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Christopher Hill

Brown University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    69
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 More details
  • Brown University
    Department of Philosophy
    Regular Faculty
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
  • All publications (69)
  •  172
    In defense of type materialism
    Synthese 59 (3): 295-320. 1984.
    Psychophysical Reduction, MiscKripke's Modal Argument Against MaterialismQualia and MaterialismMulti…Read more
    Psychophysical Reduction, MiscKripke's Modal Argument Against MaterialismQualia and MaterialismMultiple RealizabilityMind-Brain Identity TheoryReduction in Cognitive Science
  •  102
    Can Carey answer Quine?
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (3): 132-133. 2011.
    In order to defend her claim that the concept object is biologically determined, Carey must answer Quine's gavagai argument, which purports to show that mastery of any concept with determinate reference presupposes a substantial repertoire of logical concepts. I maintain that the gavagai argument withstands the experimental data that Carey provides, but that it yields to an a priori argument
    Philosophy of Cognitive SciencePhilosophy of Psychology
  •  183
    Tim Bayne on the Unity of Consciousness
    Analysis 74 (3): 499-509. 2014.
    The Unity of Consciousness
  •  146
    Quine
    Philosophical Review 120 (1): 117-124. 2011.
    W. V. O. Quine
  •  171
    Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind/Brain
    with Patricia Smith Churchland
    Philosophical Review 97 (4): 573. 1988.
    Neurophilosophy
  • Introspection and the skeptic
    In Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism, Cambridge University Press. 1991.
    Absent QualiaIntrospection and Introspectionism
  •  57
    Consciousness and the Origins of Thought
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1): 273-275. 1999.
    Philosophy of ConsciousnessIntentionality
  •  1
    Unity of consciousness, other minds, and phenomenal space
    In Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism, Cambridge University Press. 1991.
    The Unity of Consciousness
  •  175
    Reply to Alex Byrne and Fred Dretske (review)
    Philosophical Studies 161 (3): 503-511. 2012.
    Reply to Alex Byrne and Fred Dretske Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-9 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9814-2 Authors Christopher S. Hill, Department of Philosophy, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116
    Mental States and ProcessesPerception
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