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1Matters of Mind: Consciousness, Reason, and Nature (review)Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210): 123-126. 2003.
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46Précis of Thought and World: An Austere Portrayal of Truth, Reference, and Semantic CorrespondencePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (1): 174-181. 2006.I thank the commentators for their extremely rich and stimulating discussions of Thought and World.1 Their commentaries show that a number of TW’s claims are in need of clarification and defense, and that some of its arguments contain substantial lacunae. I am very pleased to have these flaws called to my attention, and to have an opportunity to try to correct them. Also, I am grateful for the commentators’ endorsements. As is perhaps inevitable in a symposium of this kind, the commentaries cont…Read more
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6Subject, Thought, and Context by Philip Pettit and John McDowell, eds (review)Journal of Philosophy 87 (2): 106-112. 1990.
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21RevisionIn Albert Casullo & Joshua C. Thurow (eds.), The a Priori in Philosophy, Oxford University Press. pp. 134. 2013.
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1Ouch! An essay on painIn Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology, John Benjamins. 2004.
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9Of bats, brains, and mindsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 38 (September): 100-106. 1977.
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Intentionality, folk psychology, and reductionIn Herbert R. Otto (ed.), Perspectives On Mind, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1987.
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10Department of Philosophy Brown University Providence, RI 02912
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49Review of Zenon W. Pylyshyn, Things and Places: How the Mind Connects with the World (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (7). 2008.
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31Anti‐individualism: Mind and language, knowledge and justificationPhilosophical Books 50 (2): 112-123. 2009.
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1Peacocke on semantic valuesAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (1). 1998.This Article does not have an abstract
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71Meaning, Mind, and KnowledgeOxford University Press. 2014.This volume presents a selection of essays by the leading philosopher Christopher S. Hill. Together, they address central philosophical issues related to four key concerns: the nature of truth; the relation between experiences and brain states; the relation between experiences and representational states; and problems concerning knowledge
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Introspection and the skepticIn Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism, Cambridge University Press. 1991.
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50Department of Philosophy Brown University Providence, RI 02915.
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29There Are Fewer Things in Reality Than Are Dreamt of in Chalmers’s Philosophy (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2): 445-454. 1999.Chalmers’s anti-materialist argument runs as follows
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44Qualitative characteristics, type materialism and the circularity of analytic functionalismBehavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1): 50-51. 1993.
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Perceptual consciousness: How it opens directly onto the world, preferring the world to itselfIn Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness, Mit Press. pp. 249--272. 2006.
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3Harman on self referential thoughtsPhilosophical Issues 16 (1): 346-357. 2006.I will be concerned in these pages with the views that Gilbert Harman puts forward in his immensely stimulating paper Self-Reflexive Thoughts.<sup>1</sup> Harman maintains that self referential thoughts are possible, and also that they are useful. I applaud both of these claims. An example of a self referential thought is the thought that every thought, including this present one, has a logical structure. I feel sure that this thought exists, for I have entertained it on a number of occasions. M…Read more
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35Ow! The Paradox of PainIn Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study, Bradford Book/mit Press. 2005.
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70ConsciousnessCambridge University Press. 2009.This book presents a comprehensive theory of consciousness. The initial chapter distinguishes six main forms of consciousness and sketches an account of each one. Later chapters focus on phenomenal consciousness, consciousness of, and introspective consciousness. In discussing phenomenal consciousness, Hill develops the representational theory of mind in new directions, arguing that all awareness involves representations, even awareness of qualitative states like pain. He then uses this view to …Read more
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10Reply to Alex Byrne and Fred Dretske (review)Philosophical Studies 161 (3): 503-511. 2012.Reply to Alex Byrne and Fred Dretske Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-9 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9814-2 Authors Christopher S. Hill, Department of Philosophy, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |