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35Ow! The Paradox of PainIn Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study, Bradford Book/mit Press. 2005.
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103Anti‐individualism: Mind and language, knowledge and justificationPhilosophical Books 50 (2): 112-123. 2009.
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148Remarks on David Papineau’s Thinking About Consciousness (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1). 2005.Thinking about Consciousness is a wonderfully clear and vigorous commen- tary on the nature of consciousness and its relationship to brain processes. It advances the contemporary discussion of a number of important issues, but it also introduces several quite valuable ideas that are independent of the con- temporary literature. Papineau has performed an important service by writing it.
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Perceptual consciousness: How it opens directly onto the world, preferring the world to itselfIn Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness, Mit Press. pp. 249--272. 2006.
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236Why cartesian intuitions are compatible with the identity thesisPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (December): 254-65. 1981.
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902There Are Fewer Things in Reality Than Are Dreamt of in Chalmers’s Philosophy (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2): 445-454. 1999.Chalmers’s anti-materialist argument runs as follows
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494Process reliabilism and cartesian scepticismPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3): 567-581. 1996.
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161Meaning, Mind, and KnowledgeOxford University Press. 2014.This volume presents a selection of essays by the leading philosopher Christopher S. Hill. Together, they address central philosophical issues related to four key concerns: the nature of truth; the relation between experiences and brain states; the relation between experiences and representational states; and problems concerning knowledge
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238Introspective awareness of sensationsTopoi 7 (1): 11-24. 1988.My goal is to formulate a theory of introspection that can be integrated with a strongly reductionist account of sensations that I have defended elsewhere. In pursuit of this goal, I offer a skeletal explanation of the metaphysical nature of introspection and I attempt to resolve several of the main questions about the epistemological status of introspective beliefs
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91ConsciousnessCambridge University Press. 2009.This book presents a comprehensive theory of consciousness. The initial chapter distinguishes six main forms of consciousness and sketches an account of each one. Later chapters focus on phenomenal consciousness, consciousness of, and introspective consciousness. In discussing phenomenal consciousness, Hill develops the representational theory of mind in new directions, arguing that all awareness involves representations, even awareness of qualitative states like pain. He then uses this view to …Read more
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109Review of Zenon W. Pylyshyn, Things and Places: How the Mind Connects with the World (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (7). 2008.
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102Can Carey answer Quine?Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (3): 132-133. 2011.In order to defend her claim that the concept object is biologically determined, Carey must answer Quine's gavagai argument, which purports to show that mastery of any concept with determinate reference presupposes a substantial repertoire of logical concepts. I maintain that the gavagai argument withstands the experimental data that Carey provides, but that it yields to an a priori argument
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171Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind/BrainPhilosophical Review 97 (4): 573. 1988.
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Introspection and the skepticIn Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism, Cambridge University Press. 1991.
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1Unity of consciousness, other minds, and phenomenal spaceIn Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism, Cambridge University Press. 1991.
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57Consciousness and the Origins of ThoughtPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1): 273-275. 1999.
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175Reply to Alex Byrne and Fred Dretske (review)Philosophical Studies 161 (3): 503-511. 2012.Reply to Alex Byrne and Fred Dretske Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-9 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9814-2 Authors Christopher S. Hill, Department of Philosophy, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116
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152Précis of Consciousness (review)Philosophical Studies 161 (3): 483-487. 2012.Précis of Consciousness Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-5 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9813-3 Authors Christopher S. Hill, Department of Philosophy, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116
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163Harman on self referential thoughtsPhilosophical Issues 16 (1): 346-357. 2006.I will be concerned in these pages with the views that Gilbert Harman puts forward in his immensely stimulating paper Self-Reflexive Thoughts.<sup>1</sup> Harman maintains that self referential thoughts are possible, and also that they are useful. I applaud both of these claims. An example of a self referential thought is the thought that every thought, including this present one, has a logical structure. I feel sure that this thought exists, for I have entertained it on a number of occasions. M…Read more
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The failings of functionalismIn Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism, Cambridge University Press. 1991.
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298Impossible Worlds and Metaphysical Explanation: Comments on Kment’s Modality and Explanatory ReasoningAnalysis 77 (1): 134-148. 2017.In this critical notice of Kment's _Modality and Explanatory Reasoning_, we focus on Kment’s arguments for impossible worlds and on a key part of his discussion of the interactions between modality and explanation – the analogy that he draws between scientific and metaphysical explanation.
Areas of Interest
| Philosophy of Mind |
| Philosophy of Cognitive Science |