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1Matters of Mind: Consciousness, Reason, and Nature (review)Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210): 123-126. 2003.
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45Précis of Thought and World: An Austere Portrayal of Truth, Reference, and Semantic CorrespondencePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1): 174-181. 2006.I thank the commentators for their extremely rich and stimulating discussions of Thought and World.1 Their commentaries show that a number of TW’s claims are in need of clarification and defense, and that some of its arguments contain substantial lacunae. I am very pleased to have these flaws called to my attention, and to have an opportunity to try to correct them. Also, I am grateful for the commentators’ endorsements. As is perhaps inevitable in a symposium of this kind, the commentaries cont…Read more
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6Subject, Thought, and Context by Philip Pettit and John McDowell, eds (review)Journal of Philosophy 87 (2): 106-112. 1990.
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21RevisionIn Albert Casullo & Joshua C. Thurow (eds.), The a Priori in Philosophy, Oxford University Press. pp. 134. 2013.
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1Ouch! An essay on painIn Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology, John Benjamins. 2004.
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312Of bats, brains, and mindsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 38 (September): 100-106. 1977.
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Intentionality, folk psychology, and reductionIn Herbert R. Otto & James A. Tuedio (eds.), Perspectives On Mind, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1988.
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35Ow! The Paradox of PainIn Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study, Bradford Book/mit Press. 2005.
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108Harman on self referential thoughtsPhilosophical Issues 16 (1): 346-357. 2006.I will be concerned in these pages with the views that Gilbert Harman puts forward in his immensely stimulating paper Self-Reflexive Thoughts.<sup>1</sup> Harman maintains that self referential thoughts are possible, and also that they are useful. I applaud both of these claims. An example of a self referential thought is the thought that every thought, including this present one, has a logical structure. I feel sure that this thought exists, for I have entertained it on a number of occasions. M…Read more
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118Reply to Alex Byrne and Fred Dretske (review)Philosophical Studies 161 (3): 503-511. 2012.Reply to Alex Byrne and Fred Dretske Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-9 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9814-2 Authors Christopher S. Hill, Department of Philosophy, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116
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69ConsciousnessCambridge University Press. 2009.This book presents a comprehensive theory of consciousness. The initial chapter distinguishes six main forms of consciousness and sketches an account of each one. Later chapters focus on phenomenal consciousness, consciousness of, and introspective consciousness. In discussing phenomenal consciousness, Hill develops the representational theory of mind in new directions, arguing that all awareness involves representations, even awareness of qualitative states like pain. He then uses this view to …Read more
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114Perceptual RelativityPhilosophical Topics 44 (2): 179-200. 2016.Visual experience is shaped by a number of factors that are independent of the external objects that we perceive—factors like lighting, angle of view, and the sensitivities of photoreceptors in the retina. This paper seeks to catalog, analyze, and explain the fluctuations in visual phenomenology that are due to such factors.
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138Why cartesian intuitions are compatible with the identity thesisPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (December): 254-65. 1981.
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856Imaginability, conceivability, possibility and the mind-body problemPhilosophical Studies 87 (1): 61-85. 1997.
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38Can Carey answer Quine?Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (3): 132-133. 2011.In order to defend her claim that the concept object is biologically determined, Carey must answer Quine's gavagai argument, which purports to show that mastery of any concept with determinate reference presupposes a substantial repertoire of logical concepts. I maintain that the gavagai argument withstands the experimental data that Carey provides, but that it yields to an a priori argument
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11Raw Feelings: A Philosophical Account of the Essence of ConsciousnessPhilosophical Books 37 (2): 127-130. 1996.
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15Locating qualia: do they reside in the brain or in the body and the world?In Hill Christopher & Gozzano Simone (eds.), New Perspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical, Cambridge University Press. pp. 127. 2012.
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56How to study introspectionJournal of Consciousness Studies 18 (1): 21-43. 2011.In this paper I celebrate the virtues of Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel's path-breaking book on introspection, but I also exp-ress dissatisfaction with a few of its recurring themes. The main body of the paper consists of seven theses about the way in which the study of introspection should be conducted. Thus, to a large extent, the paper is a methodological proposal, though it also makes a number of concrete claims about the nature of introspection, and about the epistemological status of its delive…Read more
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188Sensations: A Defense of Type MaterialismCambridge University Press. 1991.This is a book about sensory states and their apparent characteristics. It confronts a whole series of metaphysical and epistemological questions and presents an argument for type materialism: the view that sensory states are identical with the neural states with which they are correlated. According to type materialism, sensations are only possessed by human beings and members of related biological species; silicon-based androids cannot have sensations. The author rebuts several other rival theo…Read more
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27Consciousness and the Origins of Thought (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1): 273-276. 1999.
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358Process reliabilism and cartesian scepticismPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3): 567-581. 1996.
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |