. In particular, after making some minor points, I argue that Monton and van Fraassen have not done enough to show that the context dependence of counterfactuals renders their truth conditions non-objective, and I also argue that adopting modal realism does after …Read more
  •  169
    Superconductivity and structures: revisiting the London account
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 28 (3): 363-393. 1997.
    Cartwright and her collaborators have elaborated a provocative view of science which emphasises the independence from theory &unknown;in methods and aims&unknown; of phenomenological model building. This thesis has been supported in a recent paper by an analysis of the London and London model of superconductivity. In the present work we begin with a critique of Cartwright's account of the relationship between theoretical and phenomenological models before elaborating an alternative picture withi…Read more
  •  285
    Few can imagine a world without telephones or televisions; many depend on computers and the Internet as part of daily life. Without scientific theory, these developments would not have been possible. In this exceptionally clear and engaging introduction to philosophy of science, James Ladyman explores the philosophical questions that arise when we reflect on the nature of the scientific method and the knowledge it produces. He discusses whether fundamental philosophical questions about knowledge…Read more
  •  52
    Arguing about science (edited book)
    Routledge. 2013.
    Arguing About Science is an outstanding, engaging introduction to the essential topics in philosophy of science, edited by two leading experts in the field. This exciting and innovative anthology contains a selection of classic and contemporary readings that examine a broad range of issues, from classic problems such as scientific reasoning; causation; and scientific realism, to more recent topics such as science and race; forensic science; and the scientific status of medicine. The editors brin…Read more
  •  167
    Review of Anjan Chakravartty, A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism: Knowing the Unobservable (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (6). 2009.
    Review of Anjan Chakravartty: 'A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism: Knowing the Unobservable', Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
  •  171
    I—James Ladyman: On the Identity and Diversity of Objects in a Structure
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1): 23-43. 2007.
    The identity and diversity of individual objects may be grounded or ungrounded, and intrinsic or contextual. Intrinsic individuation can be grounded in haecceities, or absolute discernibility. Contextual individuation can be grounded in relations, but this is compatible with absolute, relative or weak discernibility. Contextual individuation is compatible with the denial of haecceitism, and this is more harmonious with science. Structuralism implies contextual individuation. In mathematics conte…Read more
  •  1928
    What is structural realism?
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 29 (3): 409-424. 1998.
  •  93
    Beyond a joke (review)
    The Philosophers' Magazine 42 (42): 105-107. 2008.