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Christopher Hill

Brown University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    69
    • Most Recent
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    • Topics
  •  Events
    7
  •  News and Updates
    13

 More details
  • Brown University
    Department of Philosophy
    Regular Faculty
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
  • All publications (69)
  •  494
    Process reliabilism and cartesian scepticism
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3): 567-581. 1996.
    Cartesian SkepticismReliabilismJustification
  •  161
    Meaning, Mind, and Knowledge
    Oxford University Press. 2014.
    This volume presents a selection of essays by the leading philosopher Christopher S. Hill. Together, they address central philosophical issues related to four key concerns: the nature of truth; the relation between experiences and brain states; the relation between experiences and representational states; and problems concerning knowledge
    Self-KnowledgeMind-Brain Identity TheoryRepresentationalismConceivability, Imagination, and Possibil…Read more
    Self-KnowledgeMind-Brain Identity TheoryRepresentationalismConceivability, Imagination, and PossibilityQualia and MaterialismBeliefReliabilism
  •  238
    Introspective awareness of sensations
    Topoi 7 (1): 11-24. 1988.
    My goal is to formulate a theory of introspection that can be integrated with a strongly reductionist account of sensations that I have defended elsewhere. In pursuit of this goal, I offer a skeletal explanation of the metaphysical nature of introspection and I attempt to resolve several of the main questions about the epistemological status of introspective beliefs
    Knowledge of ConsciousnessIntrospection and IntrospectionismValue TheoryTheories of Free WillTopics …Read more
    Knowledge of ConsciousnessIntrospection and IntrospectionismValue TheoryTheories of Free WillTopics in Free Will, Misc
  •  216
    The perception of size and shape
    with David J. Bennett
    Philosophical Issues 18 (1): 294-315. 2008.
    No Abstract
    Spatial Experience
  •  91
    Consciousness
    Cambridge University Press. 2009.
    This book presents a comprehensive theory of consciousness. The initial chapter distinguishes six main forms of consciousness and sketches an account of each one. Later chapters focus on phenomenal consciousness, consciousness of, and introspective consciousness. In discussing phenomenal consciousness, Hill develops the representational theory of mind in new directions, arguing that all awareness involves representations, even awareness of qualitative states like pain. He then uses this view to …Read more
    This book presents a comprehensive theory of consciousness. The initial chapter distinguishes six main forms of consciousness and sketches an account of each one. Later chapters focus on phenomenal consciousness, consciousness of, and introspective consciousness. In discussing phenomenal consciousness, Hill develops the representational theory of mind in new directions, arguing that all awareness involves representations, even awareness of qualitative states like pain. He then uses this view to undercut dualistic accounts of qualitative states. Other topics include visual awareness, visual appearances, emotional qualia, and meta-cognitive processing. This important work will interest a wide readership of students and scholars in philosophy of mind and cognitive science.
    Philosophy of ConsciousnessPhilosophy of Consciousness, General Works
  •  109
    Review of Zenon W. Pylyshyn, Things and Places: How the Mind Connects with the World (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (7). 2008.
    VisionThe Objects of Perception
  • Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study
    Bradford Book/Mit Press. 2005.
    Philosophy of Consciousness
  •  172
    In defense of type materialism
    Synthese 59 (3): 295-320. 1984.
    Psychophysical Reduction, MiscKripke's Modal Argument Against MaterialismQualia and MaterialismMulti…Read more
    Psychophysical Reduction, MiscKripke's Modal Argument Against MaterialismQualia and MaterialismMultiple RealizabilityMind-Brain Identity TheoryReduction in Cognitive Science
  •  102
    Can Carey answer Quine?
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (3): 132-133. 2011.
    In order to defend her claim that the concept object is biologically determined, Carey must answer Quine's gavagai argument, which purports to show that mastery of any concept with determinate reference presupposes a substantial repertoire of logical concepts. I maintain that the gavagai argument withstands the experimental data that Carey provides, but that it yields to an a priori argument
    Philosophy of Cognitive SciencePhilosophy of Psychology
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