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14Précis of Thought and World: An Austere Portrayal of Truth, Reference, and Semantic CorrespondencePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1): 174-181. 2006.I thank the commentators for their extremely rich and stimulating discussions of Thought and World.1 Their commentaries show that a number of TW’s claims are in need of clarification and defense, and that some of its arguments contain substantial lacunae. I am very pleased to have these flaws called to my attention, and to have an opportunity to try to correct them. Also, I am grateful for the commentators’ endorsements. As is perhaps inevitable in a symposium of this kind, the commentaries cont…Read more
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6Subject, Thought, and Context by Philip Pettit and John McDowell, eds (review)Journal of Philosophy 87 (2): 106-112. 1990.
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21RevisionIn Albert Casullo & Joshua C. Thurow (eds.), The a Priori in Philosophy, Oxford University Press Uk. pp. 134. 2013.
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1Ouch! An essay on painIn Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology, John Benjamins. 2004.
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314Of bats, brains, and mindsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 38 (September): 100-106. 1977.
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Intentionality, folk psychology, and reductionIn Herbert R. Otto (ed.), Perspectives On Mind, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1987.
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27Consciousness and the Origins of Thought (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1): 273-276. 1999.
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91Sensations: A Defense of Type MaterialismCambridge University Press. 1991.This is a book about sensory states and their apparent characteristics. It confronts a whole series of metaphysical and epistemological questions and presents an argument for type materialism: the view that sensory states are identical with the neural states with which they are correlated. According to type materialism, sensations are only possessed by human beings and members of related biological species; silicon-based androids cannot have sensations. The author rebuts several other rival theo…Read more
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360Process reliabilism and cartesian scepticismPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3): 567-581. 1996.
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78Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind/BrainPhilosophical Review 97 (4): 573. 1988.
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The failings of functionalismIn Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism, Cambridge University Press. 1991.
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179Impossible Worlds and Metaphysical Explanation: Comments on Kment’s Modality and Explanatory ReasoningAnalysis 77 (1): 134-148. 2017.In this critical notice of Kment's _Modality and Explanatory Reasoning_, we focus on Kment’s arguments for impossible worlds and on a key part of his discussion of the interactions between modality and explanation – the analogy that he draws between scientific and metaphysical explanation.
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29Remarks on David Papineau’s Thinking About Consciousness (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1). 2005.Thinking about Consciousness is a wonderfully clear and vigorous commen- tary on the nature of consciousness and its relationship to brain processes. It advances the contemporary discussion of a number of important issues, but it also introduces several quite valuable ideas that are independent of the con- temporary literature. Papineau has performed an important service by writing it.
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104Précis of Consciousness (review)Philosophical Studies 161 (3): 483-487. 2012.Précis of Consciousness Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-5 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9813-3 Authors Christopher S. Hill, Department of Philosophy, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116
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167Introspective awareness of sensationsTopoi 7 (March): 11-24. 1988.My goal is to formulate a theory of introspection that can be integrated with a strongly reductionist account of sensations that I have defended elsewhere. In pursuit of this goal, I offer a skeletal explanation of the metaphysical nature of introspection and I attempt to resolve several of the main questions about the epistemological status of introspective beliefs
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1Unity of consciousness, other minds, and phenomenal spaceIn Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism, Cambridge University Press. 1991.
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83Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism (review)Philosophical Review 122 (3): 511-518. 2013.
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24Supervenience and MaterialismPhilosophical Review 107 (1): 115. 1998.Rowlands is concerned to explain and defend a doctrine about the relationship between mental states and physical states that he calls supervenience materialism. Very roughly speaking, this is the doctrine that it is the possession of physical properties by an object that makes for or determines the possession of mental properties by that object. In explaining this doctrine, Rowlands discusses various questions of interpretation, such as what should be meant by ‘determines’ and by ‘physical prope…Read more
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |