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Visit our website at http://www. blackwellpublishing. comIn Christopher Hitchcock (ed.), Contemporary debates in philosophy of science, Blackwell. pp. 24. 2004.
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830Structural RealismIn Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, The Metaphysics Research Lab. 2014.Structural realism is considered by many realists and antirealists alike as the most defensible form of scientific realism. There are now many forms of structural realism and an extensive literature about them. There are interesting connections with debates in metaphysics, philosophy of physics and philosophy of mathematics. This entry is intended to be a comprehensive survey of the field.
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345Structural realism and the relationship between the special sciences and physicsPhilosophy of Science 75 (5): 744-755. 2008.The primacy of physics generates a philosophical problem that the naturalist must solve in order to be entitled to an egalitarian acceptance of the ontological commitments he or she inherits from the special sciences and fundamental physics. The problem is the generalized causal exclusion argument. If there is no genuine causation in the domains of the special sciences but only in fundamental physics then there are grounds for doubting the existence of macroscopic objects and properties, or at l…Read more
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46Review of Naturalizing Epistemology by Fred D’Agostino (review)Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3): 605-608. 2012.Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 90, Issue 3, Page 605-608, September 2012
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58Whether we think of the routine conviction or acquittal of suspects on the basis of scientific evidence in the law courts, the trust placed in scientific medicine and the extraordinary interventions it makes possible, or the importance that policy makers attach to the opinions of scientists, it is clear that those making up our scientific institutions are among the most authoritative and respected people that there are. Among intellectual endeavours science has an unrivalled dominance in terms o…Read more
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437Weak physicalism and special science ontologyIn Alexander Hieke & Hannes Leitgeb (eds.), Reduction, Abstraction, Analysis, Ontos. pp. 11--113. 2009.
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624Remodelling structural realism: Quantum physics and the metaphysics of structure (review)Synthese 136 (1): 31-56. 2003.We outline Ladyman's 'metaphysical' or 'ontic' form of structuralrealism and defend it against various objections. Cao, in particular, has questioned theview of ontology presupposed by this approach and we argue that by reconceptualisingobjects in structural terms it offers the best hope for the realist in thecontext of modern physics.
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107The scientistic stance: the empirical and materialist stances reconciledSynthese 178 (1): 87-98. 2011.Abstractvan Fraassen (The empirical stance, 2002) contrasts the empirical stance with the materialist stance. The way he describes them makes both of them attractive, and while opposed they have something in common for both stances are scientific approaches to philosophy. The difference between them reflects their differing conceptions of science itself. Empiricists emphasise fallibilism, verifiability and falsifiability, and also to some extent scepticism and tolerance of novel hypotheses. Mate…Read more
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238Does Physics Answer Metaphysical Questions?Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 61 179-201. 2007.According to logical positivism, so the story goes, metaphysical questions are meaningless, since they do not admit of empirical confirmation or refutation. However, the logical positivists did not in fact reject as meaningless all questions about for example, the structure of space and time. Rather, key figures such as Reichenbach and Schlick believed that scientific theories often presupposed a conceptual framework that was not itself empirically testable, but which was required for the theory…Read more
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262The dissolution of objects: Between platonism and phenomenalism (review)Synthese 136 (1). 2003.
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491What is a complex system?European Journal for Philosophy of Science 3 (1): 33-67. 2013.Complex systems research is becoming ever more important in both the natural and social sciences. It is commonly implied that there is such a thing as a complex system, different examples of which are studied across many disciplines. However, there is no concise definition of a complex system, let alone a definition on which all scientists agree. We review various attempts to characterize a complex system, and consider a core set of features that are widely associated with complex systems in the…Read more
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393Physicalism, supervenience and the fundamental levelPhilosophical Quarterly 59 (234): 20-38. 2009.We provide a formulation of physicalism, and show that this is to be favoured over alternative formulations. Much of the literature on physicalism assumes without argument that there is a fundamental level to reality, and we show that a consideration of the levels problem and its implications for physicalism tells in favour of the form of physicalism proposed here. Its hey elements are, fast, that the empirical and substantive part of physicalism amounts to a prediction that physics will not pos…Read more
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709The aim of this paper is to revisit the phlogiston theory to see what can be learned from it about the relationship between scientific realism, approximate truth and successful reference. It is argued that phlogiston theory did to some extent correctly describe the causal or nomological structure of the world, and that some of its central terms can be regarded as referring. However, it is concluded that the issue of whether or not theoretical terms successfully refer is not the key to formulatin…Read more
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30Review of Steven French, dcio Krause, Identity in Physics: A Historical, Philosophical, and Formal Analysis (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (6). 2007.
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390What's really wrong with constructive empiricism? Van Fraassen and the metaphysics of modalityBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (4): 837-856. 2000.Constructive empiricism is supposed to offer a positive alternative to scientific realism that dispenses with the need for metaphysics. I first review the terms of the debate before arguing that the standard objections to constructive empiricism are not decisive. I then explain van Fraassen's views on modality and counterfactuals, and argue that, because constructive empiricism recommends on epistemological grounds belief in the empirical adequacy rather than the truth of theories, it requires t…Read more
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316Reinflating the semantic approachInternational Studies in the Philosophy of Science 13 (2). 1999.The semantic, or model-theoretic, approach to theories has recently come under criticism on two fronts: (i) it is claimed that it cannot account for the wide diversity of models employed in scientific practice—a claim which has led some to propose a “deflationary” account of models; (ii) it is further contended that the sense of “model” used by the approach differs from that given in model theory. Our aim in the present work is to articulate a possible response to these claims, drawing on recent…Read more
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Unification and explanation in science A review of Margaret Morrison's Unifying Scientific Theories: Physical Concepts and Mathematical StructuresJournal of Economic Methodology 10 (1): 91-96. 2003.
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1624Ontic Structural Realism and ModalityIn Elaine Landry & Dean Rickles (eds.), Structural Realism: Structure, Object, and Causality, Springer. 2012.There is good reason to believe that scientific realism requires a commitment to the objective modal structure of the physical world. Causality, equilibrium, laws of nature, and probability all feature prominently in scientific theory and explanation, and each one is a modal notion. If we are committed to the content of our best scientific theories, we must accept the modal nature of the physical world. But what does the scientific realist’s commitment to physical modality require? We consider w…Read more
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63Supervenience: Not local and not two-wayBehavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5): 630-630. 2004.This commentary argues that Ross & Spurrett (R&S) have not shown that supervenience is two-way, but they have shown that all the sciences, including physics, make use of functional and supervenient properties. The entrenched defender of Kim's position could insist that only fundamental physics describes causal relations directly, but Kim's microphysical reductionism becomes completely implausible when we consider contemporary physics.
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129Wouldn’t it be Lovely: Explanation and Scientific Realism (review)Metascience 14 (3): 331-361. 2005.
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263Scientific structuralism: On the identity and diversity of objects in a structureAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1). 2007.
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