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Christopher Hill

Brown University
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  •  Publications
    69
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 More details
  • Brown University
    Department of Philosophy
    Regular Faculty
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
  • All publications (69)
  •  84
    How to study introspection
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (1): 21-43. 2011.
    In this paper I celebrate the virtues of Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel's path-breaking book on introspection, but I also exp-ress dissatisfaction with a few of its recurring themes. The main body of the paper consists of seven theses about the way in which the study of introspection should be conducted. Thus, to a large extent, the paper is a methodological proposal, though it also makes a number of concrete claims about the nature of introspection, and about the epistemological status of its delive…Read more
    In this paper I celebrate the virtues of Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel's path-breaking book on introspection, but I also exp-ress dissatisfaction with a few of its recurring themes. The main body of the paper consists of seven theses about the way in which the study of introspection should be conducted. Thus, to a large extent, the paper is a methodological proposal, though it also makes a number of concrete claims about the nature of introspection, and about the epistemological status of its deliverances. The methodology I endorse is quite different than the one that Hurlburt advocates, but even so, it is compatible with assigning a large role to Descriptive Experience Sampling. Equally, while I am no fan of Schwitzgebel's radical scepti-cism about introspection, he and I are of like mind on a number of spe-cific epistemological issues, and we share the sense that it would be useful to draw on other areas of cognitive science in extending Descriptive Experience Sampling and refining it
    Philosophy of Cognitive ScienceIntrospection and Introspectionism
  •  104
    Anti‐individualism: Mind and language, knowledge and justification
    Philosophical Books 50 (2): 112-123. 2009.
    Externalism and Self-Knowledge, Misc
  •  35
    Ow! The Paradox of Pain
    In Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study, Bradford Book/mit Press. 2005.
    The Concept of Pain
  •  149
    Remarks on David Papineau’s Thinking About Consciousness (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1). 2005.
    Thinking about Consciousness is a wonderfully clear and vigorous commen- tary on the nature of consciousness and its relationship to brain processes. It advances the contemporary discussion of a number of important issues, but it also introduces several quite valuable ideas that are independent of the con- temporary literature. Papineau has performed an important service by writing it.
    Consciousness and MaterialismPhenomenal Concepts
  • Perceptual consciousness: How it opens directly onto the world, preferring the world to itself
    In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness, Mit Press. pp. 249--272. 2006.
    Self-Representational Theories of ConsciousnessAspects of Consciousness
  •  144
    Intentionality downsized
    Philosophical Issues 20 (1): 144-169. 2010.
    Intentionality
  •  126
    Cybernetics and the Philosophy of Mind
    Philosophical Review 87 (3): 494. 1978.
    Cybernetics
  •  237
    Why cartesian intuitions are compatible with the identity thesis
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (December): 254-65. 1981.
    Kripke's Modal Argument Against Materialism
  •  904
    There Are Fewer Things in Reality Than Are Dreamt of in Chalmers’s Philosophy (review)
    with Brian P. Mclaughlin
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2): 445-454. 1999.
    Chalmers’s anti-materialist argument runs as follows
    Zombies and the Conceivability Argument
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