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459What is a complex system?European Journal for Philosophy of Science 3 (1): 33-67. 2013.Complex systems research is becoming ever more important in both the natural and social sciences. It is commonly implied that there is such a thing as a complex system, different examples of which are studied across many disciplines. However, there is no concise definition of a complex system, let alone a definition on which all scientists agree. We review various attempts to characterize a complex system, and consider a core set of features that are widely associated with complex systems in the…Read more
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262Scientific structuralism: On the identity and diversity of objects in a structureAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1). 2007.
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27S cientific S tructuralism: O n the I dentity and D iversity of O bjects in a S tructureAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1): 23-43. 2007.
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34Ontological, epistemological and methodological positionsIn Theo A. F. Kuipers (ed.), General Philosophy of Science, North Holland. pp. 303--376. 2007.
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240Constructive empiricism and modal metaphysics: A reply to Monton and Van FraassenBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (4): 755-765. 2004., I argued that Bas van Fraassen's constructive empiricism was undermined in various ways by his antirealism about modality. Here I offer some comments and responses to the reply to my arguments by Bradley Monton and van Fraassen [2003]. In particular, after making some minor points, I argue that Monton and van Fraassen have not done enough to show that the context dependence of counterfactuals renders their truth conditions non-objective, and I also argue that adopting modal realism does after …Read more
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385What's really wrong with constructive empiricism? Van Fraassen and the metaphysics of modalityBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (4): 837-856. 2000.Constructive empiricism is supposed to offer a positive alternative to scientific realism that dispenses with the need for metaphysics. I first review the terms of the debate before arguing that the standard objections to constructive empiricism are not decisive. I then explain van Fraassen's views on modality and counterfactuals, and argue that, because constructive empiricism recommends on epistemological grounds belief in the empirical adequacy rather than the truth of theories, it requires t…Read more
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Unification and explanation in science A review of Margaret Morrison's Unifying Scientific Theories: Physical Concepts and Mathematical StructuresJournal of Economic Methodology 10 (1): 91-96. 2003.
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168Superconductivity and structures: revisiting the London accountStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 28 (3): 363-393. 1997.Cartwright and her collaborators have elaborated a provocative view of science which emphasises the independence from theory &unknown;in methods and aims&unknown; of phenomenological model building. This thesis has been supported in a recent paper by an analysis of the London and London model of superconductivity. In the present work we begin with a critique of Cartwright's account of the relationship between theoretical and phenomenological models before elaborating an alternative picture withi…Read more
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52Stathis Psillos, Causation and Explanation. Chesham: Acumen, 2002 (review)Metascience 12 (3): 431-434. 2003.
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52Arguing about science (edited book)Routledge. 2013.Arguing About Science is an outstanding, engaging introduction to the essential topics in philosophy of science, edited by two leading experts in the field. This exciting and innovative anthology contains a selection of classic and contemporary readings that examine a broad range of issues, from classic problems such as scientific reasoning; causation; and scientific realism, to more recent topics such as science and race; forensic science; and the scientific status of medicine. The editors brin…Read more
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166Review of Anjan Chakravartty, A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism: Knowing the Unobservable (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (6). 2009.Review of Anjan Chakravartty: 'A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism: Knowing the Unobservable', Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
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169I—James Ladyman: On the Identity and Diversity of Objects in a StructureAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1): 23-43. 2007.The identity and diversity of individual objects may be grounded or ungrounded, and intrinsic or contextual. Intrinsic individuation can be grounded in haecceities, or absolute discernibility. Contextual individuation can be grounded in relations, but this is compatible with absolute, relative or weak discernibility. Contextual individuation is compatible with the denial of haecceitism, and this is more harmonious with science. Structuralism implies contextual individuation. In mathematics conte…Read more
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129Wouldn’t it be Lovely: Explanation and Scientific Realism (review)Metascience 14 (3): 331-361. 2005.
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15The epistemology of constructive empiricismIn Bradley John Monton (ed.), Images of empiricism: essays on science and stances, with a reply from Bas C. van Fraassen, Oxford University Press. 2007.
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381In defence of ontic structural realismIn Alisa Bokulich & Peter Bokulich (eds.), Scientific Structuralism, Springer Science+business Media. pp. 25-42. 2011.
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376Science, metaphysics and methodPhilosophical Studies 160 (1): 31-51. 2012.While there are many examples of metaphysical theorising being heuristically and intellectually important in the progress of scientific knowledge, many people wonder how metaphysics not closely informed and inspired by empirical science could lead to rival or even supplementary knowledge about the world. This paper assesses the merits of a popular defence of the a priori methodology of metaphysics that goes as follows. The first task of the metaphysician, like the scientist, is to construct a hy…Read more
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171Philosophy that’s not for the massesThe Philosophers' Magazine 53 (53): 55-60. 2011.I do not see why all philosophers should be interested in communicating their thoughts to the world. Philosophy is no different in this regard from pure mathematics or microbiology. The idea that every scientist should be a part-time public speaker is absurd.
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351Criteria of identity and structuralist ontologyPhilosophia Mathematica 16 (3): 388-396. 2008.In discussions about whether the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles is compatible with structuralist ontologies of mathematics, it is usually assumed that individual objects are subject to criteria of identity which somehow account for the identity of the individuals. Much of this debate concerns structures that admit of non-trivial automorphisms. We consider cases from graph theory that violate even weak formulations of PII. We argue that (i) the identity or difference of places in a s…Read more
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285Understanding Philosophy of ScienceRoutledge. 2001.Few can imagine a world without telephones or televisions; many depend on computers and the Internet as part of daily life. Without scientific theory, these developments would not have been possible. In this exceptionally clear and engaging introduction to philosophy of science, James Ladyman explores the philosophical questions that arise when we reflect on the nature of the scientific method and the knowledge it produces. He discusses whether fundamental philosophical questions about knowledge…Read more
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44Semantic perspective on idealization in quantum mechanicsPoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 63 51-74. 1998.
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343Structural realism and the relationship between the special sciences and physicsPhilosophy of Science 75 (5): 744-755. 2008.The primacy of physics generates a philosophical problem that the naturalist must solve in order to be entitled to an egalitarian acceptance of the ontological commitments he or she inherits from the special sciences and fundamental physics. The problem is the generalized causal exclusion argument. If there is no genuine causation in the domains of the special sciences but only in fundamental physics then there are grounds for doubting the existence of macroscopic objects and properties, or at l…Read more
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826Structural RealismIn Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, The Metaphysics Research Lab. 2014.Structural realism is considered by many realists and antirealists alike as the most defensible form of scientific realism. There are now many forms of structural realism and an extensive literature about them. There are interesting connections with debates in metaphysics, philosophy of physics and philosophy of mathematics. This entry is intended to be a comprehensive survey of the field.
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46Review of Naturalizing Epistemology by Fred D’Agostino (review)Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3): 605-608. 2012.Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 90, Issue 3, Page 605-608, September 2012
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58Whether we think of the routine conviction or acquittal of suspects on the basis of scientific evidence in the law courts, the trust placed in scientific medicine and the extraordinary interventions it makes possible, or the importance that policy makers attach to the opinions of scientists, it is clear that those making up our scientific institutions are among the most authoritative and respected people that there are. Among intellectual endeavours science has an unrivalled dominance in terms o…Read more
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