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1Matters of Mind: Consciousness, Reason, and Nature (review)Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210): 123-126. 2003.
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46Précis of Thought and World: An Austere Portrayal of Truth, Reference, and Semantic CorrespondencePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1): 174-181. 2006.I thank the commentators for their extremely rich and stimulating discussions of Thought and World.1 Their commentaries show that a number of TW’s claims are in need of clarification and defense, and that some of its arguments contain substantial lacunae. I am very pleased to have these flaws called to my attention, and to have an opportunity to try to correct them. Also, I am grateful for the commentators’ endorsements. As is perhaps inevitable in a symposium of this kind, the commentaries cont…Read more
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6Subject, Thought, and Context by Philip Pettit and John McDowell, eds (review)Journal of Philosophy 87 (2): 106-112. 1990.
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21RevisionIn Albert Casullo & Joshua C. Thurow (eds.), The a Priori in Philosophy, Oxford University Press. pp. 134. 2013.
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1Ouch! An essay on painIn Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology, John Benjamins. 2004.
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313Of bats, brains, and mindsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 38 (September): 100-106. 1977.
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Intentionality, folk psychology, and reductionIn Herbert R. Otto & James A. Tuedio (eds.), Perspectives On Mind, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1988.
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166Introspective awareness of sensationsTopoi 7 (March): 11-24. 1988.My goal is to formulate a theory of introspection that can be integrated with a strongly reductionist account of sensations that I have defended elsewhere. In pursuit of this goal, I offer a skeletal explanation of the metaphysical nature of introspection and I attempt to resolve several of the main questions about the epistemological status of introspective beliefs
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1Unity of consciousness, other minds, and phenomenal spaceIn Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism, Cambridge University Press. 1991.
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79Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism (review)Philosophical Review 122 (3): 511-518. 2013.
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39Supervenience and MaterialismPhilosophical Review 107 (1): 115. 1998.Rowlands is concerned to explain and defend a doctrine about the relationship between mental states and physical states that he calls supervenience materialism. Very roughly speaking, this is the doctrine that it is the possession of physical properties by an object that makes for or determines the possession of mental properties by that object. In explaining this doctrine, Rowlands discusses various questions of interpretation, such as what should be meant by ‘determines’ and by ‘physical prope…Read more
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10Department of Philosophy Brown University Providence, RI 02912
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31Anti‐individualism: Mind and language, knowledge and justificationPhilosophical Books 50 (2): 112-123. 2009.
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49Review of Zenon W. Pylyshyn, Things and Places: How the Mind Connects with the World (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (7). 2008.
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39Peacocke on semantic valuesAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1). 1998.This Article does not have an abstract
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71Meaning, Mind, and KnowledgeOxford University Press. 2014.This volume presents a selection of essays by the leading philosopher Christopher S. Hill. Together, they address central philosophical issues related to four key concerns: the nature of truth; the relation between experiences and brain states; the relation between experiences and representational states; and problems concerning knowledge
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Introspection and the skepticIn Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism, Cambridge University Press. 1991.
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50Department of Philosophy Brown University Providence, RI 02915.
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727There Are Fewer Things in Reality Than Are Dreamt of in Chalmers’s Philosophy (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2): 445-454. 1999.Chalmers’s anti-materialist argument runs as follows
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43Qualitative characteristics, type materialism and the circularity of analytic functionalismBehavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1): 50-51. 1993.
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |