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119Reply to Alex Byrne and Fred Dretske (review)Philosophical Studies 161 (3): 503-511. 2012.Reply to Alex Byrne and Fred Dretske Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-9 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9814-2 Authors Christopher S. Hill, Department of Philosophy, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116
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45ConsciousnessCambridge University Press. 2009.This book presents a comprehensive theory of consciousness. The initial chapter distinguishes six main forms of consciousness and sketches an account of each one. Later chapters focus on phenomenal consciousness, consciousness of, and introspective consciousness. In discussing phenomenal consciousness, Hill develops the representational theory of mind in new directions, arguing that all awareness involves representations, even awareness of qualitative states like pain. He then uses this view to …Read more
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119Perceptual RelativityPhilosophical Topics 44 (2): 179-200. 2016.Visual experience is shaped by a number of factors that are independent of the external objects that we perceive—factors like lighting, angle of view, and the sensitivities of photoreceptors in the retina. This paper seeks to catalog, analyze, and explain the fluctuations in visual phenomenology that are due to such factors.
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138Why cartesian intuitions are compatible with the identity thesisPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (December): 254-65. 1981.
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867Imaginability, conceivability, possibility and the mind-body problemPhilosophical Studies 87 (1): 61-85. 1997.
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107
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40Can Carey answer Quine?Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (3): 132-133. 2011.In order to defend her claim that the concept object is biologically determined, Carey must answer Quine's gavagai argument, which purports to show that mastery of any concept with determinate reference presupposes a substantial repertoire of logical concepts. I maintain that the gavagai argument withstands the experimental data that Carey provides, but that it yields to an a priori argument
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14Raw Feelings: A Philosophical Account of the Essence of ConsciousnessPhilosophical Books 37 (2): 127-130. 1996.
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16Locating qualia: do they reside in the brain or in the body and the world?In Simone Gozzano & Christopher S. Hill (eds.), New Perspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical, Cambridge University Press. pp. 127. 2012.
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56How to study introspectionJournal of Consciousness Studies 18 (1): 21-43. 2011.In this paper I celebrate the virtues of Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel's path-breaking book on introspection, but I also exp-ress dissatisfaction with a few of its recurring themes. The main body of the paper consists of seven theses about the way in which the study of introspection should be conducted. Thus, to a large extent, the paper is a methodological proposal, though it also makes a number of concrete claims about the nature of introspection, and about the epistemological status of its delive…Read more
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91Sensations: A Defense of Type MaterialismCambridge University Press. 1991.This is a book about sensory states and their apparent characteristics. It confronts a whole series of metaphysical and epistemological questions and presents an argument for type materialism: the view that sensory states are identical with the neural states with which they are correlated. According to type materialism, sensations are only possessed by human beings and members of related biological species; silicon-based androids cannot have sensations. The author rebuts several other rival theo…Read more
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27Consciousness and the Origins of Thought (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1): 273-276. 1999.
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360Process reliabilism and cartesian scepticismPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3): 567-581. 1996.
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78Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind/BrainPhilosophical Review 97 (4): 573. 1988.
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The failings of functionalismIn Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism, Cambridge University Press. 1991.
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29Remarks on David Papineau’s Thinking About Consciousness (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1). 2005.Thinking about Consciousness is a wonderfully clear and vigorous commen- tary on the nature of consciousness and its relationship to brain processes. It advances the contemporary discussion of a number of important issues, but it also introduces several quite valuable ideas that are independent of the con- temporary literature. Papineau has performed an important service by writing it.
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179Impossible Worlds and Metaphysical Explanation: Comments on Kment’s Modality and Explanatory ReasoningAnalysis 77 (1): 134-148. 2017.In this critical notice of Kment's _Modality and Explanatory Reasoning_, we focus on Kment’s arguments for impossible worlds and on a key part of his discussion of the interactions between modality and explanation – the analogy that he draws between scientific and metaphysical explanation.
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104Précis of Consciousness (review)Philosophical Studies 161 (3): 483-487. 2012.Précis of Consciousness Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-5 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9813-3 Authors Christopher S. Hill, Department of Philosophy, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116
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1Unity of consciousness, other minds, and phenomenal spaceIn Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism, Cambridge University Press. 1991.
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167Introspective awareness of sensationsTopoi 7 (March): 11-24. 1988.My goal is to formulate a theory of introspection that can be integrated with a strongly reductionist account of sensations that I have defended elsewhere. In pursuit of this goal, I offer a skeletal explanation of the metaphysical nature of introspection and I attempt to resolve several of the main questions about the epistemological status of introspective beliefs
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24Supervenience and MaterialismPhilosophical Review 107 (1): 115. 1998.Rowlands is concerned to explain and defend a doctrine about the relationship between mental states and physical states that he calls supervenience materialism. Very roughly speaking, this is the doctrine that it is the possession of physical properties by an object that makes for or determines the possession of mental properties by that object. In explaining this doctrine, Rowlands discusses various questions of interpretation, such as what should be meant by ‘determines’ and by ‘physical prope…Read more
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83Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism (review)Philosophical Review 122 (3): 511-518. 2013.
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |