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Introspection and the skepticIn Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism, Cambridge University Press. 1991.
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57Consciousness and the Origins of ThoughtPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1): 273-275. 1999.
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1Unity of consciousness, other minds, and phenomenal spaceIn Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism, Cambridge University Press. 1991.
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175Reply to Alex Byrne and Fred Dretske (review)Philosophical Studies 161 (3): 503-511. 2012.Reply to Alex Byrne and Fred Dretske Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-9 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9814-2 Authors Christopher S. Hill, Department of Philosophy, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116
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152Précis of Consciousness (review)Philosophical Studies 161 (3): 483-487. 2012.Précis of Consciousness Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-5 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9813-3 Authors Christopher S. Hill, Department of Philosophy, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116
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163Harman on self referential thoughtsPhilosophical Issues 16 (1): 346-357. 2006.I will be concerned in these pages with the views that Gilbert Harman puts forward in his immensely stimulating paper Self-Reflexive Thoughts.<sup>1</sup> Harman maintains that self referential thoughts are possible, and also that they are useful. I applaud both of these claims. An example of a self referential thought is the thought that every thought, including this present one, has a logical structure. I feel sure that this thought exists, for I have entertained it on a number of occasions. M…Read more
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299Impossible Worlds and Metaphysical Explanation: Comments on Kment’s Modality and Explanatory ReasoningAnalysis 77 (1): 134-148. 2017.In this critical notice of Kment's _Modality and Explanatory Reasoning_, we focus on Kment’s arguments for impossible worlds and on a key part of his discussion of the interactions between modality and explanation – the analogy that he draws between scientific and metaphysical explanation.
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The failings of functionalismIn Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism, Cambridge University Press. 1991.
Areas of Interest
| Philosophy of Mind |
| Philosophy of Cognitive Science |