Ivo Wallimann-Helmer

In der gegebenen globalen Governance-Struktur stellen souveräne Einzelstaaten die zentralen kollektiven Akteure dar, die Verantwortung für einen zeitnahen und eff ektiven Klimaschutz übernehmen müssen. Dieser Aufsatz vertritt die These, dass die Diff erenzierung der Einzelstaaten zumutbaren Verantwortung die Bedingungen berücksichtigen sollte, aufgrund derer sie als kollektivverantwortungsfähige Akteure verstanden werden können. Dies gilt sowohl mit Blick auf ihre historische Verantwortung für die Verursachung des Klimawandels als auch im Hinblick auf die Zukunft. Dabei ist für zeitnahen und eff ektiven Klimaschutz von zentraler Bedeutung, dass die Verantwortungsfähigkeit aller Mitgliedsstaaten der UNFCCC erhalten bleibt, damit sie als kollektive Akteure ihren diff erenzierten Beitrag leisten können.

This comment questions Lister's reading of the reciprocity condition in three respects. First, it challenges the view that this condition necessarily leads to egalitarian claims about just distribution. Secondly, it questions Lister's argument that the reciprocity condition is linked to substantial schemes of egalitarian distribution irrespective of context. Thirdly, it claims that entitlements to justice for people with mental or psychological impairments cannot be based on a distinction between willingness and unwillingness to contribute to the cooperative venture of a society.

The aim of this paper is to link empirical findings concerning environmental inequalities with different normative yard-sticks for assessing whether these inequalities should be deemed unjust, or not. We argue that such an inquiry must necessarily take into account some caveats regarding both empirical research and normative theory. We suggest that empirical results must be contextualised by establishing geographies of risk. As a normative yard-stick we propose a moderately demanding social-egalitarian account of justice and democratic citizenship, which we take to be best suited to identify unjust as well as legitimate instances of socio-environmental inequality

Although I believe that Gardiner and Fragnière are right to claim that geoengineering governance demands participatory structures, I think more caution is needed. First, the public to be considered because it is affected must be differentiated depending on the geoengineering technique at issue and on the severity of its impact. Second, to avoid undermining democratic legitimacy, ethical conditions of legitimacy must be carefully assessed. Even though future generations and nature are very likely to be affected by geoengineering, their representation is not as unproblematic as it might seem at first sight.

The UN's Sustainable Development Goals saw the global community agree to end hunger and malnutrition in all its forms by 2030. However, the number of chronically undernourished people is increasing continuously. Ongoing climate change and the action needed to adapt to it are very likely to aggravate this situation by limiting agricultural land and water resources and changing environmental conditions for food production. Climate change and the actions it requires raise questions of justice, especially regarding food security. 0These key concerns of ethics and justice for food security due to climate change challenges are the focus of this book, which brings together work by scholars from a wide range of disciplines and a multitude of perspectives. These experts discuss the challenges to food security posed by mitigation, geoengineering, and adaptation measures that tackle the impacts of climate change. Others address the consequences of a changing climate for agriculture and food production and how the Covid-19 pandemic has affected food security and animal welfare.0.

In this comment I challenge Kerr’s claim that a coherent expression of a ‘liberalism of freedom’ needs an extended first Rawlsian principle of justice incorporating the principle of fair equality of opportunity for two reasons. First, such an extended first principle leads to illiberal consequences by narrowing down the scope of individual responsibility for choice and effort way too much. Second, such an extended first principle misses a main Rawlsian insight, namely that in a theory of justice the principle securing basic liberties and the principle of fair equality of opportunity serve different purposes.

As our experience with this special issue shows, climate change is such a multi-faceted problem that interdisciplinary research is a necessity. This is much more easily said than done. In the course of the publication of this special issue there were many lessons to be learned. First of all we saw how the exchange between our authors allowed them to expand the focus of their respective disciplines. Philosophers considered literature from various fields they would not have touched upon in their usual course of inquiry. Scientists and legal scholars became more sensitive to the normative dimensions and justice-related intricacies involved in their research. This enabled all contributors to open up to different vocabularies and standards of research. At the same time, however, several obstacles to the success of this issue emerged as well. For such an endeavor it is necessary to find researchers who are ready to engage with other disciplines and to take up ideas and comments which at first sight might not seem relevant and out of place from their disciplinary perspective. Due to the special format another challenge was to communicate the interdisciplinary character of this special issue to the reviewers and to put the reviews in context accordingly without risking to diminish the disciplinary quality of contributions. For the guest editors this came with a further challenge. We not only had to become familiar with different disciplinary vocabularies and standards of research but also had to judge the quality and relevance of contributions in the light of our overall aim as well as disciplinary standards of quality.

Spätestens seit der Veröffentlichung von Eine Theorie der Gerechtigkeit ist Chancengleichheit ein prominentes Ideal der neueren liberalen Theoriebildung. War es im klassischen Liberalismus eher das Ideal der Freiheit, das im Vordergrund stand, kann man in der Auseinandersetzung mit der Theorie von John Rawls und der Entwicklung des Egalitarismus eine Verschiebung hin zum Ideal der Chancengleichheit beobachten, zumindest was die philosophische Theoriebildung zur Verteilungsgerechtigkeit betrifft. Ob Chancengleichheit damit allerdings eine angemessene Auslegung erfährt oder das liberale Ideal der Freiheit eher aufweicht, hängt wesentlich davon ab, welches Gewicht das Ideal in der jeweiligen liberalen Theoriebildung erhält.

In this paper I argue for the following conclusions. First, quotas are not normative goals in themselves but only a means to reach non-discriminatory selection procedures. Second, in a democracy quotas are most plausibly used as a means to fill offices in those bodies which have a major impact on how well interests or discourses are translated into policy. Third, quotas for the young can be justified since, due to demographic development, their discourses tend to be marginalized. Fourth, youth quotas cannot be a means to ensure long-term policy-making, but they can enhance legitimacy of long-term impacts from policy decisions taken today.

Attitudes toward repository projects cannot be explained merely on the basis of perceived risks, trust, or technical information. Issues of justice and fairness frequently arise when burdens and benefits are to be allocated. A fair distribution across the various parts of a given territory of the waste to be stored is unlikely to be accomplished as it is contingent on appropriate geological formations and other factors. The process by which the specific distribution is determined and accomplished needs to be taken into account as well. Thus, justice evaluations of both the distributive outcome and the process itself, by which the outcome is accomplished, are likely to affect people’s attitudes toward and acceptance of siting decisions. Data from a number of methodically different studies conducted over the last eight years on site selection in Switzerland suggest that a fair procedure is more essential than a fair distribution to a consensus about the decisions made. As a consequence, even normative assessments of the fairness of a distribution of nuclear waste must consider procedural justice as a valuable indicator, independently of the particular shape of the distribution. However, contextual factors, such as the wider nuclear energy strategy of a country, may compete with procedural fairness in terms of importance. Even though fairness is a requirement it does not guarantee acceptance. It may, however, enhance acceptability from a moral standpoint.

This chapter serves as an introduction to the collected volume. In the first section, we aim to provide background on important themes in social egalitarianism and to set the context for understanding which significant questions the chapters in this book pose and attempt to answer. In this section we focus especially on what could be said to characterize socially egalitarian relationships, on which relationships are of concern, and on what might make social egalitarianism distinct. In the second section, we provide a brief explanation of the structure of the book and each of its chapters

‘Emotions are Janus-faced,’ writes de Sousa. ‘This suggests that we might speak of a truth, or perhaps two kinds of truth of emotions, one of which is about the self, and the other about conditions in the world’. Emotions, it is claimed, disclose facts about how the world is and about who we are. The articles in this volume all focus on one, the other, or both of these aspects of emotions – How do they contribute to provide reasons for judgements and actions? How do these judgements and actions, individual or collective, serve as occasions for interrogation and evaluation of the self or of morality?

‘Emotions are Janus-faced,’ writes de Sousa. ‘This suggests that we might speak of a truth, or perhaps two kinds of truth of emotions, one of which is about the self, and the other about conditions in the world’. Emotions, it is claimed, disclose facts about how the world is and about who we are. The articles in this volume all focus on one, the other, or both of these aspects of emotions – How do they contribute to provide reasons for judgements and actions? How do these judgements and actions, individual or collective, serve as occasions for interrogation and evaluation of the self or of morality?