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102Can Carey answer Quine?Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (3): 132-133. 2011.In order to defend her claim that the concept object is biologically determined, Carey must answer Quine's gavagai argument, which purports to show that mastery of any concept with determinate reference presupposes a substantial repertoire of logical concepts. I maintain that the gavagai argument withstands the experimental data that Carey provides, but that it yields to an a priori argument
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171Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind/BrainPhilosophical Review 97 (4): 573. 1988.
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57Consciousness and the Origins of ThoughtPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1): 273-275. 1999.
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175Reply to Alex Byrne and Fred Dretske (review)Philosophical Studies 161 (3): 503-511. 2012.Reply to Alex Byrne and Fred Dretske Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-9 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9814-2 Authors Christopher S. Hill, Department of Philosophy, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116
Areas of Interest
| Philosophy of Mind |
| Philosophy of Cognitive Science |