-
421Weak physicalism and special science ontologyIn Hieke Alexander & Leitgeb Hannes (eds.), Reduction, Abstraction, Analysis, Ontos Verlag. pp. 11--113. 2009.
-
312Reinflating the semantic approachInternational Studies in the Philosophy of Science 13 (2). 1999.The semantic, or model-theoretic, approach to theories has recently come under criticism on two fronts: (i) it is claimed that it cannot account for the wide diversity of models employed in scientific practice—a claim which has led some to propose a “deflationary” account of models; (ii) it is further contended that the sense of “model” used by the approach differs from that given in model theory. Our aim in the present work is to articulate a possible response to these claims, drawing on recent…Read more
-
325The scientistic stance: the empirical and materialist stances reconciledSynthese 178 (1): 87-98. 2011.Abstractvan Fraassen (The empirical stance, 2002) contrasts the empirical stance with the materialist stance. The way he describes them makes both of them attractive, and while opposed they have something in common for both stances are scientific approaches to philosophy. The difference between them reflects their differing conceptions of science itself. Empiricists emphasise fallibilism, verifiability and falsifiability, and also to some extent scepticism and tolerance of novel hypotheses. Mate…Read more
-
1545Ontic Structural Realism and ModalityIn Elaine Landry & Dean Rickles (eds.), Structural Realism: Structure, Object, and Causality, Springer. 2012.There is good reason to believe that scientific realism requires a commitment to the objective modal structure of the physical world. Causality, equilibrium, laws of nature, and probability all feature prominently in scientific theory and explanation, and each one is a modal notion. If we are committed to the content of our best scientific theories, we must accept the modal nature of the physical world. But what does the scientific realist’s commitment to physical modality require? We consider w…Read more
-
63Supervenience: Not local and not two-wayBehavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5): 630-630. 2004.This commentary argues that Ross & Spurrett (R&S) have not shown that supervenience is two-way, but they have shown that all the sciences, including physics, make use of functional and supervenient properties. The entrenched defender of Kim's position could insist that only fundamental physics describes causal relations directly, but Kim's microphysical reductionism becomes completely implausible when we consider contemporary physics.
-
459What is a complex system?European Journal for Philosophy of Science 3 (1): 33-67. 2013.Complex systems research is becoming ever more important in both the natural and social sciences. It is commonly implied that there is such a thing as a complex system, different examples of which are studied across many disciplines. However, there is no concise definition of a complex system, let alone a definition on which all scientists agree. We review various attempts to characterize a complex system, and consider a core set of features that are widely associated with complex systems in the…Read more
-
262Scientific structuralism: On the identity and diversity of objects in a structureAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1). 2007.
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Physical Science |
General Philosophy of Science |
PhilPapers Editorships
Structural Realism |